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I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the rush to seek federal
solutions to a host of perceived problems has been remarkably
widespread.1 Calls for federal action and resources have come from
quarters that, until recently, could be relied upon to champion state
autonomy and denounce federal intervention. 2 This shift in tactics has
given new life to claims that federalism itself is an empty concept and
that arguments based on federalism are only window dressing
designed to lend legitimacy to a desired substantive outcome.3
Regardless of whether one accepts this nihilist critique, it is clear that
we are witnessing another stage in the ebb and flow that have
characterized the interpretation and application of federalist
principles throughout American history.
Just as federalism creates an intrinsic tension between federal and
state power, 4 so too it engenders tensions among competing schools of
1. The federal response to the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, has
included not only measures uniquely within the federal government's control, such as
military and national security operations, but also, for example, a federal takeover of
security screening at airports, a federal bail-out of the airline industry, and a federallyfunded and federally-administered alternative to tort recovery for victims. See, e.g.,
Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001);
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat.
230 (2001); September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-42,
115 Stat. 237 (2001).
2. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Will the Court Reassert National Authority?, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 30, 2001, at A4.
3. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 903, 948 (1994) (stating that "claims of
federalism are often nothing more than strategies to advance substantive positions");
Jack M. Balkin, The Cloning Conundrum, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 2002, at A31
("Support for states' rights has often been opportunistic, driven by substantive
goals. ... ").
4. Daniel J.Elazar, Exploring Federalism 33 (1987) (stating that "federalism is
concerned simultaneously with the diffusion of political power in the name of liberty
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thought about the respective roles to be accorded to federal and state
government. The term "federalism" denotes multiple constituent
governments united within a single, viable government entity,5 but the
question of how to strike a balance between the two has been a site of
ongoing struggle in both the political and judicial arenas.6 As
Woodrow Wilson wrote,
The question of the relation of the States to the federal government
is the cardinal question of our constitutional system ....It cannot,
indeed, be settled by the opinion of any one generation, because it is
a question of growth, and every successive stage of our political and
economic development gives it a new aspect, makes it a new
question.7
Among the infinite variations on the theme of how to allocate
federal and state authority that have emerged over time,' it is possible
to identify at least three basic conceptions of federalism in general,
and of the proper scope of federal legislative authority in particular.
The first view seeks to uphold limitations on national power9 in order
to preserve a broad sphere of deference to the states. 10 In Supreme
Court adjudication of constitutional challenges to federal statutes, this
and its concentration on behalf of unity" and that therefore "[i]t is rather like wanting
to have one's cake and eat it too"); see also David L. Shapiro, Federalism: A Dialogue
137-39 (1995) (describing the tension within federalism between centripetal forces
tending toward centralization of power and centrifugal forces tending toward
decentralization).
5. See, e.g., Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View From the States 2
(3d ed. 1984) ("Federalism can be defined as the mode of political organization that
unites separate polities within an overarching political system by distributing power
among general and constituent governments in a manner designed to protect the
existence and authority of both." (emphasis omitted)).
6. See generally, e.g., John Kincaid, Foreword: The New Federalism Context of the
New JudicialFederalism,26 Rutgers L.J. 913 (1995).

7. Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States 173 (1908),
quoted in Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law 97 (3d ed. 1999).
8. For a useful overview of arguments for and against varying views of
federalism, see generally Shapiro, supra note 4.
9. There is considerable irony in the fact that the current majority of the
Supreme Court, as well as some others, treat this stance as synonymous with
"federalism," because the term "federalist" was used by those who supported
ratification of the new Constitution to convey support for a strong national
government. See generally The Federalist Papers (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); Akhil
Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1426 n.9 (1987). But

see Shapiro, supra note 4, at 10-11 (suggesting that the supporters of the Constitution
who identified themselves as "federalists" were stretching the meaning of the term);
Amar, supra, at 1426 n.9 (stating that the framers of the Constitution were arguably
guilty of rhetorical sleight of hand by using the term "federalist" to describe a system
with strong national elements).
10. Under this view, as applied by the Court, states' rights are not absolute. For
example, they do not extend to areas that the Court regards as subject to exclusive
federal control, such as the military and foreign affairs. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (holding that a state boycott of goods
from Burma was preempted by federal legislation).
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focus on states' rights attained particular prominence in a number of
late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century cases,1' and after a period
of eclipse, it has been revived by the Court's current majority. 2 On a
doctrinal level, this approach has been most closely identified with
laissez-faire economics and the denial of racial equality. 3 However,
this conception of federalism has also been invoked by those who
have sought to harness state legal authority, including state
constitutional law, in order to expand individual rights beyond the
limits of federal protections.14
The second view of federalism looks to the federal government as
the "guarantor of basic federal rights against state power."' 5
According to this perspective, a central function of Congress is to act
affirmatively to safeguard individual rights, especially in the face of
state inaction or resistance. 6 This vision of federalism gained
ascendancy during Reconstruction and again during the civil rights era
of the mid-twentieth century.17 Although this approach is primarily
associated with the post-Civil War amendments and congressional
enforcement of their terms, its implications extend to a broad reading
of Congress's powers under other constitutional provisions as well. s
There is a third, less commonly articulated vision of federalism that
11. See infra Part IV.A-B.
12. See generally infra Part IV.
13. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
14. See generally Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial
Process (1975); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1110-14
(1977) (describing the states' rights stance adopted by antislavery lawyers in reaction
to federal fugitive slave laws and the Supreme Court's rejection of this strategy in
Priggv. Pennsylvania,41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842) and Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21
How.) 506 (1859)). Compare Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1.999) (holding
that the Vermont Constitution requires the state to allow same-sex couples to obtain
the same benefits available under state law to married different-sex couples), with
Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1
U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C) (requiring the federal government and permitting
the states to deny recognition of same-sex marriage).
15. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972).
16. As used in this article, the definition of "individual rights" is necessarily
inexact but includes, at a minimum, the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
Depending on the eye of the beholder, the right of a slave to freedom can be seen as
violating the slaveholder's right to property; a woman's right to abortion can be seen
as impairing a fetus's right to life; and protecting the rights of victims of gendermotivated violence can be seen as detracting from the rights of perpetrators. For
purposes of this article, the phrase "individual rights" refers to measures that advance
the rights of at least some individuals, regardless of whether an argument can be made
that the same measure impairs the rights of others.
17. See generally Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection By Law:
Federal AntidiscriminationLegislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 Yale L.J. 441
(2000).
18. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation:Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and
Our Bifurcated Constitution, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1259 (2001) (arguing for a reading of the
Commerce Clause that encompasses Congress's power to protect equality under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
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is in significant respects a synthesis of the other two. This vision,
which I will call cooperative rights federalism, recognizes that under
some circumstances, states' rights and individual rights are
complementary rather than mutually exclusive, and federal legislative
action can therefore enhance both the rights of the states and the
rights of individuals. Federal legislation that follows a model of
cooperative rights federalism has the potential for expanding, rather
than constricting, the states' freedom of action while at the same time
securing individual rights. Federal intervention that empowers the
states as well as individuals can take many forms. Examples include
federal civil rights legislation enacted at the request of the states,
collaborative federal-state initiatives in support of individual rights,
federal measures that relieve the states of existing obstacles that
prevent them from protecting the rights of their own citizens to the
extent that they wish to do so, and federal enactments that begin or
continue a federal-state dialogue that contributes to the development
of new ways of envisioning and enforcing individual rights. 19
The civil rights provision of the federal Violence Against Women
Act of 199420 epitomized cooperative rights federalism.2"
The
provision, which created a federal civil rights remedy for violent
crimes motivated by gender, was carefully crafted to respect the
autonomy of the states and to comply with the constitutional limits on
Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause22 and Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.23 It was also a significant advance for
women's equality.24 Nevertheless, in United States v. Morrison,25 the
Supreme Court held that the Violence Against Women Act's civil
rights provision was unconstitutional.
The Morrison decision typified the Court's tendency to focus
exclusively on the "states' rights" version of federalism. The majority
opinion ignored completely the second and third visions of federalism
described above.
Furthermore, the Court's application of its
conception of federalism was deeply flawed. Although the Court
asserted that its decision was necessary to preserve federalism, its
claims that the civil rights provision would violate the principles of
federalism were unpersuasive, and the Morrison holding, which

19. See generally infra Part III.
20. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994) (codified in relevant part at 42
U.S.C. § 13981).
21. See infra Part III.A.
22. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power... To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes ... ").
23. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
24. See infra Part II.
25. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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professed to uphold those principles, actually disserved them.26
There has of course been extensive debate about which, if any, of
these three conceptions of federalism is most faithful to the
Constitution's text and history, most analytically persuasive, and most
conducive to effective governance.27 For purposes of the present
discussion, however, it is not necessary to resolve this debate. This
article assumes as a point of departure that all three have a valid
contribution to make, deserve consideration on their own terms, and
can shed light on each other. Moreover, the relative merits of the
three approaches may depend upon the context-for example, which
constitutional source of congressional authority is under discussion.2"
Additionally, to the extent that the third view of federalism described
above incorporates fundamental concerns of the other two, it is
particularly worthy of attention.
The civil rights remedy of the Violence Against Women Act was
one in a long line of federal legislative measures that the Rehnquist
Court has invalidated, in whole or in part, on federalism grounds
during the past decade.29 Morrison thus provides fertile ground for an
examination of the Court's current mode of federalism analysis.3" The
Morrison decision is particularly significant because the Court used it
as an opportunity to clarify and extend its application of federalism
principles to both the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Part II of this article provides a brief history of the Violence
Against Women Act's civil rights provision, including a description of
the evidence compiled by Congress in support of its finding that it had
authority to enact the civil rights remedy under both the Commerce

26. See generally infra Part IV.
27. There is also debate about what criteria should predominate when
interpreting the Constitution's federalism-related provisions. For a discussion of
formalist and functionalist methodology for deriving constitutional federalism
doctrine, see infra notes 240-45 and accompanying text.
28. See infra Parts IV.B, IV.D, V (describing the primacy of Congress's role in
protecting individual rights under the Fourteenth Amendment).
29. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v.
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Coll.
Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999);
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
30. Despite the recent political and popular clamor for expanded federal authority
in the aftermath of September 11, see supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text, there is
as yet no indication that the majority of the Court is willing to disavow its current
trend of interpreting federalism as a source of constraints on congressional power and
protection for state sovereignty. See Greenhouse, supra note 2; see also Fed. Mar.
Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864 (2002) (holding that sovereign
immunity prohibits Congress from authorizing the Federal Maritime Commission to
adjudicate a complaint by a private party against a state agency).
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Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. This part
discusses the significance of the civil rights provision and describes the
resistance it faced, both while it was pending in Congress and after it
was enacted.
Part III explores the many ways in which the civil rights provision
fulfilled federalism's positive potential. As this part describes, the
civil rights remedy was a model of cooperative rights federalism,
enhancing the rights of women at the same time that it met the states'
own request for help in overcoming obstacles that prevented them
from implementing an effective legal response to gender-motivated
violence. The Violence Against Women Act's civil rights provision
was part of an ongoing federal-state legislative dialogue, a process that
is one of federalism's greatest strengths. In addition, it significantly
advanced many of the values that federalism is commonly thought to
serve.
Part IV argues that the Violence Against Women Act's civil rights
provision was a valid exercise of Congress's powers under the
Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
After critiquing the Court's reasoning in United States v. Morrison,
this part examines the decision's detrimental implications for
federalism.
Finally, Part V proposes an alternative analysis that should have
been adopted by the Court in Morrison. If the Court felt the need to
supplement well-established constitutional tests under the Commerce
Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment with an
additional limiting factor to prevent Congress from assuming
unlimited power, it should have done so by focusing on the question
of whether the problem that Congress sought to address lay beyond
the capacity of the states to handle. In the case of the civil rights
provision, the fact that the states themselves were discriminating
against victims of gender-motivated violence, and the fact that a basic
right to gender equality is a fundamental characteristic of national
citizenship, demonstrated the need for federal intervention. Unlike
the Court's misguided reliance on a series of bright-line categorical
distinctions, this approach to limiting congressional power
accommodates both the states' interest in autonomy and individuals'
right to equality. Although it is too late for the Violence Against
Women Act's civil rights remedy, application of this standard in future
cases could help the Court avoid the mistakes that it made in
Morrison.
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BRIEF HISTORY OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT'S
CIVIL RIGHTS PROVISION

The Violence Against Women Act of 1994 ("VAWA")31 was the
nation's first attempt at a wide-ranging federal response to the
devastation caused by rape, domestic violence, and other forms of
violence against women.32 The statute contains dozens of provisions

attacking the problem of violence against women from a variety of
different angles, including criminal punishment, improvement of the
legal system, research and data collection, education and prevention,
and direct assistance to victims. Among other things, the legislation
makes it a federal crime to cross state lines in order to commit
domestic violence or to violate a protection order, requires states to
give full faith and credit to protection orders issued by other states,

reforms immigration law to protect battered immigrant women who
flee their abusers, and amends the Federal Rules of Evidence to
restrict admissibility of evidence of a victim's sexual history in civil as
well as criminal cases.33 The statute authorized $1.62 billion in federal
funds over the course of six years to support a host of programs,
including federal grants to increase the effectiveness of police,
prosecutors, judges, and victim services agencies in cases of violent
crime against women; federal funding for battered women's shelters
and a national toll-free domestic violence hotline; rape and domestic
violence education and prevention programs; and a national database
to improve local, state and federal law enforcement agencies' ability

to record and share information on domestic violence and stalking
offenses."
The most significant and most controversial aspect of VAWA was

the civil rights provision, which declared for the first time that gendermotivated violent crime is a violation of the victim's federal civil
31. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8, 16, 18, 20, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). The Violence Against Women Act was
originally enacted as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994). Subsequently, Congress amended,
reauthorized, and expanded some of its provisions in 1996 and 2000. Violence Against
Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1491 (2000); Pub. L. No. 104-201,
110 Stat. 2655 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2261A). The 1996 and 2000
amendments did not affect the civil rights provision. References to VAWA in this
article apply to the original legislation enacted in 1994. Apart from the civil rights
provision, which was struck down in Morrison, all the other provisions of the 1994
legislation remain in effect, as amended.
32. See Peter Edelman, The Role of Government in the Prevention of Violence, 35

Hous. L. Rev. 7, 8 n.5 (1998) (describing VAWA as "the first significant legislative
attempt by the federal government to deal with the problem of violence against
women even though such violence has been a part of our society since the founding of
the United States").
33. See generally Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994).
34. Id. For a more detailed description of the provisions of the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994, see Sally F. Goldfarb, "No Civilized System of Justice": The Fate

of the Violence Against Women Act, 102 W. Va. L. Rev. 499, 504-06 (2000).
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rights.35 The provision created a private, civil right of action against
any person, whether or not acting under color of state law, who
committed a "crime of violence motivated by gender. 3 6 Successful
plaintiffs in civil rights actions brought under VAWA could recover

compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief,
attorney's fees, and "such other relief as the court may deem
appropriate."37 By definition, the civil rights remedy was available
only in cases of violence where gender discrimination was present.38
35. The civil rights provision reads in relevant part as follows:
(b) Right to be free from crimes of violence All persons within the United
States shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by
gender ....
(c) Cause of action A person (including a person who acts under color of
any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State) who
commits a crime of violence motivated by gender and thus deprives another
of the right declared in subsection (b) of this section shall be liable to the
party injured, in an action for the recovery of compensatory and punitive
damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other relief as the court
may deem appropriate.
(d) Definitions For purposes of this section (1) the term "crime of violence motivated by gender" means a crime of
violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at
least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender; and
(2) the term "crime of violence" means (A) an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony against the person
or that would constitute a felony against property if the conduct presents a
serious risk of physical injury to another, and that would come within the
meaning of State or Federal offenses described in section 16 of title 18,
whether or not those acts have actually resulted in criminal charges,
prosecution, or conviction and whether or not those acts were committed in
the special maritime, territorial, or prison jurisdiction of the United States;
and
(B) includes an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony described
in subparagraph (A) but for the relationship between the person who takes
such action and the individual against whom such action is taken.
42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
36. "Crime of violence" was defined to include an act or series of acts that would
constitute a felony against a person, or a felony against property that presents a
serious risk of physical injury to a person. Id. § 13981(d)(2)(A). The definition of
"crime of violence" also included acts that would meet the foregoing definition but
for the relationship between the victim and the perpetrator. Id. § 13981(d)(2)(B).
The "crime of violence" definition operated without regard to whether the defendant
had been criminally charged, prosecuted, or convicted. Id. § 13981(e)(2). The phrase
"motivated by gender" was defined as an act "committed because of gender or on the
basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender."
Id. § 13981(d)(1). For a discussion of the application of these definitions in cases
decided under VAWA's civil rights provision, see, e.g., Julie Goldscheid, GenderMotivated Violence: Developing a Meaningful Paradigmfor Civil Rights Enforcement,
22 Harv. Women's L.J. 123 (1999); Victoria F. Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship,
and Equality Meet. The Violence Against Women Act's Civil Rights Remedy, 11 Wis.
Women's L.J. 1, 28-33 (1996).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1988, § 13981(c).
38. See id. § 13981(d)(1) ("[T]he term 'crime of violence motivated by gender'
means a crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and
due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender."); see also id. §
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In short, VAWA's civil rights provision provided an "antidiscrimination remedy for violently expressed gender prejudice."39
VAWA's enactment was the culmination of a lengthy examination
by Congress of the "national tragedy" inflicted by violence against
women."' Over the course of more than four years, Congress held
hearings, compiled evidence, and issued reports examining the impact
of rape, domestic violence, and related crimes on women and
society." Statistics assembled by Congress demonstrated that rape

and domestic violence were occurring at epidemic levels and that rates
of violent crimes against women were rising even while rates of many
other crimes were dropping.42 Congress received evidence that
domestic violence is a principal cause of injury and death to women,
and that rape exacts an enormous toll from its victims and disrupts the
lives of countless women who fear becoming victims.43 In addition,

Congress heard testimony that violence committed by men against
women is often an expression of gender discrimination and a way to
keep women "in their place."'

Throughout the extended period when it was under consideration in
Congress, VAWA's civil rights remedy received strong support from
many quarters, including a broad range of women's rights and civil
rights organizations, advocates for domestic violence and rape
survivors, and labor, religious, and community groups.45 State
attorneys general from the vast majority of the states and other state
and local law enforcement officials lobbied actively for its passage.4"

13981(e)(1) ("Nothing in this section entitles a person to a cause of action... for
random acts of violence unrelated to gender or for acts that cannot be demonstrated,
by a preponderance of the evidence, to be motivated by gender.").
39. S. Rep. No. 103-138, at 38 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Senate Report].
40. See S. Rep. No. 102-197, at 39 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Senate Report].
41. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628-35 (2000) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (citing legislative history).
42. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 101-545, at 30-36 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 Senate
Report].
43. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 631-34 (Souter, J., dissenting) (summarizing
evidence before Congress).
44. See Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives, 103d Cong. 3, 5, 7 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 House Hearing]
(statement of Sally Goldfarb); Violence Against Women: Victims of the System:
Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 102d Cong. 262 (1991) [hereinafter 1991
Senate Hearing] (statement of Leslie R. Wolfe). Crimes such as rape and domestic
violence are not committed exclusively by men against women. Accordingly, the
VAWA civil rights remedy applied to crimes of violence motivated by gender,
regardless of the sex of the victim and perpetrator. However, the overwhelming
majority of rape and domestic violence is committed by men against women. Patricia
Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Prevalence, Incidence, and
Consequences of Violence Against Women: Findings From the National Violence
Against Women Survey 2, 8 (1998). Because of the predominance of this pattern, this
article, like the legislative history of VAWA, focuses on male-against-female violence.
45. See Goldfarb, supra note 34, at 543.
46. See infra notes 172-87, 445-47 and accompanying text.
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The civil rights remedy also encountered resistance. Among its
most outspoken opponents were representatives of the federal and
state judiciaries, including Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Judicial
Conference of the United States, and the Conference of Chief
Justices.4 7 Their objections were largely framed in terms of

federalism.48 The judicial critics protested that the civil rights
provision would "federalize" areas of law reserved to the states,

particularly family law.49 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist,
VAWA's civil rights remedy would "involve the federal courts in a
whole host of domestic relations disputes."5 °
These arguments erroneously equated the civil rights claims created

by VAWA with domestic relations claims, and compounded the error
by supposing that domestic relations issues are alien to federal law.
VAWA established a civil rights remedy that was entirely
distinguishable from domestic relations actions available under state
law, beginning with the fact that VAWA redressed a different injury,
required different proof, and offered different relief. The civil rights
provision applied to cases of sex-discriminatory violence, without
regard to whether those cases arose within or outside the family. 2
Although articulated in terms of federalism, the judges' arguments
reflected a set of traditional assumptions that have long operated to
insulate violence against women from legal redress. As I have
described at greater length elsewhere, these assumptions include the
tendency to consider all legal matters involving women as domestic
relations matters, the belief that issues concerning the family belong
47. See generally Goldfarb, supra note 34, at 510-12; Sally F. Goldfarb, Violence
Against Women and the Persistence of Privacy, 61 Ohio St. L.J. 1, 51-54 (2000); Judith
Resnik, The Programmatic Judiciary: Lobbying, Judging, and Invalidating the
Violence Against Women Act, 74 S.Cal. L. Rev. 269 (2000). The judiciary was not
united in opposing the civil rights provision, however. The National Association of
Women Judges actively supported VAWA in its entirety. 1993 House Hearing,supra
note 44, at 30-32.
48. See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 36, at 16.
49. See, e.g., 1993 House Hearing, supra note 44, at 70, 75 (statement of the
Judicial Conference of the United States); id. at 80 (statement of the Conference of
Chief Justices). To a lesser extent, the judicial opposition also rested on claims that
the civil rights provision would contribute to the excessive federalization of criminal
law. See id. at 71, 73 (statement of the Judicial Conference of the United States); id. at
83 (statement of the Conference of Chief Justices). The criminal law objection, like
the family law objection, betrayed a misunderstanding of both the civil rights remedy
and the relationship between federal and state law. See infra Parts III.A, IV.D.
50. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice's 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal
Judiciary,The Third Branch, Jan. 1992, at 1, 3.
51. For further discussion of the differences between VAWA's civil rights
provision and state domestic relations law, see infra Parts III.A, IV.D.
52. In fact, close to half the VAWA civil rights cases resulting in reported
decisions arose in commercial or educational settings. Brief of Law Professors as
Amici Curiae at 12-14 & n.18, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos.
99-5, 99-29). United States v. Morrison arose from a gang rape at a university and
involved no family relationships. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598.
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exclusively in state court, and the idealization of family privacy and
legal nonintervention in the family. 3 All of these assumptions can be
traced to gender stereotypes that associate women with the private
sphere. 4
VAWA's chief congressional sponsor responded to the judges'
objections by pointing out the similarities between VAWA and other
federal civil rights laws and asserting that the bill fell "within well
established grounds for Federal jurisdiction."55 However, in a major
concession to the judiciary, the bill's sponsors ultimately agreed to
adopt amendments narrowing the civil rights provision substantially.56
The amendments included the addition of the animus requirement;
restrictions on the types of felonies covered; language stating that
federal courts hearing VAWA civil rights cases would not have
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims seeking establishment
of divorce, alimony, marital property, or child custody decrees; and a
prohibition on removal to federal court of any VAWA civil rights
action filed in state court.57 On the basis of these changes, the Judicial
Conference withdrew its opposition to the civil rights remedy."
VAWA then passed by an overwhelming bipartisan majority and was
signed into law. 9

When Congress enacted the civil rights provision, it explicitly based
its authority to do so on both the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment.6 " The extensive legislative record
Congress compiled thoroughly documented the factual and legal
foundation for its exercise of both of these constitutional powers.61
As the basis for its action under the Commerce Clause, Congress
found that gender-motivated violence has massive effects on interstate
commerce. Specifically, Congress found that
[c]rimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse

effect on interstate commerce, by deterring potential victims from
53. See generally Goldfarb, supra note 47.
54. See id.
55. Violence Against Women: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime & Criminal
Justice of the House of Reps. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 10 (1992)

[hereinafter 1992 House Hearing](statement of Senator Joseph Biden).
56. See 1993 Senate Report, supra note 39, at 40, 64 (stating that amendments
were the result of discussions with, inter alia, a representative of the Judicial
Conference).
57. See 1993 House Hearing,supra note 44, at 71.

58. Id. at 70-73. The Conference of Chief Justices continued to oppose the civil
rights measure. Id. at 74-77.
59. Nourse, supra note 36, at 34-36.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (1994).
61. On the legal basis for Congress's constitutional authority to enact the civil
rights provision, see 1993 House Hearing, supra note 44, at 42-50 (statement of Burt
Neuborne); id. at 51-68 (statement of Cass Sunstein); 1991 Senate Hearing,supra note
44, at 84-102, 126-30 (statement of Burt Neuborne); id. at 103-30 (statement of Cass
Sunstein).
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traveling interstate, from engaging in employment in interstate
business, and from transacting... business.., in interstate
commerce; crimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial
adverse effect on interstate commerce, by diminishing national
productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing the
supply of and the demand for interstate products .... 6 2

Statistics presented to Congress estimated that the social costs of
violence against women total as much as ten billion dollars per year.63
Witnesses before Congress testified to the losses suffered by interstate
64
businesses because of the impact of domestic violence on employees.
As the statistics compiled by Congress attest, rape and domestic
violence have a disastrous economic impact on women, impairing
their ability to participate in interstate commerce. As many as half of
all homeless women and children are fleeing domestic violence.65
Almost fifty percent of rape victims quit their jobs or are fired in the
aftermath of the crime.66 Fear of rape prevents women from taking
otherwise desirable jobs that are perceived as unsafe because of their
hours, location, or the need to use dangerous public transportation.6 7

Many abusive spouses or partners use violence to prevent women

from obtaining employment or education. 68 A battered woman who is

employed often suffers from increased absenteeism, decreased
productivity, physical and psychological injury, and the effects of the
abuser's on-the-job harassment, all of which jeopardize her ability to
62. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994) [hereinafter House Conference
Report]; see also 1993 Senate Report, supra note 39, at 54; 1991 Senate Report, supra
note 40, at 53 ("Gender-based crimes and the fear of gender-based crimes restricts
movement, reduces employment opportunities, increases health expenditures, and
reduces consumer spending, all of which affect interstate commerce and the national
economy.").
63. 1993 Senate Report, supra note 39, at 41.
64. See Hearing on Domestic Violence: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary

Comm., 103d Cong. 17-18 (1993) (statement of James Hardeman, describing the
economic impact of domestic violence on employers' "bottom line" due to tardiness,
poor job performance, increased medical claims, and interpersonal conflicts in the
workplace); Women and Violence: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 101st

Cong., pt. 1, 58 [hereinafter 1990 Senate Hearing] (statement of Helen R. Neuborne,
citing estimates that absenteeism due to domestic violence costs employers between
three and five billion dollars a year).
65. 1990 Senate Report, supra note 42, at 37 (citation omitted).
66. 1993 Senate Report, supra note 39, at 54 (citation omitted).
67. See 1993 House Hearing, supra note 44, at 40-41 (statement of Burt

Neuborne); 1993 Senate Report, supra note 39, at 54; 1991 Senate Report, supra note
40, at 38-39.
68. 1992 House Hearing, supra note 55, at 117 (statement of Marcella Maxwell,
stating that "women cannot work because of possessive/abusive spouses, or they are
limited to working in places where the spouse can maintain control or contact"); 1991
Senate Hearing, supra note 44, at 242 (statement of Elizabeth Athanasakos, citing
study showing that one-third of women surveyed said that abusive husbands had
prohibited them from working and one-quarter reported that abusive husbands had
prevented them from going to school).
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advance her career or even keep her job.69 Thus, violence is a tool for
maintaining women's economic inferiority to, and dependency on,
men. As the Senate Judiciary Committee concluded, "[g]ender-based
violence bars its most likely targets-women-from
full
[participation] in the national economy."7'
With regard to its legislative authority under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress assembled a "voluminous
congressional record" revealing "pervasive bias in various state justice
systems against victims of gender-motivated violence."'" Congress
found that the states' discrimination against women took several
forms.
Some states blocked women's access to the courts by
continuing to enforce legal doctrines such as spousal tort immunity,
which bars one spouse from suing the other, and marital rape
exemptions, which eliminate or restrict criminal penalties in cases of
husbands who rape their wives.72 These doctrines originated in, and
are reflective of, an era when women were expressly denied legal
equality.73 States also erected barriers to justice for women by singling
out domestic violence and rape cases for the imposition of
burdensome procedural and evidentiary rules.74 Finally, police,
prosecutors, and judges routinely regarded crimes against women as
less serious than comparable crimes against men and treated female
victims with suspicion and disdain.
Much of the information on
states' discriminatory treatment of female victims of violent crime
69. 1991 Senate Hearing, supra note 44, at 242-43 (statement of Elizabeth
Athanasakos, citing studies indicating that approximately one-quarter to one-half of
women interviewed reported losing a job at least in part because of abuse); 1990
Senate Hearing,supra note 64, at 68-69 (statement of Helen R. Neuborne, describing
ways in which domestic violence causes women's absenteeism, reduced work
performance, and difficulty in securing and maintaining employment); 1990 Senate
Report, supra note 42, at 33 (stating that the costs of violent crime against women
include "lost careers"); id. at 37 (stating that domestic violence "takes its toll in
employee absenteeism and sick time").
70. 1993 Senate Report, supra note 39, at 54; see 1991 Senate Report, supra note
40, at 53.
71. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619-20 (2000).
72. 1993 Senate Report, supra note 39, at 42; 1991 Senate Report, supra note 40,
at 45, 54. Six states still bar intentional tort suits between spouses. See 6 Family Law
& Practice 67A-1 to 67A-5 (Arnold H. Rutkin ed., 2001). The majority of states
retain a partial exemption from criminal charges for husbands who rape their wives;
their statutes typically impose lighter sentences for sexual offenses within marriage,
create special procedural requirements for marital rape prosecutions, or consider
certain acts to be sexual offenses only if they take place outside of marriage. See Jill
Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 Cal. L. Rev.
1373 (2000).
73. See generally Hasday, supra note 72; Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife
Beating as Prerogativeand Privacy, 105 Yale L.J. 2117 (1996).
74. 1993 Senate Report, supra note 39, at 44-47; 1991 Senate Report, supra note
40, at 44-46.
75. See 1993 Senate Report, supra note 39, at 41-42, 49; H.R. Rep. No. 103-395, at
27-28 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 House Report]; 1991 Senate Report, supra note 40, at
34, 43-48.
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came from studies commissioned by the highest courts of the states to
examine gender bias in the state courts. 6 These reports provided
"overwhelming evidence that gender bias permeates the court system
and that women are most often its victims."77 In summarizing its
findings, Congress concluded that
existing bias and discrimination in the criminal justice system often
deprives victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender of equal
protection of the laws and the redress to which they are entitled;...
and the victims of crimes motivated by gender have a right to equal
protection of the laws, including a system of justice that is unaffected
by bias or discrimination and that, at every relevant stage, treats
such crimes as seriously as other violent crimes. 8
Congress found that the discriminatory treatment of women by the
state justice systems was rooted in centuries-old patterns of sex
discrimination and adherence to invidious stereotypes about women;
these are the same attitudes that contribute to the epidemic of
violence against women.79 Thus, the discrimination practiced by state
actors mirrored and compounded the discrimination committed by
individual perpetrators of gender-motivated violence."0
Many
witnesses spoke of victims' experiences of being "revictimized" by
their discriminatory treatment within the state legal system."s In
passing the civil rights provision of VAWA, Congress sought to
confront this phenomenon of mutually reinforcing private and public
discrimination by providing a remedy that would simultaneously
attack the bias inherent in gender-motivated violence and the bias
inherent in the state justice systems.8 2
76. See 1993 Senate Report, supra note 39, at 44-47, 49; 1993 House Report, supra
note 75, at 27-28; 1991 Senate Report, supra note 40, at 34, 43-47.
77. 1993 Senate Report, supra note 39, at 49 (quoting Lynn Hecht Schafran,
Overwhelming Evidence: Reports on Gender Bias in the Courts, Trial, Feb. 1990, at

28).
78. House Conference Report, supra note 62, at 385-86.
79. 1993 Senate Report, supra note 39, at 38 (describing "archaic prejudices"
against women by "the public and those within the justice system"); 1991 Senate
Report, supra note 40, at 33-34 (describing lingering "prejudices" and "stereotypes"
against female victims of rape and domestic violence); id. at 46 (stating that "law
reform has failed to eradicate the stereotypes that drive the system" to treat female
victims disadvantageously); 1990 Senate Report, supra note 42, at 34 (describing
"negative attitudes" that lead those in the state criminal justice system to blame and
devalue victims of rape and domestic violence, and stating that these attitudes "may
reflect more general societal attitudes" that condone violence against women).
80. See 1993 House Hearing, supra note 44, at 67 (statement of Cass Sunstein,
describing the "clear[]" involvement of the state justice system in private acts of
gender-motivated violence).
81. See, e.g., 1991 Senate Hearing, supra note 44, at 148-49 (statement of Gill

Freeman); 1990 Senate Report, supra note 42, at 33-34.
82. See 1993 Senate Report, supra note 39, at 38 ("[T]he act is intended to educate
the public and those within the justice system against the archaic prejudices that
blame women for the beatings and the rapes they suffer .. "); id. at 55 ("[F]irst, it
attacks gender-motivated crimes that threaten women's equal protection of the laws;

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

Despite the gender discrimination that marred the states' handling
of rape and domestic violence cases, there was one sense in which the
law of some states was ahead of federal law with regard to gendermotivated violence.
When VAWA was under consideration,
Congress noted that a handful of states had adopted criminal or civil
remedies for bias crimes committed because of gender.83 These state
statutes recognized that violent crime motivated by gender bias is a
form of discrimination, an insight not fully reflected in federal law at
the time.84 The state laws had a number of deficiencies, however.
First, although the majority of states had adopted an anti-bias crime
law, only a small number covered gender bias.85 Second, some of the
statutes covering gender bias provided only criminal remedies.86
Although criminal law has an important role to play in combating
violence against women, civil remedies for gender-motivated violence
are critically important because they allow the plaintiff to control the
litigation, provide an opportunity for recovery of monetary damages,
and are subject to the preponderance of the evidence standard rather
than the more demanding standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.87 Additionally, some of the state civil statutes presented
procedural and substantive obstacles that made them ill-suited to
cases arising from rape and domestic violence.88 As a result, the state
civil statutes were rarely used in cases of gender-motivated violence.89
Nevertheless, the state laws provided a useful, real-world model for
the concept that gender-based acts of violence could be identified as
an illegal denial of equality.
At the time VAWA was introduced, federal law lacked a generally
applicable prohibition against gender-motivated violence, although
federal civil rights legislation had prohibited many other types of
discriminatory violence for 120 years.90 The two principal federal
statutes that address the issue of bias crimes omit gender-motivated
crimes from their coverage. 9' Other federal civil rights laws fail to
second, it provides a remedy to fill the gaps and rectify the biases of existing State
laws."). For a discussion of ways in which the VAWA civil rights remedy would
redress and prevent discriminatory state action, see infra Part IV.B.
83. 1993 Senate Report, supra note 39, at 48 & n.47.
84. See infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
85. 1993 Senate Report, supra note 39, at 48 & n.47.
86. Id.; see also 1993 House Hearing,supra note 44, at 15 n.17 (statement of Sally
Goldfarb, indicating that only eight states and the District of Columbia provided civil
remedies for gender-motivated violence).
87. For discussion of the advantages of civil over criminal remedies for gendermotivated violence, see Goldfarb, supra note 34, at 539-40.
88. See, e.g., Andrea Brenneke, Civil Rights Remedies for Battered Women:
Axiomatic & Ignored, 11 Law & Ineq. 1, 39-43 (1992) (describing the Massachusetts
Civil Rights Act).
89. Id. at 36, 112-13.
90. See 1993 Senate Report, supra note 39, at 51.
91. See 18 U.S.C. § 245 (2000); Hate Crimes Statistics Act, 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1994).
Efforts to include gender in these statutes have been unsuccessful. See Goldscheid,
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provide a remedy in most cases of violence motivated by gender. For
example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 forbid certain types of sexdiscriminatory violence in the workplace and educational institutions
respectively, but they do not apply to violence that occurs in other
settings. 92 Forty-two U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for
discrimination committed under color of state law, and 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3) prohibits conspiracies to deprive someone of a federally
protected right, but neither statute extends to most cases of rape and
domestic violence, which involve individual, private defendants.
By enacting VAWA's civil rights remedy, Congress sought to close
a gap in federal antidiscrimination law by treating violence motivated
by gender bias as seriously as violence motivated by racial or religious
prejudice. 93 Congress modeled the language of the new civil rights
remedy on previous federal civil rights legislation. 4 The congressional
committee reports pointed to existing federal civil rights laws as
sources of guidance on how to interpret and apply the new
legislation. 95
The passage of VAWA's civil rights provision represented a major
expansion of legal protection for women's right to equality. The civil
rights provision proclaimed that violence motivated by gender is not
merely an assault on an individual; it is part of a social pattern of
discrimination by members of one group against members of
another.96 This formulation is consistent with the feminist hypothesis
that male violence against women is one of the main ways in which
gender inequality is expressed and maintained. 97 Witnesses before
Congress emphasized that women's disproportionate vulnerability to
gender-motivated violence results in a form of second-class
citizenship. 98 By declaring that such violence is a denial of the victim's
supra note 36, at 124, 131; W.H. Hallock, The Violence Against Women Act. Civil
Rights For Sexual Assault Victims, 68 Ind. L.J. 577, 604 (1993). At the same time that
it passed VAWA, Congress passed the Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act,
which provides for increased sentences in cases of federal crimes committed because
of bias, including gender bias. Pub. L. No. 103-322 § 280,003, 108 Stat. 2096 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 994 note (1994)).
92. See Education Amendments of 1972, tit. IX, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88; Civil Rights
Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.
93. See 1993 Senate Report, supra note 39, at 38, 49.
94. The phrase "because of gender or on the basis of gender" in 42 U.S.C. §
13981(d)(1) was derived from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 1993
Senate Report, supra note 39, at 52-53. The term "animus" was based on Supreme
Court case law interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S.
88, 102 (1971).
95. 1993 Senate Report, supra note 39, at 52-54, 64; 1991 Senate Report, supra
note 40, at 50-51.

96. See 1993 Senate Report, supra note 39, at 51.
97. See generally Goldfarb, supra note 47, at 14-18.
98. See, e.g., 1990 Senate Hearing, supra note 64, at 57 (statement of Helen R.
Neuborne).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

federal civil rights, the new legislation went far toward guaranteeing
women equal status under the law.99
On a more concrete level, the new civil rights remedy provided
victims with a cause of action that was frequently a desirable
substitute for or complement to existing legal alternatives. Plaintiffs
in civil suits brought under VAWA could sidestep the restrictions of
state laws establishing tort immunities, marital rape exemptions, and
short statutes of limitations. 10 The option of filing in federal court
afforded access to a potentially superior forum. 1°1 VAWA differed
from Title VII by offering unlimited damages awards, a far longer
statute of limitations, and no requirement of exhaustion of
administrative remedies; moreover, for acts of violence in workplaces
employing fewer than fifteen people, a plaintiff could sue under
VAWA but not under Title VII.1°2 Unlike most state tort claims,
VAWA provided access to court-ordered attorney's fees'013 and
redress for the discriminatory aspect of gender-motivated violence." 4
By providing a civil remedy, VAWA was in many ways more
advantageous to plaintiffs than a criminal statute.' 5
In the years following VAWA's enactment in 1994, plaintiffs
invoked the new civil rights remedy in cases alleging various types of
gender-motivated violence, including rape and sexual assault, sexual
harassment in the workplace, domestic violence, and murder. 16 In
99. See 1993 Senate Report, supra note 39, at 44 (stating that the civil rights
provision "sends a powerful message that violence due to gender bias affronts an ideal
of equality shared by the entire Nation"); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male
Sovereignty: On United States v. Morrison, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 135, 138 (2000) ("[T]he
Violence Against Women Act [civil rights provision] took an historic stand and
hopeful step toward free and safe lives for women as equal citizens of this nation.").
100. The statute of limitations for VAWA civil rights claims was four years. See 28
U.S.C. § 1658 (1994); Julie Goldscheid & Susan Kraham, The Civil Rights Remedy of
the Violence Against Women Act, 29 Clearinghouse Rev. 505, 523-24 (1995).
101. Plaintiffs could choose-whether to file a VAWA claim in federal or state court.
42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(3),(4) (1994). For a description of the potential advantages of
bringing a VAWA suit in federal court, see Goldfarb, supra note 34, at 539; see also
Goldscheid & Kraham, supra note 100, at 521 (discussing strategic considerations in
choosing whether to file a VAWA claim in federal or state court).
102. See 3 Merrick T. Rossein, Employment Discrimination Law and Litigation §
35.3 (1998).
103. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994).
104. See 1993 Senate Report, supra note 39, at 50-51.
105. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th
Cir. 1999) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)
(alleging gang rape by fellow students in university dormitory); Santiago v. Alonso, 96
F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.P.R. 2000) (alleging rape, domestic violence, and attempted
homicide, as described in Santiago v. Alonso, No. 97-2737 (DRD), 1999 WL 688137
(D.P.R. Aug. 27, 1999)); Burgess v. Cahall, 88 F. Supp. 2d 319 (D. Del. 2000) (alleging
sexual assault by employment supervisor); Williams v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, No.
98-2485-JTM, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13532 (D. Kan. Aug. 24, 1999) (alleging rape by
police officer); Kuhn v. Kuhn, No. 98-C2395, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11010 (N.D. Ill.
July 14, 1999) (alleging physical and sexual violence by husband); Bergeron v.
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several decisions on a motion to dismiss or motion for summary
judgment, the courts found that the plaintiff had made a sufficient

showing of gender motivation by alleging factors such as the
defendant's use of derogatory epithets, the absence of provocation,
the fact that the crime alleged was a sexual assault, and the use of
violence to perpetuate women's stereotypically submissive role. °7
Almost as soon as plaintiffs began filing claims under VAWA,
defendants raised the argument that the legislation was
unconstitutional. Challenging Congress's declaration that it had
authority to enact the civil rights provision under both the Commerce
Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, defendants

asserted that a civil rights remedy for gender-motivated violence
exceeded Congress's constitutionally enumerated powers.

Of the

approximately two dozen cases in which state and lower federal courts
decided this issue, all but three upheld the statute's constitutionality. 18
Bergeron, 48 F. Supp. 2d 628 (M.D. La. 1999) (alleging battery, assault, and
attempted rape by husband); Wright v. Wright, No. Civ. 98-572-A (W.D. Okla. Apr.
27, 1999) (alleging physical violence by defendant against wife and daughter); Ericson
v. Syracuse Univ., 45 F. Supp. 2d 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (alleging sexual harassment by
university tennis coach, as described in Ericson v. Syracuse Univ., No. 98 Civ. 3435
(JSR), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 691 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1999)); Culberson v. Doan, 65 F.
Supp. 2d 701 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (alleging that defendant beat and murdered girlfriend);
Doe v. Mercer, 37 F. Supp. 2d 64 (D. Mass.) (alleging gang rape), vacated and
remanded on other grounds sub nom. Doe v. Walker, 193 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 1999); Liu
v. Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D.R.I. 1999) (alleging sexual harassment and rape by
university advisor); Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. Wash. 1998) (alleging
assault, threats, and harassment by husband); Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, No. 981550-Civ-Highsmith (S.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 1998) (alleging sexual harassment and sexual
assault by employment supervisor); C.R.K. v. Martin, No. 96-1431-MLB, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22305 (D. Kan. July 10, 1998) (alleging rape and threats of physical
violence by fellow student at plaintiff's high school); Timm v. DeLong, 59 F. Supp. 2d
944 (D. Neb. 1998) (alleging physical and sexual assault by husband); Mattison v.
Click Corp. of Am., No. 97-CV-2736, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 720 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27,
1998) (alleging sexual assault, battery, and harassment by employer); Crisonino v.
N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 985 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (alleging nonsexual, gendermotivated assault by employment supervisor); Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531
(N.D. Il. 1997) (alleging assault, harassment, and rape by employer); Seaton v.
Seaton, 971 F. Supp. 1188 (E.D. Tenn. 1997) (alleging physical and sexual abuse by
husband); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (alleging sexual abuse by
priest), rev'd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 134 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir.
1998); Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996) (alleging physical and mental
abuse by husband).
107. See, e.g., Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000); Jugmohan v.
Zola, No. 98 Civ. 1509, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1910 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2000); Kuhn,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11010; Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d 601; Crisonino,985 F. Supp. 385;
see also Julie Goldscheid & Risa E. Kaufman, Seeking Redress for Gender-BasedBias
Crimes: Charting New Ground in FamiliarLegal Territory, 6 Mich. J. Race & L. 265
(2001) (analyzing how courts have defined gender motivation); cf Harris v. FranklinWilliamson Human Servs., Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 892 (S.D. Ill. 2000) (granting
defendants' motion for summary judgment in the absence of allegations showing
gender motivation).
108. Of the cases listed in note 106, all but Brzonkala, Santiago, and Bergeron held
that the civil rights remedy was constitutional. See also Fisher v. Grimes, No. 98 CVD
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The

first

case

to

hold

VAWA's

civil

rights

provision

unconstitutional was Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
State University."9 In this case, plaintiff Christy Brzonkala alleged
that soon after she arrived at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University (Virginia Tech) as an eighteen-year-old freshman, she was
gang-raped in a university dormitory by two students whom she had
just met, Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, both of whom were
members of the school's nationally ranked football team. 110 After the
two men took turns forcing her onto a bed and raping her, Morrison

warned her, "You better not have any fucking diseases.""' Later, he
announced publicly, "I like to get girls drunk and fuck the shit out of
them.""'2

Brzonkala was severely traumatized by the attack and became

depressed, suicidal, and unable to continue attending her classes." 3
She filed a complaint against Morrison and Crawford under Virginia
Tech's sexual assault policy."' Although a university judicial
committee found Morrison guilty of sexual assault and ordered him
suspended for two semesters, the university convened a rehearing and

eventually overturned Morrison's punishment, allowing him to
continue his education, remain on the football team, and retain his full16
athletic scholarship." 5 Humiliated and fearing for her safety,"

Brzonkala withdrew from the university and filed suit in federal
district court. Her complaint claimed, inter alia, that Morrison and

Crawford had violated her civil rights under VAWA." l7
865 (N.C. Dist. Ct. July 22, 1999); Young v. Johnson, No. CV 97-90014 (Ariz. Sup. Ct.
May 13, 1999) (written record of oral proceedings). For analysis of VAWA civil
rights cases decided prior to United States v. Morrison, see, for example, Goldfarb,
supra note 47, at 57-85.
109. Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va.
1996), rev'd, 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997), vacated & reh'g en banc granted (Feb. 5,
1998), affd en banc, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), affid sub nom. United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
110. Because the case was decided on a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations in
plaintiff's complaint should be taken as true. Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 783.
111. Id. at 782.
112. Id. Both the trial court and the Fourth Circuit en banc found that this
statement helped demonstrate the gender-based "animus" required to state a claim
under VAWA's civil rights remedy. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 830; Brzonkala, 935 F.
Supp. at 785.
113. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint at 8, Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. &
State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (No. 95-1358-R) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint].
114. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 603. Brzonkala initially did not pursue criminal
remedies against her attackers because she had not preserved any physical evidence
of the rapes and assumed that prosecution would be impossible. Brzonkala, 132 F.3d
at 954. Later, she attempted to press criminal charges, but the grand jury refused to
indict. See MacKinnon, supra note 99, at 140.
115. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, supra note 113, at 15-18.
116. Id. at 10.
117. Id. at 2-3. Her complaint also raised claims under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 and state tort and contract law. These claims were not before
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The trial court held that Brzonkala had stated a valid claim under
VAWA's civil rights provision, but granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss on the ground that the civil rights provision fell outside the
powers conferred on Congress by the Commerce Clause and Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment." 8 A divided panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed on the
constitutional issue, finding that Congress had constitutional authority
to enact the civil rights remedy under the Commerce Clause.119 After
voting to vacate the panel's decision and rehear the case en banc, the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court over a vigorous dissenting
opinion.12 Finally, the case reached the Supreme Court under the
name United States v. Morrison.2 ' The Court, by a vote of five to
four, affirmed the decision of the Fourth Circuit en banc and
invalidated the civil rights remedy as unconstitutional.' 22
The decision in Morrison hinged on the Court's adoption of an
extremely narrow reading of both the Commerce Clause and Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court claimed that its
interpretations of the Constitution were dictated by the need to
preserve the distinction between state and federal government and
that the civil rights provision was antithetical to federalism. As Part
IV of this article will describe, the Court's constitutional federalism
analysis was unconvincing, and a contrary holding would have better
advanced the goal of upholding the principles of federalism that the
Court purported to serve. To set the stage for an examination of
Morrison's constitutional analysis, the next part considers the extent
to which VAWA's civil rights remedy was consistent with the positive
the Supreme Court in United States v. Morrison and are beyond the scope of this
article.
118. Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. 779.
119. Brzonkala, 132 F.3d 949. Judge Motz wrote the opinion for the panel, which
Judge Hall joined. Judge Luttig wrote a dissenting opinion.
120. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d 820. The court of appeals en banc reached its decision by
a vote of seven to four. Judge Luttig, who had dissented from the decision of the
three-judge panel, wrote the opinion for the court of appeals en banc, which was
joined by six other judges. Chief Judge Wilkinson and Judge Niemeyer wrote
concurrences. Judge Motz, who had written the opinion for the panel, dissented and
was joined by three other judges.
121. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). The case was known at the trial and intermediate
appellate levels as Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.
Virginia Tech was no longer a party when the case reached the Supreme Court,
because the Title IX claim was not before the Court. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 605
n.2. Beginning at the trial level, the United States intervened in the case to defend
the constitutionality of the statute. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 783. After the
decision of the court of appeals en banc, both the United States and Brzonkala filed
petitions for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. The Court granted both
petitions. See 527 U.S. 1068 (1999). The Court decided the two cases of United States
v. Morrison and Brzonkala v. Morrison together. Because the United States' petition
was docketed first, the name of the United States appears first in the caption.
Therefore, the Supreme Court decision bears the name United States v. Morrison.
122. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598. See generally infra Part IV.
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attributes of federalism.
III. THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT AND FEDERALISM

In their constitutional challenges to the civil rights provision of the
Violence Against Women Act, litigants typically argued that the new
federal remedy would destroy the appropriate balance of federal and
state power by granting excessive control to Congress at the expense
of the states.'23 This argument was reminiscent of the objections
raised by the judiciary while VAWA was pending in Congress. 24
Most of the lower court decisions addressing the issue rejected this
argument.'
However, in Morrison, the federalism-based attack on
the civil rights provision was successful in the federal district court, the
court of appeals en banc, and the Supreme Court. The trial court, in
its opinion dismissing Christy Brzonkala's VAWA claim on the
ground that Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact the civil
rights provision, stated that upholding the civil rights provision
"would have the practical result of excessively extending Congress's
power and of inappropriately tipping the balance [of power] away
from the states."' 26 According to the Fourth Circuit en banc, the civil
rights remedy "simply cannot be reconciled with the principles of
limited federal government upon which this Nation is founded."' 27
Finally, the Supreme Court held that VAWA's civil rights provision
must be struck down to avoid "obliterat[ing] the distinction between
what is national and what
is local and creat[ing] a completely
28
centralized government.'
In fact, as the following discussion will show, the civil rights
provision was carefully devised to create a limited federal role while
preserving an appropriate sphere of state autonomy. Far from
undermining the federal-state balance, VAWA's civil rights remedy
was a model of cooperative rights federalism. The civil rights
provision actually empowered the states in significant respects at the
same time that it empowered women. The interaction between
VAWA's civil rights remedy and state law exemplified federal-state
legislative dialogue, which is one of federalism's greatest strengths.
Also, VAWA's civil rights provision was supportive of many of the
129
values that federalism is commonly assumed to serve.
123. See, e.g., Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d 601, 614 (E.D. Wash. 1998); Doe v.
Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 615-16 (D. Conn. 1996).
124. See supra Part II.
125. See, e.g., Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 614; Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 616. See generally
supra note 108.
126. Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 792.
127. Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 826 (4th Cir.
1999).
128. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000) (quoting United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556-57 (1995)); id. at 608 n.3, 616 n.6; see id. at 615, 620.
129. Of course, the civil rights provision's relationship to the values served by
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A. VA WA's Civil Rights Provision as a Model of Cooperative Rights
Federalism

In its broadest sense, the term "cooperative federalism" applies to
any "partnership between the States and the Federal Government,
animated by a shared objective." 3 ' Cooperative federalism, in the
sense of overlapping federal and state functions in the service of
common goals, is a familiar feature of American government.'31 The
Supreme Court has held that while Congress may not compel the
states or their officials to carry out a federal regulatory program,'3 2
Congress is permitted to give states a choice between "regulating...
according to federal standards or having state law preempted by
federal regulation."' 33 Congress may also use its conditional spending
power to attract state participation in federal programs.' During the
twentieth century, federal statutes created an extensive network of
cooperative federalism ventures, including programs characterized by
various combinations of federal and state funding and federal and
state responsibility for implementation.'3 5 Some commentators have
called for expanding the principles of cooperative federalism to new
frontiers. 36
federalism would be irrelevant if it fell outside the scope of Congress's
constitutionally enumerated powers. Part IV will critique the majority's constitutional
analysis in United States v. Morrison and argue that the civil rights remedy was
authorized by both the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
130. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (quoting Arkansas v.
Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992) (describing the Clean Water Act)).
131. See, e.g., Thomas R. Dye, American Federalism 7 (1990); Richard P. Nathan,
The Role of the States in American Federalism in The State of the States 15,16 (Carl E.
Van Horn ed., 1989).
132. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997); New York, 505 U.S.
at 188.
133. New York, 505 U.S. at 173-74 (citing FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 76465 (1982) (upholding challenged provisions of the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies
Act); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)
(upholding the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act)).
134. See, e.g., New York, 505 U.S. at 167.
135. See, e.g., George Rutherglen, Employment Discrimination: Visions of
Equality in Theory and Doctrine 229 (2001) (discussing the role of state agencies in
the enforcement of Title VII); Stephen D. Sugarman, Welfare Reform and the
Cooperative Federalism of America's Public Income Transfer Programs,14 Yale L. &
Pol'y Rev. 123 (1996) (describing federal and state roles in public assistance
programs); Philip J.Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative
Federalism, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 663, 669-70 (2001) (discussing cooperative elements of
New Deal programs and environmental statutes such as the Clean Air Act); see also
New York, 505 U.S. at 167-68 (citing statutes); Hodel, 452 U.S. at 289 n.30 (citing
statutes).
136. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional
Interpretation, 2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 61 (proposing a cooperative process among the
Supreme Court, Congress, and the states to interpret the Constitution); Michael C.
Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 Colum.
L. Rev. 267 (1998) (urging the establishment of a system of "democratic
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The Violence Against Women Act represents a unique form of
cooperative federalism that can best be described as cooperative

rights federalism. Unlike the more common forms of cooperative
federalism, such as those that require state compliance with federal
standards or provide federal funding for state-administered programs,
the VAWA civil rights remedy was a federal effort to serve the joint

federal and state interest in advancing individual rights, without
impairing the rights of the states.
VAWA's civil rights provision entailed federal-state cooperation on
a number of levels. As noted above, VAWA as a whole was a broadranging statute designed to respond in numerous ways to the national
epidemic of rape, domestic violence, and other forms of violence
against women. 3 7 This epidemic, and the difficulty of combating it,
were a source of profound concern to the states as well as to the
federal government.'3 8 Taken in its entirety, VAWA created a series

of coordinated measures in which the federal and state governments
worked in concert, with both playing indispensable roles. Many
sections of VAWA were aimed at strengthening the ability of the
states to provide their own civil and criminal legal remedies for

violence against women.'39
Others created joint federal-state
collaborations.14
Still others addressed the distinctively federal

aspects of a multifaceted problem that had both federal and state

dimensions. 4 '
The civil rights remedy was integrated with and complementary to
VAWA's other provisions.142 The civil rights remedy enhanced the
rest of the statute by condemning gender-motivated violence in the
uniquely powerful terms of a federal civil rights guarantee. 43 This
experimentalism" to encourage the development and dissemination of local solutions
to the question of how best to implement nationally-defined rights and objectives);
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State
Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 813 (1998)
(suggesting that the federal government should use voluntary intergovernmental
agreements to purchase state and local governments' assistance in implementing
federal policy).
137. See supra Part II.
138. See infra notes 172-87 and accompanying text (discussing state support for

VAWA).

139. Examples include federal funding to state law enforcement agencies and the
requirement that states grant full faith and credit to protection orders issued in other
states. See 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (2000); 42 U.S.C. §§ 3769gg, 13991-14002 (1994).
140. Examples include the provision establishing a joint federal, state, and local
database on domestic violence and stalking offenses. See Violence Against Women
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, subtitle F, 108 Stat. at 1950-53.
141. Examples include the provisions amending federal immigration law. See
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, subtitle G, 108
Stat. at 1953-55.
142. See 1991 Senate Report, supra note 40, at 34 (stating that the federal civil
rights remedy and federal funding to states are "different complementary strategies").
143. See 1993 Senate Report, supra note 39, at 50 (stating that the civil rights
remedy "provid[es] a special societal judgment that crimes motivated by gender bias
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message had the potential to reinforce the educational and deterrent
effects of other sections of the bill.144 VAWA's civil rights remedy

also had the potential to change attitudes among state actors and spur
them to1 45 improve the states' legal response to violence against
women.
The civil rights remedy left the laws of the states intact. 46 Contrary

to the assertions of some judges,4 the civil rights remedy did not
usurp the role of the states in regulating family law, torts, or criminal
law.1 48 Rather, it established a parallel, alternative remedy for a
different injury. The wrong for which VAWA provided redress was
the discrimination inherent in gender-motivated violence,'149 as distinct
from the interests that are remedied by traditional domestic relations,
personal injury, or criminal proceedings under state law.1 50

The civil rights provision of VAWA created an antidiscrimination
claim of a type that is commonly found in federal law. Federal civil
rights statutes often provide a cause of action for conduct that also
contravenes state law.' 5'

Whereas claims under conventional state

are unacceptable because they violate the victims' civil rights").
144. See supra Part II.
145. For further discussion of ways in which the civil rights provision would assist
the states in combating violence against women, see infra Parts III.B-C, IV.B.
146. Of course, Congress is permitted to displace or preempt state laws when acting
within its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va.
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 290-92 (1981). Congress may do
the same when enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U.S. 445, 455 (1976). Although the civil rights provision was a legitimate exercise of
both of these powers, Congress structured the remedy so as to minimize interference
with state law. See infra Part IV; see also infra notes 168-90 and accompanying text
(arguing that even if VAWA's civil rights remedy altered the legal climates in the
states, it did so in ways that enhanced rather than eroded state autonomy).
147. See, e.g., 1993 House Hearing, supra note 44, at 77-84 (statement of
Conference of Chief Justices).
148. See, e.g., 1993 House Hearing, supra note 44, at 31 (statement of National
Association of Women Judges, endorsing VAWA and stating that the civil rights
remedy would play a "complementary role" with respect to state criminal, personal
injury, and domestic relations law).
149. See supra notes 36, 38 (defining "crime of violence motivated by gender").
150. See Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d 601, 612 (E.D. Wash. 1998) ("A civil
rights remedy [such as VAWA] is recognized as distinct from that of a criminal
conviction or a civil remedy for a tort. Criminal convictions vindicate the state
interest in protecting its citizens while a civil tort addresses personal injury. A civil
rights claim by contrast addresses equality, a victim's interest in equal treatment."
(citations omitted)); Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 616 (D. Conn. 1996) ("VAWA
does not encroach on traditional areas of state law; it complements them by
recognizing... a civil right to be free from gender-based violence ... ."); 1993 Senate
Report, supra note 39, at 50-51 (distinguishing VAWA's civil rights remedy from state
tort and criminal law).
151. See 1991 Senate Hearing, supra note 44, at 87, 93-94 (statement of Burt
Neuborne); 1991 Senate Report, supra note 40, at 49. For example, a raciallymotivated lynching that violates the Ku Klux Klan Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), would
presumably also constitute a murder under state criminal law and wrongful death
under state tort law.
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tort, domestic relations, and criminal laws focus on the harm done to
an individual,152 federal civil rights relief recognizes that

discrimination targets an individual because of her membership in a
disfavored group and therefore constitutes "an assault on a commonly
shared ideal of equality."' 53 By vindicating interests different than
those protected by the states' legal response, VAWA's civil rights
remedy served to supplement, not supplant, the law of the states.'

In addition to leaving criminal and civil remedies under state law
unchanged, VAWA's civil rights provision deferred in other
significant respects to state law. The definition of "crime of violence"
was based in part on the definition of a felony under applicable state
law.'55 A conviction or guilty plea in a state criminal proceeding
would presumably have a preclusive effect on a subsequent VAWA

civil rights claim. 156 To minimize the possibility of interference with
state domestic relations proceedings, the statute expressly stated that
federal courts hearing VAWA cases would not have supplemental
jurisdiction over state law claims seeking establishment of a divorce,
alimony, marital property, or child custody decree.157
Because VAWA's civil rights remedy did not preempt, prohibit, or

require any action by the states, it interfered with state autonomy
significantly less than other federal statutes that the Court has
recently struck down in the name of federalism. The civil rights
provision did not "commandeer" the resources of the states by
compelling them to "enact or administer a federal regulatory
program.' 5 8 It did not authorize lawsuits against the states.'5 9 It was
152. As noted earlier, only a small number of states had civil or criminal remedies
for gender-discriminatory violence when VAWA was enacted. See supra notes 83-89
and accompanying text. Congress found that state criminal laws "do not adequately
protect against the bias element of crimes of violence motivated by gender." House
Conference Report, supra note 62, at 385.
153. 1993 Senate Report, supra note 39, at 51; see also 1991 Senate Report, supra
note 40, at 49.
154. See Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 930 (4th
Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Motz, J., dissenting); see also Tr. of Oral Argument, United
States v. Morrison, Nos. 99-5, 99-29, 2000 WL 41232, at *45-46, 52 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2000)
(including Justice Ginsburg's questions referring to VAWA's civil rights remedy as an
"alternate remedy in an alternate forum"; an "auxiliary action" that "complement[s]
what the States do"; and an example of "harmonious," "parallel State and Federal
regulation").
155. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(2). However, the civil rights remedy diverged from state
law by allowing a federal cause of action under circumstances where state civil or
criminal relief would be barred by the spousal immunity doctrine or marital rape
exemption. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c); id. § 13981(d)(2)(B). See generally infra notes
161-90 and accompanying text (discussing effects of the civil rights remedy in states
with spousal immunity and marital rape doctrines).
156. Goldscheid & Kraham, supra note 100, at 526.
157. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(4). This limitation on supplemental jurisdiction was
adopted in response to concerns expressed by the federal and state judicial
organizations. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
158. Cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925-33 (1997) (finding background
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qualitatively less intrusive than the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the
federal criminal statute invalidated in United States v. Lopez, which
"effect[ed] a change in the sensitive relation between federal and state
criminal jurisdiction" by creating potential conflicts between federal
and state investigatory and prosecutorial authority. 6 '
It might be argued that even though VAWA's civil rights remedy
nominally left state law intact, it nevertheless altered the overall legal
environment in the states) 61 For example, consider a hypothetical
state that strictly enforces a doctrine of interspousal immunity in its
tort law and a complete marital rape exemption in its criminal law. As
a result, acts of marital rape within the state are immune from legal
penalties. The advent of VAWA meant that while the state laws
remained unchanged, a man who committed marital rape in this state
would now be subject to a federal civil rights action; 162 such acts would
no longer be devoid of legal consequences. Thus, it could be said that
VAWA's civil rights remedy displaced state policy choices indirectly,
even if it did not do so directly. 6 3
There are several answers to this argument. First, it is well

established that Congress may act within its enumerated powers to
create causes of action that are enforceable in each state without

running afoul of federalism principles."6 Indeed, because virtually
any federal statute creates a new legal environment in the states by
adding to the corpus of applicable law on a given subject, treating
every such statute as an impermissible "displacement" of state law
would reduce Congress's power almost to the vanishing point.

In

particular, forbidding federal statutes that touch even indirectly on
check provisions of the Brady Act unconstitutional); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 174-77, 188 (1992) (finding the take title provision of the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act unconstitutional).
159. Cf., e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706 (1999); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expenses Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). Ironically, the
Morrison decision implied that a federal cause of action against the states would be
preferable to the cause of action against private parties provided by VAWA. See infra
Part IV.C.
160. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
161. See Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 840-42 (4th
Cir. 1999) (en banc).
162. In order to overcome discrimination in the state legal systems that denied
women equal protection of the laws, VAWA granted a federal cause of action under
circumstances where a state's spousal immunity or marital rape exemption would bar
civil or criminal relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(2)(B); 1993 Senate Report, supra
note 39, at 55; see also supra Part II (describing equal protection violations by the
states); infra Part IV.B (same).
163. See, e.g., Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 840-42.
164. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178-79 (1992). For an
explanation of why VAWA's civil rights provision was within Congress's
constitutionally enumerated powers, see infra Part IV.
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areas covered by state law would effectively prevent enactment of any
federal civil rights legislation."' Civil rights legislation is precisely
designed to achieve a uniform level of minimum legal guarantees,
applicable throughout the country despite variations in state law. 6
Even outside the civil rights area, the Court has approvingly applied
the label "cooperative federalism" to a federal legislative scheme that
allowed the states to enact and administer their own laws, within
limits imposed by federal minimum standards. 6 7 VAWA's civil rights
provision went even further in the direction of deference to the states,
by allowing them an entirely free hand to choose their own civil and
criminal laws regarding gender-motivated violence, subject only to the
presence of a parallel federal civil rights remedy.
Most importantly, it is a mistake to assume that federal legislative
action that alters the status quo in the states is necessarily an
infringement on state prerogatives.' 68 The Court has consistently
assumed, in Morrison and other recent cases, that the allocation of
power between the federal and state governments is a zero-sum
game.'69 But as the VAWA civil rights remedy illustrates, exercises of
federal legislative authority can enhance, rather than impair, the
authority of the states.17 VAWA's civil rights remedy met the states'
self-defined needs and assisted 171them in overcoming preexisting
constraints on their policy choices.
VAWA's civil rights provision enjoyed enormous state support.
The National Association of Attorneys General unanimously adopted
165. See 1991 Senate Hearing, supra note 44, at 87, 93-94 (statement of Burt

Neuborne); 1991 Senate Report, supra note 40, at 49 ("Each and every one of the
existing civil rights laws covers an area in which some aspects are also covered by
State laws.").
166. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of
State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 535, 548

(1986) ("As is well known, federal preservation of civil liberties is a minimum, which
the states may surpass so long as there is no clash with federal law."); see also infra
Parts III.C.2, V.

167. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 289
(1981) (describing the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act).

168. See generally David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51
Duke L.J. 377 (2001).
169. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).

170. See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 587-88 (1937) (describing the
joint federal-state unemployment tax scheme created by the federal Social Security
Act as "not [a] constraint, but the creation of a larger freedom [for the states]" by
relieving them from competitive pressures that had prevented them from establishing
systems of unemployment insurance); Barron, supra note 168; Peter M. Shane,
Federalism's "Old Deal": What's Right and Wrong With Conservative Judicial
Activism, 45 Vill. L. Rev. 201, 242-43 (2000).

171. The background constraints on the states' policy choices took several forms,
some of which are discussed in this subpart at notes 178-84 and accompanying text.
For discussion of another form of background constraint that could be alleviated by
VAWA's civil rights remedy, see infra Part III.C.3 (describing collective action
problems arising from interstate competition).
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a resolution endorsing VAWA, including the civil rights remedy.172
Forty-one attorneys general signed a letter to Congress urging the
enactment of VAWA in general and the civil rights provision in
particular. 73 Later, thirty-six states and Puerto Rico joined an amicus
curiae brief to the Supreme Court defending the statute's
constitutionality; 17 4 only one state, Alabama, filed a brief on the other
side.'75 The process that led to VAWA's adoption was characterized
by an unusually high degree of collaboration and interchange between
representatives of the state and federal governments.'76 A number of

state and local law enforcement officials testified before Congress in
favor of the civil rights remedy.177
State officials acknowledged that they were not handling cases of
violence against women effectively and pleaded for federal help. 7 ' By
172. 1991 Senate Hearing, supra note 44, at 27, 30 (statement of Bonnie J.
Campbell, Attorney General, State of Iowa); id. at 37-38 (National Association of
Attorneys General resolution).
173. 1993 House Hearing, supra note 44, at 34-36. The attorneys general signing
the letter represented thirty-eight states, the District of Columbia, Guam, and the
Virgin Islands. Although one might question whether attorneys general speak for
their states, their active support for the civil rights remedy is highly significant from
the point of view of assessing the legislation's effect on federalism. "It is difficult to
imagine a group of officials who would be more concerned about the preservation of
traditional areas of state control than the state officials charged with the enforcement
of those areas." Cass Sunstein et al., The Constitutionality of the Violence Against
Women Act, in Violence Against Women: Law and Litigation 6-30 n.5 (David Frazee
et al. eds., 1998). A desire for federal funds cannot explain the position taken by the
attorneys general, because they specifically endorsed VAWA's civil rights provision,
which carried no funding whatsoever. Nor can their endorsement be seen as a
strategic move to hasten passage of the bill as a whole; the civil rights measure was the
most controversial portion of VAWA and slowed the bill's progress through Congress
substantially. See, e.g., 1992 House Hearing, supra note 55, at 7-12 (statement of
Senator Joseph Biden, describing the controversy over and opposition to the civil
rights provision).
174. Brief of Amici Curiae State of Arizona et al., United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29) [hereinafter Brief of Arizona]. The states' brief
specifically addressed and rejected the argument that the civil rights remedy infringed
on state autonomy. See, e.g., id. at 21 ("Because the remedy.., complements state
and local efforts to combat violence against women without in any way compromising
those efforts, it does not undermine federalism by intruding in an area of traditional
state concern." (citation omitted)).
175. Brief of Amicus Curiae State of Alabama, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.

598 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29).
176. Even the Conference of Chief Justices, which opposed the legislation, sought
and obtained several important amendments that reflected the priorities of the state
judiciary. See supra Part II.
177. See, e.g., 1991 Senate Hearing,supra note 44, at 24-36 (Statement of Bonnie J.
Campbell, Attorney General, State of Iowa); id. at 71-84 (statement of Roland W.
Burris, Attorney General, State of Illinois); 1990 Senate Hearing,supra note 64, at 104
(statement of Roni Young, Director, Domestic Violence Unit, Office of the State's
Attorney for Baltimore City, Maryland).
178. See, e.g., 1993 House Hearing, supra note 44, at 35 ("Our experiences as
Attorneys General strengthen our belief that the problem of violence against women
is a national one, requiring federal attention, federal leadership, and federal funds.");
Brief of Arizona, supra note 174, at 20 (stating that "States' longstanding efforts to
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their own account, state officials seeking to combat violence against
women in the absence of VAWA were operating under numerous
pressures that constrained their freedom of action. State and local
governments were straining to bear "the tremendous burdens caused
'
by gender-based violence."179
Gender-motivated violence caused the
states to incur substantial costs for welfare and government-subsidized
health care."s The states also suffered economic losses due to the
impact of gender-motivated violence on state employees and on the
demand for homeless shelters, domestic violence shelters, law
enforcement, and court services."' All of these costs siphoned money
from the states' coffers that might otherwise have been available to
fund more innovative, effective approaches to preventing gendermotivated violence.182
Meanwhile, the attitudes of state and local police, prosecutors,
judges, and court personnel, like the attitudes of the public, were
shaped by deeply ingrained sex-discriminatory stereotypes that caused
them to blame the victims of rape and domestic violence and condone
and trivialize crimes against women. 183 These attitudes were so
entrenched that even in states that had dramatically reformed their
rape and domestic violence statutes, enforcement remained
profoundly inadequate. 84 Thus, in the absence of VAWA, states
seeking to bring about genuine improvements in their response to
gender-motivated violence were largely stymied.
According to state officials, VAWA's civil rights remedy had the
potential to relieve these background constraints significantly. Access
to the federal civil rights remedy would provide victims with an
alternative to overburdened state courts. 85 The educational impact of
address pervasive gender-based violence... have thus far fallen far short" and urging
the Court to uphold the civil rights remedy).
179. 1993 House Hearing, supra note 44, at 34 (including a letter from forty-one
attorneys general).
180. Brief of Arizona, supra note 174, at 10-12. Notably, these financial outlays by
the states were required as a result of federal laws that antedated VAWA; therefore,
even before VAWA was enacted, federal law was not neutral with respect to
regulating the states' response to violence against women. Barron, supra note 168, at
425.
181. Brief of Arizona, supra note 174, at 8, 12.
182. See, e.g., 1991 Senate Hearing, supra note 44, at 138 (statement of Gill
Freedman, indicating that the state of Florida could provide only enough funding to
train fifty teachers per year in the entire state on how to incorporate prevention of
sexual violence into sex education courses).
183. Brief of Arizona, supra note 174, at 17-20; see also supra Part II.
184. Brief of Arizona, supra note 174, at 15-20; see also 1991 Senate Report, supra
note 40, at 39 ("Despite States' most fervent efforts at legislative reform, these
stereotypes persist and continue to distort the criminal justice system's response to
violence against women.").
185. See 1993 House Hearing,supra note 44, at 34-35 (reprinting a letter from fortyone attorneys general); see also id. at 31 (statement of National Association of
Women Judges, describing the civil rights remedy as a "complement" to "the ever
increasing work load of state courts").
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a declaration that gender-motivated violence is a federal civil rights
violation would help change the attitudes and behavior of potential
offenders as well as of workers in the state justice system.186 If these
attitudinal and behavioral changes led to fewer offenses and better
enforcement, the resulting savings to the states would permit them to
budget more money for the programs that they would prefer to
implement. Additionally, by reducing the volume of cases clogging
state courts, institutions, and agencies, the civil rights remedy could
create enough "breathing room" to free the states to contemplate new
policy approaches, including the possible adoption of state civil rights
legislation.87
In sum, the presence of the federal civil rights remedy constrained
the states' regulatory choices far less than the absence of it. The states
are not free to alter the constitutional limits on congressional power to
suit their purposes;"' the fact that a federal statute meets the needs of
the states does not make it constitutional. However, in the case of a
statute like VAWA's civil rights provision that falls within the
boundaries of Congress's enumerated powers, 8 9 extensive state
support belies the argument that Congress has violated the precepts of
federalism by infringing on the states' prerogatives. Congress enacted
VAWA at the request of representatives of the states to help the
states overcome obstacles to achieving their own goals. In the words
of Justice Breyer's dissent in Morrison, VAWA's civil rights provision
was "an instance, not of state/federal conflict, but of state/federal
efforts to cooperate in order to help solve a mutually acknowledged
national problem."1 9°
B. VA WA's Civil Rights Provision and State-FederalLegislative
Dialogue
Over the course of American history, the task of protecting
individual rights has fallen to both the state and federal
governments. 9 1 In fact, as discussed below, new definitions of
individual rights have often arisen from a process of interaction
between state and federal law. The Supreme Court's simplistic view
that states must be allowed to regulate gender-motivated violence (or
186. See Brief of Arizona, supra note 174, at 21; 1991 Senate Hearing,supra note

44, at 34 (statement of Bonnie J. Campbell); 1990 Senate Hearing,supra note 64, at 86
(statement of Roni Young); see also infra Part IV.B.

187. See Brief of Arizona, supra note 174, at 21-22. On the role of the federal civil

rights remedy as a model for similar state legislation and vice versa, see infra Part

III.B.
188. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992).
189. See generally infra Part IV.
190. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 662 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
191. See G.Alan Tarr and Ellis Katz, Introduction, in Federalism and Rights ix, xiixiv (Ellis Katz & G. Alan Tarr eds. 1996)[hereinafter Federalism and Rights]; see also
supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
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not regulate it) as they see fit'92 does an injustice not only to women,

but to federalism. Under the federalist system, the states cannot
handle civil rights issues alone, nor are they expected to.'93 Yet the
federal government cannot do the job alone, either. 9 4 It is both
necessary in practice, and desirable in principle, for federal and state
law each to play a role in articulating and enforcing civil rights.
The essence of federalism is redundancy. With fifty state

governments acting simultaneously to address many of the same
concerns, duplication among their legal and policy efforts is inevitable.
Moreover, despite important limitations placed on each level of
government by the United States Constitution, vast areas of overlap
between federal and state power remain. 9 5 Redundancy among the

states, and between the state and federal governments, is not only
unavoidable; it is also advantageous for a number of reasons.
First, a redundant system contains built-in security against the
failure of a single element. Redundancy in the organs of the body, or
in the safety features of cars and airplanes, avoids catastrophes that
would otherwise occur when one part malfunctions.'96 As the Framers
recognized, the same principle applies to governments.'97 Features
like the veto, judicial review, and, above all, separate federal and state

governments with overlapping mandates help avert disaster when one
political actor or entity sets out on a destructive course.'98 Similarly,
allowing one level of government to fill the gaps left by another's
inaction provides a necessary corrective for failures that take the form
of omission rather than commission. Although duplication of effort is

192. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627.
193. See, e.g., infra Part III.C.4, 5.
194. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, CategoricalFederalism: Jurisdiction,Gender, and the
Globe, 111 Yale L.J. 619, 625 (2001) ("The collapse of both the first and the second
Reconstructions illustrates that, without popular support at all levels, moments of
national affiliation to widening norms of equality are fleeting.").
195. See generally id.
196. See Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest,
Ideology, and Innovation, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 639, 649 (1981); Martin Landau,
Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap, 29 Pub.
Admin. Rev. 346 (1969).
197. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people
is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to
each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security
arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other,
at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.").
198. Cover, supra note 196; Landau, supra note 196. Redundancy provides an
effective buffer against failure only if the redundant elements are sufficiently separate
from each other. Otherwise, the failure of one may automatically cause the failure of
the others. Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism:
Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 Yale L.J. 1035, 1042 (1977). The Framers' design,
with its system of checks and balances, separation of powers, and especially
federalism, maintains the necessary separation among redundant elements.
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commonly assumed to be inefficient,199 the improved efficiency of a
perfectly nonredundant
system is more than offset by the increased
200
likelihood of error.
Second, the proliferation of government entities characteristic of a
federal system multiplies opportunities for innovation. The federal
government provides a separate setting for experimentation,
in
21
addition to those provided by the states and localities.
Third, and most important for the present discussion, redundancy
among the states and between the state and federal governments
creates room for dialogue and interchange that would not exist within
a single governmental entity. Fifty states provide far more than fifty
times the capacity for legal and policy development that a single state
would provide; through a complex process of emulation and feedback,
the states build on and alter each other's innovations, with the result
that innovation increases geometrically rather than arithmetically.0 2
In the same way, dialogue between federal law and the law of the
states has the potential to create a synergy that leads to legal advances
and refinements that neither could achieve alone.
Dialogue presupposes separate actors engaged in a shared
communicative enterprise. According to one account, the conditions
necessary for dialogue include "two or more entities capable of
discourse[;] a physical or mental space between these entities,
separating them, distinguishing them from each other[;] and a
reciprocal exchange of meaning (logos) by these entities across this
space. '203
The relationship between the federal and state
governments supplies these conditions. As with dialogue between
individuals, dialogue between federal and state law entails not only
the exchange of information, but a net increase in available
information as the participants assimilate, reflect upon, and respond
to input from each other. Thus, dialogue is "'an evolutionary process
in which the parties are changed as they proceed.' 2 4
Much has been written about the virtues of state-federal
redundancy in the adjudicative sphere. The legal literature on
199. See, e.g., Harry N. Scheiber, Foreword: The Direct Ballot and State
Constitutionalism,28 Rutgers L.J. 787, 806-07 (1997) (suggesting that specialization of
labor between federal and state governments is necessary for the sake of efficiency).
200. Landau, supra note 196, at 347.
201. See generally infra Part II.C.1.
202. For varying perspectives on the process of diffusion of innovations among the
states, see generally, for example, Virginia Gray, Innovation in the States: A Diffusion
Study, 67 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1174 (1973); Robert L. Savage, Diffusion Research
Traditions and the Spread of Policy Innovations in a Federal System, 15 Publius 1
(1985); Jack L. Walker, The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States, 63
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 880 (1969).
203. Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New
Judicial Federalism,28 Hastings Const. L.Q. 93, 113-14 (2000) (citing Robert Grudin,
On Dialogue: An Essay in Free Thought 11 (1996)).
204. Id. at 122 (quoting Grudin, supra note 203, at 12).
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subjects such as parity between state and federal courts, habeas
corpus, and state constitutional law is dominated to a significant
degree by a debate over whether the advantages of providing access to
both federal and state judicial resources are outweighed by the
disadvantages.2 "5 One of the most compelling arguments in support of
this duplication of resources is that it permits the federal and state
courts to engage in a dialectical process that is uniquely conducive to
the development and refinement of legal rights." 6 In a system where
two levels of government are engaged in the joint process of defining
legal norms, the resulting tension and indeterminacy provide fertile
ground for creativity and self-examination on both their parts.2

7

This observation about the value of the state-federal dialectic
should not be limited to adjudication, however. A similar interplay
can operate between federal and state legislation. Federal civil rights
laws are typically part of a complex pas de deux in which both federal
and state law play leading roles. Sometimes, federal civil rights
legislation fills a vacuum left by state legislative inaction, and states
then follow suit by enacting their own versions of the federal statute.
At other times, state statutes provide a model for federal civil rights

legislation, which in turn inspires further state legislative activity.
Regardless of which entity acts first, the general pattern consists of
alternating and mutually responsive federal and state legislative

action, with the federal statutes establishing a universal minimum
level of legal protection.2 8
History affords numerous examples of this pattern.2

9

States began

205. Compare, e.g., Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 198 (describing the importance
of the federal role in habeas corpus review), and Neuborne, supra note 14 (arguing
that the federal forum has distinct advantages for vindication of constitutional
claims), with Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441 (1963) (arguing against federal habeas corpus
review of constitutional claims that have been fully and fairly litigated in state courts);
compare, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977) (urging state courts to interpret state
constitutional protections of individual liberties more broadly than the Supreme
Court has interpreted similar guarantees under the federal constitution), with James
A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism,90 Mich. L. Rev. 761
(1992) (arguing that state constitutions do not provide a valid basis for a distinct
constitutional discourse).
206. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 198; see also, e.g., Lawrence Friedman, supra
note 203 (describing state-federal judicial discourse concerning constitutional rights).
207. See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 198.
208. The role of federal law as a uniform national baseline is discussed infra at
notes 278-80 and accompanying text; see also infra Part V.
209. Although the present discussion focuses on civil rights legislation, federal-state
legislative dialogue has been a major force in other areas as well, including minimum
wage and maximum hours laws, unemployment compensation, welfare reform, and
environmental regulation, to name just a few examples. See generally, e.g., Elazar,
supra note 5, at 111; A.E. Dick Howard, Does Federalism Secure or Undermine
Rights?, in Katz & Tarr, Federalism and Rights, supra note 191, at 11, 17; Keith
Boeckelman, The Influence of States on Federal Policy Adoptions, 20 Pol'y Stud. J.
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to develop laws prohibiting employment discrimination decades
before Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.210
Title VII was modeled on those laws but went further than most of
them, most notably by prohibiting sex discrimination.21 ' After Title
VII was enacted, all of the states that previously lacked
antidiscrimination statutes adopted them.212 Today, many state
employment discrimination statutes are considerably more protective
of employees' rights than the federal version; thus, they provide a
roadmap for possible future reforms of federal law.213 Similarly, many
states and localities had legislation prohibiting discrimination in places
of public accommodation before Congress enacted Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.214 In the aftermath of the federal statute, states
and localities have continued to expand their legislation, in many
instances adding new categories to the list of prohibited types of
discrimination. 215 By the time Congress enacted the Americans With
Disabilities Act in 1990, every state had enacted a similar measure,
but the federal statute went further than a number of the state laws in
requiring accommodation for the disabled.2 16 The federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act inspired numerous states to adopt
similar legislation.217
The existence of dialogue between the state and federal
governments does not mean that the two speak in identical voices.
State legislatures, free of the limitations imposed on Congress by the
federal constitution, have broader scope for their legal and policy

365 (1992). Such dialogue also occurs in the sphere of constitutional amendments, as
illustrated by the Nineteenth Amendment (which was preceded by suffrage laws in
several states) and the proposed federal Equal Rights Amendment (which spawned
numerous state analogues). See generally Eleanor Flexner, Century of Struggle: The
Woman's Rights Movement in the United States 256-85 (rev. ed. 1975) (describing
adoption of state suffrage laws in the years leading up to ratification of the
Nineteenth Amendment); Mary Frances Berry, Why ERA Failed 90-100 (1986)
(describing the relationship between federal and state Equal Rights Amendments);
Jane J. Mansbridge, Why We Lost the ERA 189-90 (1986) (same).
210. See Rutherglen, supra note 135, at 229 (stating that twenty-one states had laws
against employment discrimination when Title VII was passed); Jackson, supra note
18, at 1302 n.160 (stating that states began to pass laws prohibiting employment
discrimination during the 1940s).
211. Rutherglen, supra note 135, at 229.
212. Id.
213. See id. at 229-32.
214. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 259 n.8 (1964)
(listing statutes); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 284-85 (1964) (Douglas, J.,
concurring in part) (listing states and localities with public accommodations
legislation).
215. See, e.g., Wayne van der Meide, Legislating Equality: A Review of Laws
Affecting Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgendered People in the United States 4
(2000) (stating that nine states and the District of Columbia prohibit discrimination
based on sexual orientation in public accommodations).
216. Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 n.5 (2001).
217. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 n.1 (2000).
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Meanwhile, federal legislation can play a number of

roles not open to its state counterparts. Under the doctrine of
supremacy, the federal government can impose universal rules that
are binding on the states.219 Moreover, even aside from supremacy,
federal law has a degree of visibility and persuasiveness that state law
lacks. As a result, when a legislative innovation has been adopted at
the federal level, states tend to adopt analogous innovations in their

own laws more rapidly than if the innovation had been adopted only
by other states.2
Federal law has a particularly crucial role to play in the

establishment of equality rights. By definition, only federal law can
provide a national standard. To the extent that certain concepts of
equality are essential to our self-definition as a nation, a nationally

uniform antidiscrimination law is not merely a shortcut to obtaining
coverage in all fifty states, but bespeaks the fundamental nature of the
guarantee being offered. Since the end of the Civil War, there has
been widespread recognition of a unique federal interest in

establishing equality norms precisely to express and enforce the view
that such norms are a central feature of national citizenship.2
VAWA's civil rights remedy was a product of this tradition.222
The interplay between federal and state legislation has been central
to the effort to achieve gender equality. In the evolution of women's
legal rights, federal and state statutes have often been at least as

important as judicial decisions. 223 Because of the inadequacy of
existing legal protections against sex discrimination, a number of
feminist theorists have argued that the enactment of new legislation is
more likely than litigation to lead to the attainment of equality rights

218. In contrast to the United States Congress, which possesses only those powers
enumerated in the United States Constitution, state legislatures generally enjoy
plenary power. See Williams, supra note 7, at 793; see also The Federalist No. 45, at
292 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The powers delegated by the
proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which
are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.").
219. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause).
220. See Susan Welch & Kay Thompson, The Impact of Federal Incentives on State
Policy Innovation, 24 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 715 (1980).
221. See generally Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 24546 (1964) (tracing the history of federal civil rights enactments beginning in 1866).
222. For further discussion of VAWA's civil rights remedy in light of the unique
role of federal civil rights legislation in establishing equality norms, see infra Part V.
223. See John J. Dinan, Keeping the People's Liberties 161-62, 218 n.95 (1998).
Compare, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (holding that
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy does not violate Title VII), and Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (holding that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause), with Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)) (defining
sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII to include discrimination based on
pregnancy and related conditions).
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for women.224 Crucial legal protections for women have arisen from
the interaction of state and federal legislation.225
VAWA illustrates the pattern of state-federal legislative dialogue in
the development of new legal rights. The drafters of the federal
legislation were aware that there were state statutes creating civil
rights remedies for discriminatory violence motivated by gender. 26
They were also aware that those remedies existed in only a few states
and furnished inadequate relief. 227 Furthermore, the state civil rights
remedies were little known and rarely used.22 s Once VAWA was
introduced, the issue of civil rights protection from gender-motivated
violence moved into the national spotlight for the first time. VAWA's
civil rights remedy created a uniform baseline level of civil rights
protection, applicable throughout the country-but its impact on the
states did not end there. In 1990, when VAWA was introduced, only
seven states had anti-bias crimes laws that included gender; by 1998,
nineteen states did.229 One reason state officials gave for supporting
VAWA's civil rights remedy was that it would free them to consider
initiating similar civil rights legislation of their own.23 ° Indeed, as a
result of VAWA, a number of states and localities introduced their
own analogues of the federal civil rights remedy.23' Just as VAWA's
224. See, e.g., Robin West, Progressive Constitutionalism 47-49 (1994); Ruth
Colker, The Anti-Subordination Principle:Applications, 3 Wis. Women's L.J. 59, 60
(1987). VAWA's civil rights remedy is an example of a legal reform that could not
have been achieved through the courts. See MacKinnon, supra note 99, at 150; Cass
R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies,79 Cal. L. Rev. 751, 772 n.64 (1991).
225. See, e.g., Rutherglen, supra note 135, at 229 (describing Title VII's prohibition
of sex discrimination in employment as an outgrowth of state antidiscrimination
legislation).
226. 1993 Senate Report, supra note 39, at 48 & n.47.
227. Id.; see also id. at 55 (stating that VAWA "provides a necessary remedy to fill
the gaps and rectify the biases of existing State laws").
228. See Brenneke, supra note 88, at 112-13; see also id. at 37.
229. Anti-Defamation League, 1999 Hate Crimes Laws 3 (1998). As one measure
of the impact of VAWA's civil rights remedy, in 1996 the Anti-Defamation League, a
national organization in the forefront of the fight against bias crimes, changed its
model state anti-bias crimes legislation to include crimes motivated by gender bias, in
part in response to the example set by VAWA. Id. at 2-3.
230. See Brief of Arizona, supra note 174, at 21-22.
231. New York City enacted the Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection
Act, which closely resembles VAWA's civil rights remedy. New York City, N.Y.,
Admin. Code tit. 8, §§ 8-901 to -907 (2000). Westchester County, New York, adopted
a similar law. County Board of the County of Westchester, Local Law Intro. No. 102001 (2001) (enacting new Chapter 701 of the Laws of Westchester County). Several
states have proposed analogous legislation. See, e.g., S.B. 1535, 44th Leg., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Ariz. 2000); H.B. 1691, 83d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2001); A.B. 1933,
2001-02 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002); H.B. 3279, 92d Gen. Assem. (Ill. 2001); H.B. 4407, 91st
Gen. Assem. (Ill. 2000); A.B. 6223, 224th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2001); S.B. 7903, 223d Leg.
Sess. (N.Y. 2000); S.B. 1321, 186th Gen. Assem. (Pa. 2002); S.B. 5451, 57th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Wash. 2001). Some of these state and local bills were introduced after
Morrison was decided and therefore can be seen as replacements for the invalidated
federal legislation. Nevertheless, the fact remains that they were inspired by the
federal example.
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civil rights provision departed significantly from the structure of
preexisting state laws,232 the state and local legislation that followed
VAWA continued the process of reexamining the protections due to
victims of gender-based violence and, in some instances, expanded on
the federal model.233
It is not a coincidence that the evolution of civil rights law so often
takes the form of a state-federal dialogue. Federalism itself is "a

dialogue
about
government"
that
requires
"continuing
accommodation of competing, and in many instances, equally
compelling considerations. '23 4 The potential for a dialectic between
the states and the federal government is one of the most valuable
contributions of federalism. 35 From the interchange between two

levels of government, each with its own perspective, new
understandings can emerge. In Morrison, the Court showed no
awareness of the crucial purpose served by state and federal law as
"co-conversationalists in norm development. '236 Instead, the Court
silenced the federal partner in an unfinished state-federal
conversation.
What are the consequences of Morrison for the process of state-

federal dialogue? Without access to a federal cause of action, many
women now lack an effective legal remedy for acts of violence
motivated by gender. State and local civil rights remedies for genderdiscriminatory violence are nonexistent in most jurisdictions; where

they do exist, they are inconsistent and often inadequate.2 37 With
respect to gender-motivated violence, the states at least have a model
provided by the now-unenforceable federal civil rights statute. 23 8 The

232. See, e.g., Brenneke, supra note 88, at 37-43 (describing California,
Massachusetts, and Vermont legislation).
233. For example, bills introduced in Illinois define the types of violent acts that
are covered very broadly; they also expressly cover violent acts based on sexual
orientation or gender role nonconformity. H.B. 3279, 92d Gen. Assem. (Ill. 2001);
H.B. 4407, 91st Gen. Assem. (I11.2000). Bills introduced in New York State provide
for treble damages. A.B. 6223, 224th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2001); S.B. 7903, 223d Leg. Sess.
(N.Y. 2000). The New York City and Westchester County laws cover acts that are
misdemeanors as well as felonies. County Board of the County of Westchester, Local
Law Intro. No. 10-2001 (2001) (enacting new Chapter 701 of the Laws of Westchester
County); New York City, N.Y., Admin. Code tit. 8, §§ 8-901 to -907 (2000). The New
York City ordinance has a statute of limitations of at least seven years. New York
City, N.Y., Admin. Code tit. 8, §§ 8-901 to -907 (2000).
234. Shapiro, supra note 4, at 108 & n.4.
235. Id. at 123.
236. Judith Resnik, Afterword: Federalism'sOptions, 14 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 465,
486 (1996) (citations omitted).
237. See generally Goldfarb, supra note 34, at 537-40; Goldscheid & Kaufman,
supra note 107, at 270-71.
238. New federal legislation is still a possibility, but the stringent requirements
imposed by the Court's decision in Morrison make it unlikely that Congress could
pass a statute that will serve as a useful example to the states. See Violence Against
Women Civil Rights Restoration Act, H.R. 5021, 106th Cong. (2000) (proposing a
federal remedy for crimes of violence motivated by gender that is limited to
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real price of Morrison will be paid in the form of the federal civil
rights legislation that will never be drafted, introduced, or enacted,
legislation that will never exist to inspire and challenge the states to
take action of their own. Without federal participation in the civil
rights dialogue, the states in turn will have less to say.
The Morrison case attempted to curtail redundancy, which is the
hallmark of federalism, by reserving to the states the power to redress
gender-motivated violence.239 Not only women, but also the states,
are the poorer for it.
C. Judging VA WA's Civil Rights ProvisionAccording to the Values of
Federalism
Although federalism is a pervasive presence in the Constitution,
few constitutional provisions furnish a clear and unambiguous
blueprint for how to realize the federalist vision.24 The process of
interpreting the Constitution's mandates regarding the allocation of
power between the federal and state governments is therefore far
from straightforward. Formalism and functionalism provide two
methodological approaches to this process. The formalist approach
looks to the constitutional text, structure, history, or some
combination of the three in order to define constitutional doctrine.24'
The functionalist approach instead looks to the values that a federalist
system potentially serves and shapes doctrine in order to maximize
the achievement of those values.242
Despite their conceptual
differences, formalism and functionalism are deeply interwoven in the
development of constitutional doctrine concerning federalism. The
ambiguities of the constitutional text, structure, and history are such
that even the most devoted formalists typically define the
Constitution's federalism precepts at least in part by reference to the
goals that federalism ostensibly serves. 243 The Supreme Court's
decision in Morrison was no exception to this rule. Although framed
circumstances where specific types of ties to interstate commerce can be proven).
239. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (stating that a remedy for
gender-motivated violence may be provided only by the states).
240. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985);
Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?,
111 Harv. L. Rev. 2180, 2215 (1998) (stating that although the Constitution does
include some explicit constitutional protections for the states, standards for limiting
congressional action "do not emerge clearly from the naked text of Congress's
enumerated powers" (citation omitted)); Resnik, supra note 194 (arguing that courts
do not discover federalism but rather construct it).
241. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Context and Complementarity Within Federalism
Doctrine, 22 Harv. J.L & Pub. Pol'y 161, 161-62 (1998); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Relationships Between Formalism and FunctionalismIn Separation of Powers Cases,
22 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 21, 21-22 (1998).
242. See Caminker, supra note 241, at 162.
243. See id.; Burt Neuborne, Formalism, Functionalism, and the Separation of
Powers, 22 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 45, 47-48 (1998).
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primarily in terms of formalism, the majority opinion also relied on
arguments derived from the advantages that federalism is supposed to
confer. 2" Accordingly, before examining the Morrison decision's
constitutional analysis,245 it is useful to consider the values associated
with federalism and the extent to which VAWA's civil rights provision
advanced those values.

American federalism's division of power between the state and
federal governments-like its closely related corollary, the separation
of powers among the legislative, judicial, and executive branches'
was designed as "a check on abuses of government power." 246
By
'
"split[ting] the atom of sovereignty,"247
the Framers intended to
prevent the risk of tyranny resulting from the accumulation of power
in a single level of government. 48 As the Supreme Court has often
reminded us, "The 'constitutionally mandated balance of power'
between the States and the Federal Government was adopted by the
Framers to ensure the protection of 'our fundamental liberties."'249
"[O]ur dual system of government" ' is widely viewed as providing
a host of subsidiary benefits.25 ' In addition to protecting citizens from
over-concentration of political power, the federalist system is
commonly described as encouraging innovation, diversity, and
competition among states and localities; ensuring citizen involvement
and political accessibility, while safeguarding against the dominance of
local factions; and protecting the liberty and rights of individuals. 2
244. See generally infra Part IV.
245. See infra Part IV (critiquing the Morrison decision and arguing that the civil
rights provision should have been upheld as constitutional).
246. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
247. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504 n.17 (1999) (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
248. See The Federalist No. 28, at 181 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government will at
all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments, and these will
have the same disposition towards the general government."); The Federalist No. 51,
at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("In the compound republic of
America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct
governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and
separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The
different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be
controlled by itself."), quoted in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576 (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
249. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (citations omitted).
250. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
251. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 Fla. L. Rev. 499
(1995); Michael C. Dorf, Instrumental and Non-Instrumental Federalism, 28 Rutgers
L.J. 825 (1997); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism,82 Minn. L. Rev. 317 (1997).
252. See, e.g., Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458; FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 787-90
(1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Chemerinsky, supra
note 251, at 525; Jackson, supra note 240, at 2213-14; Michael W. McConnell,
Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1484, 1492-1510
(1987); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy:
Federalism for a Third Century, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 3-10 (1988); Shane, supra note
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Adherents of all three visions of federalism discussed earlier in this
and
article-namely, the states' rights view, the individual rights view,253
federalism
rights
cooperative
as
described
the view I have
they
although
generally recognize the desirability of these values,
differ in how they prioritize them.254 This subpart will examine the
values commonly attributed to federalism and demonstrate that, on
balance, VAWA's civil rights remedy advanced those values.
1. The Value of Innovation
Admirers of federalism often point to the autonomy accorded to
the states as a source of beneficial creativity and experimentation. 55
They agree with Justice Brandeis's famous statement that "[i]t is one
of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country. '' 256 Those who regard the states as laboratories 257 often assert
that federal law should avoid imposing national solutions to important
problems, in order to leave room for state and local innovation. 8
Respect for the value of innovation dovetails neatly with the view
that congressional power should be limited and state autonomy
protected. One might therefore expect adherents of the states' rights
view of federalism to argue against VAWA's civil rights remedy on
the ground that it would impede policy experimentation by the states.
In fact, however, opponents of the civil rights provision repeatedly
170, at 212, 221, 229, 242.
253. See generally supra Part I.
254. Some commentators have suggested that the advantages of federalism are
largely illusory and that its purported benefits are actually attributable to
decentralization rather than to federalism. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 3, at 91026 (describing public participation in government, citizen choice, competition among
states, and experimentation as characteristics of decentralization that are not unique
to federalism). But see, e.g., Friedman, supra note 251, at 378-412 (critiquing Rubin &
Feeley and emphasizing the advantages of federalism); Jackson, supra note 240, at

2213-28 (same). For purposes of the present discussion, it is not necessary to resolve

the question of whether the benefits attributed to federalism could also be achieved

through a different political structure.
255. See, e.g., FERC, 456 U.S. at 788 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (describing state innovation as one of "the most valuable aspects of
our federalism").
256. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,

dissenting).
257. Some commentators have questioned the empirical accuracy of the "states as
laboratories" model. See, e.g., James A. Gardner, The "States-As-Laboratories"
Metaphor in State Constitutional Law, 30 Val. U. L. Rev. 475 (1996); Susan RoseAckerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J.
Legal Stud. 593 (1980); Rubin & Feeley, supra note 3. But see, e.g., Friedman, supra
note 251, at 397-400; Merritt, supra note 252, at 9 n.47.

258. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581, 583 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); FERC, 456 U.S. at 787-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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made the opposite argument. They claimed that the civil rights
provision was undesirable because it would promote innovation. This
argument emerged particularly clearly in the opponents' references to
the ancient common-law doctrines of interspousal tort immunity and
the marital rape exemption. Both of these doctrines owe their
existence to the antiquated belief that the wife's legal identity merges
into the husband's upon marriage, a belief grounded in pernicious
gender stereotypes." 9 Although one would not expect to find much
support for these centuries-old doctrines designed to maintain
women's subordinate role in marriage and society, they were
vigorously defended as legitimate state prerogatives in the course of
attacks on VAWA.2 6 The Fourth Circuit, in its en banc opinion in
Brzonkala, criticized the civil rights provision for providing a remedy
in cases where a state's interspousal tort immunity or marital rape
" ' The court wrote, "[T]hese policy
exemption would deny relief.26
choices have traditionally been made not by Congress, but by the
'
States."262
The court acknowledged that "Congress may well be
correct... that such defenses represent regrettable public policy," but
nevertheless asserted that the decision of whether to eliminate them
belongs to the states.26 3 Similarly, in oral argument before the
Supreme Court, the lawyer for Antonio Morrison decried the fact that
VAWA would allow plaintiffs to avoid the effects of state tort
immunities." Thus, opponents of the civil rights remedy chose to
advance the cause of states' rights at the expense of the value of
innovation, rather than in the service of that value.
Even if VAWA's civil rights provision could somehow be
characterized as an interference with opportunities for innovation at
the state level, a proponent of the second view of federalism, which
emphasizes individual rights, would argue that this is no justification
for allowing states to continue applying discriminatory doctrines that
deprive women of access to the legal system. According to this
perspective, when states lag in guaranteeing equal rights for their
citizens, it is entirely fitting for federal law to enter the picture and
impose a national standard. This is the very argument that supports
Congress's authority to enact VAWA's civil rights remedy under the

259. See 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *430-33; Hasday, supra note 72;
Siegel, supra note 73.
260. See, e.g., Santiago v. Alonso, 96 F. Supp. 2d 58, 66-67 (D.P.R. 2000); 1993
House Hearing,supra note 44, at 81 (statement of Conference of Chief Justices).
261. See Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 843, 873
(4th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
262. Id. at 843.
263. Id.
264. Tr. of Oral Argument, United States v. Morrison, Nos. 99-5, 99-29, 2000 WL
41232, at *46-47, 52-54 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2000); see also infra Part III.C.2 (discussing
testimony of Bruce Fein).
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Fourteenth Amendment.26 State experimentation is not intrinsically
good, if individual rights are sacrificed in the process.266
In fact, in the case of VAWA's civil rights remedy, there was no
tradeoff between innovation and individual rights. Contrary to the
assumption that federal statutes stifle innovation, VAWA's civil rights
remedy both grew out of and stimulated innovation by the states. A
handful of states had adopted some version of civil rights relief for
gender-motivated violence before VAWA was enacted. 267 Although
these state laws were weak and rarely used, they provided a
conceptual framework on which Congress could build.268 VAWA, in
turn, inspired further innovative legislation at the state and local
levels.26 9 Thus, far from foreclosing state experimentation, VAWA
was part of a fruitful cycle of mutually reinforcing experimentation by
the state and federal governments. Such interchanges are typical of
the way in which civil rights are developed and expanded.27 °
It is true that innovations adopted by the federal government,
unlike those adopted by a single state, apply to the entire country and
therefore present greater risks in case of failure. 7' While this fact
counsels that Congress should not occupy a field of regulation
precipitously, it surely does not indicate that Congress should never
do so. On the contrary, the scientific metaphor chosen by Brandeis
suggests that once a policy experiment has proven successful in one
state, its results can and should be generalized to other states, with a
uniform national policy as the inevitable and desirable result.272 Even
Justice O'Connor, in her paean to state innovation in FERC v.
Mississippi, praised the states for being pioneers in adopting female
suffrage, unemployment insurance, and minimum wage laws,273 all of
which were eventually adopted at the federal level.
2. The Value of Diversity
Because each state can adopt laws that reflect its local conditions
and culture, federalism promotes legal pluralism. The resulting
265. See supra Part II, infra Parts IV.B, V.

266. See, e.g., Gilliard v. Mississippi, 464 U.S. 867, 869-73 (1983) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Brennan, supra note 166, at 550.
267. See supra Part II.

268. See supra Parts 1I, III.B.
269. See supra Part III.B.
270. See supra Part III.B.

271. Cf New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (stating that a single state may "serve as a laboratory... without risk to
the rest of the country"); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (defending "social experiments" "in the insulated chambers afforded by
the several States").
272. See G. Alan Tarr, Laboratories of Democracy?: Brandeis, Federalism, and
Scientific Management, 31 Publius 37, 42-47 (2001).

273. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788-89 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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diversity is often cited as an advantage of the federalist system.274
When VAWA was pending in Congress, its opponents appealed
directly to the value of diversity. In his testimony against the civil
rights provision at a congressional hearing, Bruce Fein, a former
Justice Department official under President Reagan, objected to the
fact that VAWA would interfere with a state's choice not to make
marital rape a crime. Fein characterized a state's decision about
whether to criminalize marital rape as one that is "peculiarly local and
'
responsive to local customs."275
At the outset, Fein was incorrect in claiming that VAWA would
overturn states' marital rape exemptions.27 6 In reality, VAWA's civil
rights remedy had no direct effect on state law. VAWA provided a
federal civil cause of action in cases of gender-discriminatory
violence-including some cases where no criminal remedy was
available because of a state's marital rape exemption-but it did not
require state criminal law to do away with such exemptions.
But what if the civil rights remedy did displace states' marital rape
exemptions? 77 To someone immersed in the individual rights view of
federalism, Fein's invocation of diversity as an end in itself would still
ring false. Holders of this viewpoint emphasize that unlimited
diversity among state legal systems is clearly not contemplated by the
federalist system. The principle of supremacy dictates that there is a
line where diversity ends and uniformity begins.278 Since the end of
the Civil War, the ground ceded to diversity has necessarily shrunk in
direct proportion to the federal government's growing role in
protecting individual rights.
For example, the once common
arguments that slavery and segregation are legitimate expressions of
state and regional diversity have been thoroughly discredited.279 Like
racial discrimination, gender discrimination is a subject on which local
customs and the quest for diversity have repeatedly been forced to
yield to a consistent level of basic federal equality guarantees.""' By
its very nature, a federal civil rights measure creates a "floor" of legal
protection that applies uniformly throughout the country. VAWA's
274. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1990); Merritt, supra note
252, at 10.
275. 1993 House Hearing,supra note 44, at 27-28 (statement of Bruce Fein).
276. See id. at 28 ("[I]t seems to me highly improper for the Federal Government
to be instructing the States as to how they ought to grant or withhold spousal
immunity [from rape charges].").
277. See supra Part III.A (discussing the argument that the civil rights remedy
displaced state law indirectly).
278. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl.
2 (Supremacy Clause).
279. See Jackson, supra note 240, at 2214 n.156.
280. See Akhil Reed Amar, Race, Religion, Gender, and Interstate Federalism:
Some Notes from History, 16 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 19, 25 (1996) (observing that the
federal government initially left the questions of slavery and female suffrage up to
local option, but eventually was forced to adopt national guarantees of race and
gender equality).
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civil rights provision followed in that tradition.
Although
responsiveness to local conditions may generally be desirable, a "local
custom" of281permitting men to rape their wives hardly seems worth
preserving.
Given the discriminatory purposes underlying the marital rape
exemption,282 Congress could arguably have acted within its
Fourteenth Amendment powers by directly forbidding the states to
include a marital rape exemption in their criminal codes.283
Alternatively, Congress could have made abrogation of the states'
marital rape exemptions a condition for the receipt of federal funds
under its Spending Clause powers.2 4 Instead, Congress chose a
middle ground that respected the rights of the states as well as the
rights of women. The VAWA civil rights provision allowed diverse
approaches within state law to the problem of gender-motivated
violence, while at the same time establishing a minimum baseline level
of civil rights protection that could not be denied in any state. The
civil rights provision thus made a significant concession to diversity,
even as it created a new level of national protection for women's
equality.
3. The Value of Competition
Closely related to the values of innovation and diversity is the
argument that federalism enhances beneficial competition among the
states. According to this argument, the states participate in a free
market, competing for residents, businesses, and other resources;
because of this competition, individuals and businesses enjoy greater
variety among potential places to settle, and states are more likely to
develop desirable policies in order to attract and maintain population
and investment.2 85
Michael Greve, director of the Center for Individual Rights, which
represented Antonio Morrison before the Supreme Court, has
281. Rape constitutes a particularly severe infringement of bodily autonomy. See,
e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (describing rape as the ultimate
violation of self, short of homicide). As a class of offenses, marital rape is at least as
physically violent and psychologically damaging to its victims as rape by a stranger.
See Lynn Hecht Schafran, Writing and Reading About Rape: A Primer,66 St. John's
L. Rev. 979, 1020-21 (1993); Lana Stermac et al., Violence, 'Injury, and Presentation
Patternsin Spousal Sexual Assaults, 7 Violence Against Women 1218 (2001).
282. See supra notes 72-73,259 and accompanying text.
283. See West, supra note 224, at 48-49, 69-71.
284. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987); see also infra notes 480-81
and accompanying text (discussing opportunities left open by Morrison for Congress
to use its spending power to address gender-motivated violence).
285. See, e.g., Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative
Incentives to Recognize Same-Sex Marriage,68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 745 (1995) (describing
incentives for states to legalize same-sex marriage in order to take advantage of
interstate competition); McConnell, supra note 252, at 1498-1500 (setting forth
arguments in support of state and local competition).
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explicitly endorsed the application of "competitive federalism" to civil
rights and social welfare programs. 286 He has argued that the Court
must sharply curtail congressional action on social issues in order to
further "federalism's purpose of mimicking, in the government sector,
the advantages of private markets-variety, consumer choice, and
competition."28' 7 "Only when Congress is barred from imposing onesize-fits-all solutions will the states have to compete for their citizens'
business, talents, assets, and affections,"
Greve wrote.2 8 "This
would.., allow citizens to sort themselves into the jurisdictions most
' Greve's argument would suggest
to their liking."289
that VAWA went
astray by preventing states from competing for residents on the basis
of the legal rights they offer to victims of gender-motivated violence.
There are a number of flaws in Greve's analysis. Contrary to his
analogy to private markets, people do not generally shop for a
"package" of legal rights the way they shop for groceries or shoes. 29
Most citizens are not aware of what legal rights are established by
their own state's statutes and judicial decisions, much less those of
other states.2 91

Even if people were familiar with state laws affecting their rights,
relatively few have the mobility to take advantage of differences

among them. Most people live where they do for more pressing
reasons, such as proximity to employment, family relationships, and
availability and cost of housing.29 2 To the extent that differences in

state (or local) laws affect decisions of where to live, laws regulating
economic matters such as welfare benefits, tax rates, and expenditures
286. See Michael Greve, Real Federalism 2, 8 (1999); Michael Greve, Federalism Is
More Than States' Rights, Wall St. J., July 1, 1999, at A22 [hereinafter More Than
States' Rights].
287. Greve, More Than States' Rights, supra note 286, at A22.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Cf. id. ("[T]he court must confront federal entitlements head-on, thereby
allowing us to pick and choose among the regulatory packages the various states or
localities would create in their stead.").
291. A notable exception is the issue of legal recognition of same-sex relationships.
Because this is a discrete legal question that has been highly publicized in recent
years, most gay men and lesbians are probably aware of Vermont's recent adoption of
a unique statute that grants to same-sex couples the right to enter into a status known
as a civil union, which confers the same rights and obligations under Vermont law as
marriage. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 1201-07 (2001). In theory, this awareness opens up
the possibility of moving to Vermont to take advantage of the civil union law in that
state. See Brian H. Bix, State of the Union: The States' Interest in the MaritalStatus of
Their Citizens, 55 U. Miami L. Rev. 1, 18-19 (2000); see also Brown, supra note 285.
By contrast, a comparison of the relative merits of different states' legal protections
for female victims of violence is a far more obscure and complex legal question. See
Victoria Nourse, The "Normal" Successes and Failuresof Feminism and the Criminal
Law, 75 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 951, 961-69 (2000) (describing state statutory schemes
governing marital rape that are so complex that understanding them is "exhausting"
for a criminal law scholar and impossible for the average citizen).
292. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 251, at 387-88.
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on public services are far more likely to be influential than civil rights

laws.293 Practical and financial barriers to relocation are numerous.294
Without both information and mobility, meaningful competition
among states cannot exist.
The assumption of mobility is particularly inapt where women are

concerned.

Poverty makes relocation especially difficult,295 and

women are more likely than men to be poor.296 Until fairly recently, a

married woman was legally unable to choose her domicile, because
her domicile was automatically that of her husband. 297 Even today,
many married or cohabiting women live where they do because of
their husband's or partner's job or preferences; this is especially likely
to be true of battered women, whose abusers typically exercise total
control over their living arrangements. 298 The idea of an abused
woman "shopping" for a state that provides vigorous legal remedies
for battering and marital rape299is absurd. Realistically, such women
have little or no "right of exit.

If we assume that problems with information and mobility could be
overcome, and that competition among states on the basis of legal
rights for female victims of violence were a reality, it is by no means
clear that the result would be a competition among states to enhance
those rights. Instead, the result might be the opposite. If states cared
more about attracting male residents than female ones (a reasonable
preference, because men on average have higher incomes than
women), and if they assumed that men would be attracted to
jurisdictions that impose few legal consequences for marital rape and
domestic violence, the states would compete to weaken their laws on
violence against women. Any state that would prefer to provide
293. See, e.g., Robert Moffitt, Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System: A
Review, 30 J. Econ. Literature 1, 31-36 (1992) (describing studies showing patterns of
migration by welfare recipients to states with relatively high welfare rates). But see
Roe v. Anderson, 966 F. Supp. 977, 982-83 (E.D. Cal. 1997) (describing evidence
contradicting the "welfare magnet" hypothesis), afftd, 134 F.3d 1400 (9th Cir. 1998),
affd sub nom. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). See also Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure
Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416 (1956) (proposing a model under
which an individual enjoying unlimited mobility would move to the locality best
satisfying his or her preferred pattern of taxation and expenditures for public goods).
294. Friedman, supra note 251, at 387-88.
295. Shapiro, supra note 4, at 37.
296. See Katharine T. Bartlett et al., Gender and Law 1185-86 (3d ed. 2002).
297. See Barbara Allen Babcock et al., Sex Discrimination and the Law 1185 (2d
ed. 1996).
298. See, e.g., Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman
Syndrome to Coercive Control,58 Alb. L. Rev. 973 (1995).
299. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the
Issue of Separation, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1991) (documenting the enormous barriers
confronting battered women attempting to leave relationships, including increased
risk of injury and death); cf.Shapiro, supra note 4, at 95-96 (arguing that right of exit,
coupled with diversity among states, enhances individual freedom to live as one
wishes).
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vigorous protection for women would be trapped in a "prisoner's
dilemma" situation. 3°° Competitive forces would compel such a state
to lower its level of protection, even though it would prefer not to do
so. The result would be a "race to the bottom" among the states."'
Interstate competition can be injurious to individuals if it leads
states to sacrifice their rights. Moreover, interstate competition can
be detrimental to the states themselves if it forces them to abandon
policy preferences in order to compete with other states. Avoiding
this kind of "race to the bottom" has been recognized as a powerful
justification for adoption of a uniform national standard.3 2 A federal
standard, such as that provided by VAWA's civil rights remedy,
300. The "Prisoner's Dilemma," a classic scenario used in game theory, has been
summarized as follows:
[T]wo prisoners have the same two choices: to cooperate with each other by
keeping silent with respect to his and the other prisoner's involvement in the
crime or to "defect" by confessing his and the other prisoner's criminal act.
Each prisoner must make his choice without knowing what the other
prisoner will do. If both deny all involvement in the crime, each is sentenced
to a light sentence; if both confess, each is given a sentence of mediumseverity; if one confesses, the one confessing is released, but the other
prisoner is handed a harsh sentence. Although collectively the prisoners
would be best off if both denied the crime, each follows his own self-interest
and confesses.
Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting. Is There a "Race" and Is It

"To the Bottom"?, 48 Hastings L.J. 271, 301 (1997).
301. The phrase "race to the bottom" refers to the tendency of states to adopt
suboptimal policies as a result of competition with other states to attract and retain
desirable residents and businesses. See generally Friedman, supra note 251, at 408. An
example of a "race to the bottom" would be a state's decision to set its welfare rates
lower than it would prefer, in order to avoid attracting so many welfare recipients that
they drive away taxpayers who are unwilling to bear the increased costs of the welfare
program. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 509-10 (1999) (considering and
rejecting the argument made by the United States as amicus curiae that states should
be permitted to impose durational residency requirements on welfare recipients in
order to avoid a "race to the bottom" among states in setting benefit levels). Another
example would be a state's decision to abandon the environmental standards that it
would otherwise choose, and instead to adopt excessively lax standards, in order to
compete for industry with other states. For varying perspectives on the "race to the
bottom" phenomenon in the environmental context, compare, for example, Engel,
supra note 300 (documenting the existence of a race to the bottom in state
environmental regulation) with, for example, Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the
Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 Minn. L.

Rev. 535 (1997) (claiming that the risk of a race to the bottom in state environmental
regulation is exaggerated), and Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate
Competition: Rethinking the "Race to the Bottom" Rationale for Federal
EnvironmentalRegulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210 (1992) (same).

302. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S.
264, 281-82 (1981) (describing "destructive interstate competition" as a justification
for nationwide surface mining and reclamation standards); United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) (describing the federal Fair Labor Standards Act as a
response to "injurious" competition among the states); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548, 588 (1937) (describing the unemployment tax provisions of the Social
Security Act as a solution to "paraly[sis]" among the states caused by interstate
competitive pressures to keep labor costs low).
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relieves both the states and individuals of the potentially deleterious
effects of interstate competition.
4. The Value of Government Close to the People
A frequently cited advantage of the federalist system is the
presence of governmental units on a small scale. State and local
governance is said to enhance opportunities for citizen participation in
the democratic process and to increase the accessibility and
responsiveness of government officials.3"3
Assuming that this depiction of state and local government is
accurate, 3°4 the fact that state and local officials are more closely
identified with and more easily influenced by their constituents is a
double-edged sword. Governance close to the grass roots has
consistently been viewed as a danger as well as a benefit. As Madison
pointed out in The Federalist No. 10, factions are more likely to
command a majority in a small rather than a large unit of government,
and factions that command a local majority are likely to hold local
government captive and oppress members of the minority.3"' The
solution to this problem, according to Madison, is to have a strong
national government that can counterbalance the influence of factions
at the subnational level.30 6 Thus, even for advocates of the states'
rights view of federalism, small-scale governance is not an unqualified
good.
Those who embrace the individual rights view of federalism are
even more skeptical of the advantages of local governance. One does
not have to look far to find historical evidence bearing out Madison's
303. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); FERC v. Mississippi,
456 U.S. 742, 789-90 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Chemerinsky, supra note 251, at 527; Merritt, supra note 252, at 7-8.
304. Scholars have questioned whether government becomes increasingly
responsive and accessible as one moves from the federal to the state and local levels.
See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 4, at 93 (pointing out that many states are too large and
heterogeneous to conform to the ideal of small, accessible governing units);
Chemerinsky, supra note 251, at 528 (observing that citizen interest is greater in
federal than in state and local elections); Resnik, supra note 194, at 669 n.234 (arguing
that "the role of extra-local organizations in making local policy" calls into question
the proposition that smaller units of government "permit[] more participation and
enhance[] the ability of individuals to have impact" (citation omitted)); Shane, supra
note 170, at 242 (suggesting that citizens can more easily monitor government activity
at the federal level than at the state or local level).
305. The Federalist No. 10, at 78-81 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Madison defined a faction as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority
or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of
passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community." Id. at 78.
306. Id. at 82-84; see also The Federalist No. 51, at 324-25 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). But see McConnell, supra note 252, at 1502 (arguing that
Madison overestimated the influence of factions at the local level and underestimated
their influence at the federal level).
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prediction that federal power would prove to be necessary to offset
oppressive local factions.3 7 VAWA's civil rights provision is a case in
point. Congress acted to vindicate the equality rights of women in
response to evidence of pervasive bias against female victims of
violence within the state criminal and civil justice systems.
The fact that women's interests were sacrificed by government
actors at the subnational level is not entirely surprising. To the extent
that local government is predisposed to be accessible and responsive,
the relevant question is, accessible and responsive to whom? Local
police, judges, and other officials, predominantly male, are more likely
to be acquainted with the perpetrators of violence against women
than with its victims.3"8 As Professor Catharine MacKinnon has
written, just as women are most likely to be victims of violence in or
near their homes,30 9 they are also least likely to receive justice at the
level of government closest to their homes.3"0
According to
MacKinnon,
One way to describe the process of change in women's legal status
from chattel to citizen is as a process of leaving home. The closer to
home women's injuries are addressed, the less power and fewer
rights they seem to have; the further away from home the forum, the
more power and rights women have gained.... 31
Thus, women's quest for legal equality has taken them from the
home to the state, federal, and international arenas.31 2 At each
progressively higher level, if they succeed in gaining access to it,3 3
genuine redress for violence becomes more likely.3" 4 "For physically
and sexually violated women, going public with their injuries has
meant seeking accountability and relief from higher sovereigns, men
who have power over the men who abused them because they are
above, removed from, hence less likely to be controlled by those
307. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 251, at 367 (giving examples of nullification,
slavery, the Civil War and Reconstruction, Jim Crow, and the civil rights struggle).
308. See Culberson v. Doan, 65 F. Supp. 2d 701 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (case brought
under the VAWA civil rights provision alleging complicity between police and
perpetrator); Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1526 (D. Conn. 1984)
(alleging liability under the Fourteenth Amendment for a police department's
discriminatory failure to protect the plaintiff from domestic violence committed by
her husband, who was acquainted with many police officers); Julie Goldscheid,
United States v. Morrison and the Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against
Women Act: A Civil Rights Law Struck Down in the Name of Federalism, 86 Cornell
L. Rev. 109, 138 & n.197 (2000) (describing "cases in which the perpetrator is familiar
with local law enforcement officials").
309. Unlike most violence against men, most violence against women takes place
within family or intimate relationships. Tjaden & Thoennes, supra note 44, at 2, 8.
310. MacKinnon, supra note 99, at 173-76.
311. Id. at 174.
312. Id. at 174-76.
313. As MacKinnon points out, women's access to a higher forum is often
obstructed, as it was in Morrison. Id. at 175-76.
314. Id. at 173-77.
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'
On this account, where women are concerned, Madison's
abusers."315
assumption that citizens will more easily influence state and local
government than national government should be turned on its head.
To recognize that women and members of many other vulnerable
groups are often systematically disadvantaged by the denial of rights
at the state and local levels does not mean that the protection of rights

should be turned over wholesale to the federal government.3 16 It does

mean, however, that it is worth remembering that one of the purposes
of federalism is to "enhanc[e] personal and group liberty [and]
empowerment, by providing multiple layers of government to which
'
Access to the federal government as an
citizens may appeal."317
alternative to state and local government plays a crucial corrective
role.3 18

5. The Value of Individual Rights
The Court has frequently stated that federalism's ultimate goal is to
protect individual freedom, liberty, and rights.319 Fundamentally, the
reason to divide power between the state and federal governments, as
well as among the coordinate branches 32 -indeed, the reason to have
a government32 1 - is to defend the rights of the people. As Justice
O'Connor wrote for the Court in New York v. United States,
The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of the States for
the benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political
entities, or even for the benefit of the public officials governing the
315. Id. at 175.

316. See supra Part III.B (describing the importance of state and federal
participation in development of civil rights law).
317. Jackson, supra note 240, at 2214; see also Brennan, supra note 205, at 503 ("[It
should not be] forgotten that one of the strengths of our federal system is that it
provides a double source of protection for the rights of our citizens. Federalism is not
served when the federal half of that protection is crippled.").
318. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 9, at 1492-1519 (describing the federal and state
governments as sources of redress for each other's violations of individual rights).
319. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (stating that the division of power between the states and federal
government, as well as among the coordinate branches, creates "a double security...
to the rights of the people" (quoting The Federalist No. 51, at 323 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))); Gregory v. Ashcroft 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (stating
that the balance of power between the state and federal governments "'was adopted
) (citations
by the Framers to ensure the protection of "our fundamental liberties .....
omitted); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 790 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (describing the federal system as the source of "the
balance of power that buttresses our basic liberties").
320. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 ("'Just as the separation and
independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent
the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power
between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and
abuse from either front."' (quoting Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458)).
321. See The Federalist No. 52, at 324 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("Justice is the end of government.").
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States. To the contrary, the Constitution divides authority between
federal and state governments for the protection of individuals.322
The individual rights view of federalism obviously elevates this
value above all others that the federalist system ostensibly serves.
From this vantage point, VAWA's civil rights provision was a
resounding success. As discussed earlier, the civil rights remedy was a
significant advance for securing the rights of women in the face of
widespread discrimination by the states.3 23 By providing federal
protection for equality rights that were being violated by the states,
the civil rights remedy advanced federalism's basic value of protecting
individual rights.
From the viewpoint of defenders of the states' rights view of
federalism, however, the fact that the civil rights provision expanded
the rights of women is not enough to prove that the legislation truly
served federalism's rights-protecting function. If VAWA protected
women's rights at the cost of the continued vitality of the states as
separate units of government, it would be open to the charge that it
was actually detrimental to the goals of federalism-including, in the
long run, the goal of protecting the rights of individuals.3 24 As Justice
O'Connor explained, "State sovereignty is not just an end in itself:
'Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from
the diffusion of sovereign power."'325 Seen in this light, any
impairment of the states' autonomy weakens their ability to function
as a bulwark against federal incursions on individual liberty.
In fact, however, VAWA's civil rights provision did not jeopardize
the authority of the states. Rather, the civil rights remedy was
carefully tailored to further the rights of women without infringing on
legitimate state prerogatives; indeed, it actually expanded the states'
range of policy choices by relieving them of preexisting constraints.326
In the true spirit of cooperative rights federalism, the civil rights
provision neither protected states' rights at the expense of individual
rights, nor protected individual rights at the expense of states' rights.
As the preceding discussion has shown, the civil rights provision of
VAWA enhanced innovation, left room for diversity, alleviated
322. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992).
323. See supra Part II; see also infra Parts IV.B, V.
324. See Ann Althouse, Variations on a Theory of Normative Federalism: A

Supreme Court Dialogue, 42 Duke L.J. 979, 1009 (1993) (describing Justice
O'Connor's strategy in Gregory v. Ashcroft as an attempt to "preserve the vigor of the
state as a political entity independent of Congress, on the theory that strong states
would have the ability to protect their citizens from encroachments on their rights by
the national government" and stating that "[r]ather than siding with individual rights
on a case-by-case basis,. .. [t]he Gregory Court chose to invigorate the states in a
grand balance of power, trusting that over time benefits would flow to individuals").
325. New York, 505 U.S. at 181 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759
(1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
326. See supra Part III.A.
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possible detrimental effects of interstate competition, utilized the
federal government to counteract the bias of local factions, and
promoted individual rights without sacrificing states' rights. Thus, the
civil rights remedy was faithful to the values of federalism. The
constitutional dimension of this issue-that is, whether the civil rights
measure fell within Congress's constitutionally authorized powers--is
the subject of the next part.
IV. UNITED STATES V. MORRISON AND FEDERALISM

In United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court, by a vote of five to
four, held that neither the Commerce Clause nor Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment authorized Congress to enact the civil rights
provision of the Violence Against Women Act.3 27 The opinion for the
Court insisted that the decision to strike down the civil rights remedy
was required by the need to distinguish between "what is truly
national and what is truly local. 3 28 The Court presented formalist
arguments based on the text of the Constitution as interpreted in
previous cases, as well as functionalist arguments focusing on the
supposedly dire consequences for the functioning of federalism that
would result from upholding the civil rights provision. Despite the
majority's pervasive emphasis on federalism, however, the outcome in
Morrison was dictated neither by the Constitution as interpreted in
the Court's previous decisions, nor by the values of federalism that the
Court claimed to serve.
A core weakness of the majority's reasoning was its failure to see
beyond the "states' rights" conception of federalism. The Court
assumed that its obligation was to curtail the power of Congress in
order to permit the states to regulate violence against women-or not
to do so-as they see fit. Missing from the Court's analysis was any
recognition of the special federal role in protecting the rights of
individuals; indeed, the Court barely alluded to the nature of the
challenged legislation as a civil rights law and entirely omitted any
discussion of the impact of gender-motivated violence on women's
327. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote

the opinion for the majority, which was joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas. Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion rejecting the "substantial
effects" test under the Commerce Clause as inconsistent with the "original
understanding" and with early Commerce Clause cases. Id. at 627. Justice Souter,
joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, authored a dissent asserting that the
civil rights provision was a legitimate exercise of Congress's commerce power. Id. at
628-55. Justice Breyer's dissent, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, also

argued for upholding the civil rights provision under the Commerce Clause. Id. at
655-61. Additionally, a section of Justice Breyer's dissent that was joined only by
Justice Stevens expressed "doubt" about the majority's rejection of Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment as a constitutional basis for the civil rights provision. Id. at
664-66.
328. Id. at 617-18.
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equality. Also missing from the majority opinion was a recognition
that federal legislative intervention can add to, rather than detract
from, the states' freedom at the same time that it enhances the
freedom of individuals.
This part critiques the Court's analysis of the civil rights provision
under the Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment. It will
then assess Morrison's impact on federalism and conclude with an

examination of the categorical distinctions relied upon by the
Morrison Court. The following section, Part V, will propose an
alternative analysis that the Court could have used in Morrison to
uphold VAWA's civil rights remedy. The linchpin of this analysis is
the need for federal intervention in areas that the states are incapable
of handling alone. This approach would maintain limits on Congress's
power while preserving opportunities for cooperative rights
federalism.
A. The Commerce Clause
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Commerce Clause began

in earnest with Gibbons v. Ogden, in which Chief Justice Marshall's
opinion accorded broad power to Congress to control the regulation

of interstate commerce.3 29 However, by the late nineteenth and early

twentieth centuries, the Court had begun to curtail Congress's

commerce powers, typically by finding that the challenged federal

legislation was concerned not with interstate commerce but with
issues subject to the states' police powers.33 The Court's narrow
reading of Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause intensified
in cases challenging New Deal legislation, such as Schechter Poultry
Co. v. United States"' and Carter v. Carter Coal Co. 33 2 In 1937, under
a variety of pressures,333 the Court changed direction, upholding the
329. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). In the earlier case of
McCulloch v. Maryland, the Court had given a broad reading to Congress's power to
enact legislation "necessary and proper" to carry out the powers conferred on it by
the Constitution. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411-21 (1819).
330. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1
(1895). Even during this period, the Court did not consistently invalidate Congress's
attempts to exercise its Commerce Clause powers. See, e.g., Champion v. Ames (The
Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903); see also Larry D. Kramer, But When Exactly Was
Judicially-Enforced Federalism "Born" In the First Place?, 22 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y
123, 131-35 (1998) (stating that the Court "experimented" with invalidating
congressional enactments in the name of federalism during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries but only adopted this approach consistently during the years
1935 and 1936).
331. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
332. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
333. The exact roles that President Roosevelt's court-packing plan and other forces
played in bringing about the so-called "switch in time that saved nine" remain a
matter of debate. See generally, e.g., Paul Brest et al., Processes of Constitutional
Decisionmaking 426-28 (4th ed. 2000).
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National Labor Relations Act in the watershed case of NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp.3 4 Subsequent cases established that
Congress's commerce power extended to activities that were local and
not overtly commercial but that substantially affected interstate
commerce;33 5 that even an activity that was trivial in itself could be
regulated by Congress if the aggregate effect of all such activities on
interstate commerce was substantial;336 and that the Court would defer
to Congress if there was a "rational basis" for concluding that a
regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce and
Congress's legislative scheme was "reasonably adapted" to its
constitutionally permissible purpose. 331 These principles dominated
the Court's Commerce Clause decisions throughout the next five
decades.
The case of United States v. Lopez,338 which was decided after

VAWA had been signed into law, marked the first time since 1937
that the Court invalidated an exercise of the commerce power. In
Lopez, the same five-member majority that would later decide
33 9
Morrison
held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which created

federal criminal penalties for knowingly possessing a firearm in a
school zone, exceeded Congress's authority under the Commerce
Clause. Although Lopez struck down a federal statute enacted under
the Commerce Clause for the first time in almost sixty years, it did not
overturn but rather reaffirmed previous cases that established highly
deferential standards for evaluating the constitutionality of
congressional exercises of the commerce power.340

For its Commerce Clause analysis, the Morrison decision relied
heavily on Lopez. According to Lopez, there are "three broad
categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce
power": the use of the channels of interstate commerce;
instrumentalities of interstate commerce or persons or things in
interstate commerce; and activities that substantially affect interstate

334. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
335. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124-25 (1942); Darby, 312 U.S. at
118-20.
336. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301 (1964); Wickard, 317 U.S.
at 127-28.
337. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S.
264, 276 (1981) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1964).
338. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
339. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy and Thomas constituted the majority in Lopez and Morrison, as they have
in numerous other cases. See generally David G. Savage, United They Sit, A.B.A. J.,
Sept. 2001, at 34.
340. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553-61 (citing, inter alia, Hodel, McClung, Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Wickard, Darby, Jones & Laughlin Steel, and Gibbons); see also id. at 573-74
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing earlier cases that are "not called in question by our
decision today").
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commerce.3 41 In both Lopez and Morrison, the Court's analysis
focused on whether the challenged federal statute could be sustained
under the third category, as a regulation of an activity that
substantially affects interstate commerce.34 2

The Morrison Court devised a four-part "framework" for its
Commerce Clause inquiry that purported to rest on the reasoning of
Lopez.343 As its first "consideration[]" under this framework, 3 " the

Court found that "[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in
any sense of the phrase, economic activity.

3 45

Leaving aside for the

moment the advisability of creating a bright-line distinction between
economic and noneconomic activity for Commerce Clause
purposes,

346

the Court erred for at least two reasons. First, Congress

had assembled a "mountain of data ' 347 demonstrating the enormous
impact of gender-motivated crime on interstate commerce and
particularly on women's ability to function as economic actors.
Gender-motivated crime is economic crime; it robs women of the
ability to be economically self-sufficient, and that is often its
purpose.348 Second, by apparently requiring that an activity be
economic in nature in order to be regulated by the Commerce
Clause,349 the Court diverged from the holding of Lopez. The Lopez
Court quoted with approval the following statement from Wickard v.

Filburn: "[E]ven if appellee's activity be local and though it may not
be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached
by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce .... "350 Although the Lopez opinion stated that the Gun-

Free School Zones Act was "a criminal statute that by its terms has
341. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59, quoted in Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608-09.
342. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
343. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609-16.
344. Id. at 609.
345. Id. at 613.
346. See infra Part IV.D.
347. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628-36 (Souter, J., dissenting).
348. See supra Part II; see also, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Equal Rights Advocates
et al. at 10-12, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29)
("Exclusion from the workplace is often the intended result, not merely an
unintended consequence, of violence against women.").
349. The Morrison Court stated that "we need not adopt a categorical rule" against
congressional regulation of noneconomic activity that substantially affects interstate
commerce. 529 U.S. at 613. However, the Court proceeded to state, "We ... reject
the argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct
based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce." Id. at 617.
This seemed to suggest the adoption of just such a categorical rule. On the Morrison
opinion's questionable reliance on categorical distinctions, see infra Part IV.D.
350. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942), quoted in Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
556 (1995). Wickard held that a farmer's cultivation of homegrown wheat for
consumption on the farm "overhangs the market" and "competes with wheat in
commerce." 317 U.S. at 128. Gender-based violence, with its overt economic effects
and often with economic motives as well, is at least as economic in nature as growing
wheat for home consumption.
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nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise,"35 '
that characterization did not determine the outcome of the case. On
the contrary, after observing that the Gun-Free School Zones Act did
not regulate a commercial activity, the Court proceeded to consider at
length whether Congress could rationally conclude that possession of
a gun in a school zone substantially affected interstate commerce.352
The Court's second "consideration" in Morrison turned on the fact
that VAWA, like the Gun-Free School Zones Act, contained no
jurisdictional element requiring proof of a connection with or effect
on interstate commerce in each case.353 Such a jurisdictional element
would, the Court wrote, "lend support" to the argument that the
activity regulated by Congress had a sufficient tie to interstate
commerce.35 4 However, the Morrison majority did not suggest that a
jurisdictional element is a constitutional requirement in cases
involving the third category of Commerce Clause powers, nor would
such a suggestion accurately reflect the holding in Lopez.355

As the third step in its Commerce Clause analysis, the Morrison
Court conceded that in contrast to the lack of congressional findings
in support of the Gun-Free School Zones Act, Congress made
extensive findings showing that gender-motivated violence has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. Lopez had pointed out that
"legislative findings, and indeed even congressional committee
findings" are entitled to careful consideration as part of the Court's
inquiry into a statute's constitutionality.356 The function of such
findings, according to Lopez, is to help the Court see links between
the regulated activity and357
interstate commerce that would not be
"visible to the naked eye." ' The legislative history of VAWA was
replete with findings that domestic violence, sexual assault, and other
forms of violence against women have a massive effect on women's
employment, workplace productivity, interstate travel, consumer
spending, and health care expenses, as well as on other aspects of

351. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; see also id. at 608 (Souter, J., dissenting) (critiquing the
majority's distinction between commercial and non-commercial activities); id. at 62728 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (same).
352. Id. at 562-68.
353. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
354. Id. at 613. The Court distinguished the criminal provisions of VAWA, which
do contain a jurisdictional element and have been upheld by the courts of appeals as
legitimate exercises of Congress's power under the first of the three Lopez categories.
Id. at 613 n.5.
355. Lopez observed that the Gun-Free School Zones Act contained no
jurisdictional element but did not indicate that a jurisdictional element is required.
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62. On the related but distinct point that jurisdictional
elements are neither necessary nor sufficient to safeguard federalism, see infra notes
476-79 and accompanying text.
356. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562.
357. Id. at 563, quoted in Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612.
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interstate commerce.358
The Morrison Court, however, hastened to undercut the
significance of the legislative findings supporting VAWA's civil rights
provision. Instead of approaching the legislative findings with the
deference dictated by Lopez,359 the Morrison majority rejected those
findings based on the assertion that they were "substantially
weakened" by their reliance on "a method of reasoning" that the
Court described as "unworkable. 36 ° In so doing, the Court essentially
allowed the fourth element in its Commerce Clause test to cancel out
the third.
When it turned to the fourth element in its inquiry, the Court stated
that the "method of reasoning" embodied in VAWA's legislative
record was indistinguishable from the government's unsuccessful
arguments in support of the Gun-Free School Zones Act in Lopez.36'
According to the Court, the links between gender-motivated violence
and interstate commerce are equally "attenuated" as those connecting
gun possession in school zones to interstate commerce.362 In fact, the
differences between the two statutes' demonstrated connections to
interstate commerce are stark.
Unlike the speculative,
unsubstantiated arguments advanced by the government in Lopez,363
VAWA's passage was accompanied by specific, well-documented
findings of the effects of gender-motivated violence on interstate

358. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614-15 (citing legislative history); id. at 628-36
(Souter, J., dissenting) (same).
359. The Lopez Court pointed out that a determination of constitutionality under
the Commerce Clause is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2, quoted in Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614. It made that
observation, however, in the context of endorsing the lenient "rational basis" test for
deciding whether a regulated activity sufficiently affects interstate commerce. Lopez,
514 U.S. at 557. In keeping with the rational basis approach, Lopez suggested that
congressional findings, were they available, would be treated as factually persuasive,
even if not legally binding. See id. at 562-63.
360. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615. Because legislative findings are statements of fact
based on evidence received by Congress, it is difficult to see how such findings can
legitimately be criticized as the product of a disfavored "method of reasoning," as if
they were the result of congressional theorizing rather than fact-finding. See id. at 638
(Souter, J., dissenting).
361. Id. at 615.
362. Id. at 612, 615.
363. With no contemporaneous congressional findings on which to rely, the
government defended the Gun-Free School Zones Act by hypothesizing that
possession of guns may lead to violent crime and that violent crime is costly and
reduces the willingness of individuals to travel to areas that are perceived as unsafe.
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-64. The government also argued that guns in schools pose
a threat to the educational process, which threatens to produce a poorly educated
workforce, which would negatively affect national productivity. Id. at 564; see also
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612-13 (summarizing "costs of crime" and "national
productivity" arguments advanced by the government in Lopez). The Lopez Court
found that accepting these arguments in the absence of any factual underpinnings
would require it to "pile inference upon inference." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
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commerce.3" Furthermore, the economic consequences of gendermotivated violence include effects that are qualitatively different from
the types of costs that are intrinsic to crime in general.365 Gendermotivated crime has a discriminatory economic impact, and it often
has a discriminatory economic purpose.366 As the Senate Judiciary
Committee reported,
Gender-based violence bars its most likely targets-women-from
full [psarticipation] in the national economy. For example, studies
report that almost 50 percent of rape victims lose their jobs or are
forced to quit in the aftermath of the crime. Even the fear of
gender-based violence.., deters women from taking jobs in certain
areas or at certain hours that pose a significant risk of such
violence.367
This discriminatory element differentiates gender-motivated crime
from most other crimes and provides additional justification for
congressional action under the Commerce Clause.368
The legislative findings in support of the civil rights remedy were
explicitly stated. They were based on empirical information. They
demonstrated a massive and direct effect on interstate commerce, and
revealed widespread economic discrimination against a disadvantaged
group. All these facts rendered the chain of causation identified by
the petitioners in Morrison far less "attenuated" than that advanced
by the government in Lopez.

364. See supra Part II. Based on the extensive evidence it had gathered, Congress
concluded that
crimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse effect on
interstate commerce, by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate,
from engaging in employment in interstate business, and from transacting
with ... business... in interstate commerce; crimes of violence motivated by
gender have a substantial adverse effect on interstate commerce, by
diminishing national productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and
decreasing the supply of and the demand for interstate products ....
House Conference Report, supra note 62, at 385; see also, e.g., 1993 Senate Report,
supra note 39, at 54 ("Gender-based crimes and the fear of gender-based crimes
restricts movement, reduces employment opportunities, increases health
expenditures, and reduces consumer spending, all of which affects interstate
commerce and the national economy.").
365. Cf. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615 (stating that "petitioners' reasoning would allow
Congress to regulate any crime"); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 (observing that the
government's "costs of crime" reasoning could apply to all violent crime).
366. See supra Part II; see also, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Equal Rights Advocates
et al. at 10-12, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29)
(describing men's use of violence against women as a tactic to prevent women from
gaining economic independence).
367. 1993 Senate Report, supra note 39, at 54.
368. For further discussion of the Morrison Court's failure to recognize the
significance of economic discrimination as a factor in establishing the civil rights
provision's constitutionality, see infra Part V.
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B. The FourteenthAmendment
Having found VAWA's civil rights provision invalid under the
Commerce Clause, the Court proceeded to consider its
constitutionality under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.369
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is a "positive grant of
legislative power" authorizing Congress "to enforce, by appropriate
legislation," the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive guarantees,
including the guarantee of equal protection of the laws.37 Section 5 is
part of a "vast transformation" in American federalism wrought by
the Reconstruction Amendments, which were designed to expand
Congress's power at the expense of state autonomy.371 Although
congressional power under Section 5 is not unlimited, "'[i]t is for
Congress in the first instance to "determine whether and what
legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment," and its conclusions are entitled to much deference."'372
After the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, the Court initially
responded favorably to federal legislation enacted under Section 5.373
However, as the tide turned against Reconstruction, the Court soon
invalidated exercises of Congress's enforcement power.374 During the
last quarter of the nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth,
Congress did not attempt to legislate under the Fourteenth
Amendment.375 With the advent of the civil rights era of the midtwentieth century, Congress and the Court again turned their
attention to congressional enforcement of the post-Civil War
amendments.376 During this period, the Court demonstrated its
willingness to interpret Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
expansively in order to permit Congress to take affirmative steps to
protect individual rights.377
369. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619-27.

370. See id. at 619 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517 (1997); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966)).
371. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-39, 242 (1972); see also City of Rome
v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 178-80 (1980); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 45356 (1976).
372. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80-81 (2000) (quoting Boerne, 521
U.S. at 536 (quoting Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651)).
373. See Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
374. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. Harris,
106 U.S. 629 (1883).
375. Laurence H. Tribe, 1 American Constitutional Law 922 (3d ed. 2000).
376. See generally Post & Siegel, supra note 17, at 486-502.
377. See, e.g., Morgan, 384 U.S. 641. The Court accorded a similarly broad reading
to the enforcement clauses of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. See, e.g.,
City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409 (1968); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). The Court has
interpreted the enforcement clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as
conferring "coextensive" powers on Congress. City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 208 n.1
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Morgan, 384 U.S. at 650-51.
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After VAWA was signed into law but before Morrison was
decided, the Court decided four cases invalidating some or all
applications of certain federal statutes enacted under Section 5. City
of Boerne v. Flores378 struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration

Act, which was Congress's attempt to override the constitutional
standard previously adopted by the Court to govern claims brought
under the Free Exercise Clause. In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,379 the Court held

that the federal Patent Remedy Act was not a valid exercise of
Congress's power under Section 5 and therefore did not waive the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. College Savings Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board8 ' held that
the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act cannot authorize suits
against the states for false advertising of their own products because
such activity is not a deprivation of property without due process of
law and therefore is not a valid subject for legislation under Section 5.
In Kimel v. FloridaBoard of Regents,"' the Court upheld an Eleventh
Amendment challenge to the application of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA") to the states, on the ground that
Congress lacked authority to enact the ADEA under Section 5. In
each of these cases, the Court emphasized that Congress's powers
under Section
5 are "remedial and preventive" only, not
' Moreover,
"substantive."382
Congress faulted all four statutes for their
failure to rest on a demonstrated record of constitutional violations
that they were ostensibly intended to remedy or prevent.383
The civil rights provision of VAWA presented a very different
picture from the statutes struck down in Boerne, Florida Prepaid,
College Savings Bank, and Kimel. Unlike the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, VAWA made no attempt to redefine prevailing
constitutional norms.3 84 VAWA was expressly designed to respond to

the constitutionally recognized harm of gender discrimination.385
378. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
379. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
380. 527 U.S. 666 (1999).

381. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
382. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 524-29. Congress "has been given the power 'to enforce,'
not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation." Id. at 519,
quoted in Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 638 and Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81; see also Coll. Sav.

Bank, 527 U.S. at 672-75 (holding that Congress may not validly legislate under
Section 5 when the right it seeks to enforce is not protected by the Constitution).
383. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89-91; Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 672-75; Fla. Prepaid,527

U.S. at 640; Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530-31.
384. Cf Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532 (describing RFRA as an attempt to create "a
substantive change in constitutional protections"); see also Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
at 672-75 (rejecting Congress's attempt to legislate under Section 5 to prevent a harm
that the Court does not recognize as a constitutional violation).
385. Sex discrimination has been accorded heightened scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Miss. Univ.
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); cf.
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After holding numerous hearings and issuing multiple reports,
Congress amassed ample proof that states were violating the equal
protection rights of female victims of violence on a widespread scale.
Reports on gender bias in the state courts, prepared under the
auspices of the states themselves, revealed "overwhelming evidence"
of a vast pattern of glaring gender discrimination by actors in the state
criminal and civil justice systems.386 In the words of the Senate
Judiciary Committee,
[The civil rights remedy] takes aim at gender-discrimination of the
type for which the 14h amendment provides heightened scrutiny ....
Under the

14 h

amendment, there is no clearer case of Congress's

power to legislate than when States have failed to protect equal
rights .... "[T]he criminal justice system is not providing equal
protection of the laws [to] women in the classic sense." For
example.... in many States rape survivors must overcome barriers
of proof and local prejudice that other crime victims need not
hurdle; they bear the burden of painful and prejudicial attacks on
their credibility that other crime victims do not shoulder; they may
be forced to expose their private lives and intimate conduct to win a
damage award; and finally, in some cases, they may be barred from
38 7
suit altogether by tort immunity doctrines or marital exemptions.
Based on the extensive legislative record it had compiled, Congress
explicitly found that "existing bias and discrimination in the criminal
justice system often deprives victims of crimes of violence motivated
by gender of equal protection of the laws" and that therefore "a
Federal civil rights action.., is necessary to guarantee equal
protection of the laws."3'88
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83-86 (invalidating the ADEA as applied to the states and
discussing the application of rational relation scrutiny to age discrimination under the
Equal Protection Clause).
386. 1993 Senate Report, supra note 39, at 45-47, 49 & n.52; 1991 Senate Report,
supra note 40, at 43-44 & n.40.
387. 1993 Senate Report, supra note 39, at 55 (quoting testimony of Cass Sunstein).
388. House Conference Report, supra note 62, at 385. As noted in the text, many
of the discriminatory policies and practices identified by Congress rose to the level of
violations of the Equal Protection Clause. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886) (holding that discriminatory enforcement of a facially neutral statute violates
equal protection). However, Congress was justified in concluding that the difficulties
of litigating individual cases alleging constitutional violations pointed to the need for
federal antidiscrimination legislation as an alternative remedy. See, e.g., South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966) (upholding a federal remedial
statute to protect constitutional rights which proved difficult to vindicate through
individual lawsuits). Some successful suits have been brought by female crime victims
alleging that state actors have violated their constitutional rights. See, e.g., Thurman
v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1531 (D. Conn. 1984) (denying motion to
dismiss in case alleging equal protection violations by city police department). There
are, however, numerous obstacles to such cases. The obstacles include restrictive
standing doctrines, see, e.g., Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973); the
requirement that non-facial discrimination must be intentional in order to give rise to
heightened scrutiny, see Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); the application of
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In Morrison, the Court acknowledged that by enacting the civil
rights provision, Congress was attempting to "remedy the States' bias
'
and deter future instances of discrimination in the state courts."389
The Court also conceded that Congress had assembled a
"6voluminous... record" supporting its finding of pervasive bias
against victims of gender-motivated violence in the state justice
systems.390 Nevertheless, the Court held that the civil rights remedy
could not be sustained under Section 5 for two reasons: because it
authorized lawsuits against private actors39' and because it was not
"congruent and proportional" to the harm it sought to remedy and
prevent.39
By apparently adopting a rule that legislation adopted under
Section 5 may create remedies only against state actors,3 93 the
Morrison Court betrays a puzzling failure to recognize the distinction
between Section 1 and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although the self-enforcing Equal Protection Clause of Section 1
applies only to state action, 394 its scope is not coextensive with that of
Section 5, which confers broad powers on Congress "to enforce, by
'
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."395
The Court
has repeatedly held that "[l]egislation which deters or remedies
constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress's
enforcement power [under Section 5] even if in the process it prohibits
conduct which is not itself unconstitutional."3' 96 In Katzenbach v.
Morgan, the Court confirmed that Congress had authority to enact
rational relation scrutiny to policies discriminating against victims of domestic
violence that are found to be gender-neutral, see, e.g., Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712,
717 (9th Cir. 1995); and narrow interpretations of the due process guarantee, see, e.g.,
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). On the
difficulty of bringing constitutional claims arising from gender-motivated violence, see
generally, for example, West, supra note 224, at 45-72; Siegel, supra note 73, at 219194.
389. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 620.
390. Id. at 619-20.
391. Id. at 620-25.
392. Id. at 625-27.
393. The Morrison opinion is not entirely clear on whether the applicability of the
civil rights remedy to private actors was constitutionally fatal in itself, or whether it
was only one factor to be considered in the context of the "congruence and
proportionality" test. For an argument that the latter is the correct interpretation, see
Post & Siegel, supra note 17; see also infra notes 521-27 and accompanying text
(discussing the unclear implications of the categorical distinctions adopted in
Morrison).

394. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ...deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
395. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5; see also supra notes 370-72 and accompanying
text (describing the breadth of Congress's enforcement power under Section 5).
Among the reasons why the scope of Section I is narrower than that of Section 5 is
the fact that the Court's institutional role, unlike that of Congress, requires the
exercise of judicial restraint. See generally Post & Siegel, supra note 17.
396. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997); see also, e.g., Kimel v. Fla.
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000).
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legislation under Section 5 in order to combat discrimination that the
Court itself had held did not violate Section 1.97 Yet in Morrison, the
Court inexplicably cited cases decided under Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to establish the parameters for Congress's

powers under Section

5.398

Given the longstanding view that Congress enjoys broad
enforcement powers to enact prophylactic legislation under Section 5,
it is by no means clear why legislation targeting private actors in order
to remedy or prevent Section 1 violations, as VAWA attempted to
do,399 should be prohibited.4"'
Several of the Court's twentiethcentury decisions contained language suggesting that Congress could
reach private acts of discrimination under Section 5.401 Instead of
relying on this modern precedent, the Morrison Court looked back to
4 °2 and
the nineteenth-century cases of United States v. Harris
the Civil
403
Rights Cases, which the Court viewed as standing for the principle
that Congress's powers under Section 5 extend only to regulating state
action.4" The Court's reliance on Harris and the Civil Rights Cases
was misplaced, because both cases specifically addressed the
constitutionality of federal statutes that were directed at the actions of
private actors without reference to any alleged constitutional
violations by the states or state officials.4 5 In marked contrast,
397. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 649 (1966); see also City of Rome v.
United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1966).
398. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621 ("Foremost among these limitations is the timehonored principle that the Fourteenth Amendment, by its very terms, prohibits only
state action. '[T]he principle has become firmly embedded in our constitutional law
that the action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only
such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States."' (emphasis added) (quoting
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 & n.12 (1948))); id. at 621-22 (citing Section 1 cases
in support of the proposition that Section 5 applies only to state action).
399. On the mechanisms by which VAWA would remedy and deter discrimination
by state actors, see infra notes 417-22 and accompanying text.
400. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 665 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[W]hy can Congress
not provide a remedy against private actors?"); Evan H. Caminker, Private Remedies
for Public Wrongs Under Section 5, 33 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1351, 1363 (2000) ("[I]f
Congress may, as a prophylactic matter, prohibit conduct that is 'not itself
unconstitutional' because some of the activity being proscribed is within constitutional
boundaries, why cannot Congress prohibit conduct that is 'not itself unconstitutional'
because some of the actors whose activity is being proscribed are not state actors?");
Post & Siegel, supra note 17.
401. See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424 n.8 (1973); Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1971); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 762
(1966) (Clark, J., concurring); id. at 782 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Because cases examining the constitutionality of twentiethcentury civil rights legislation relied primarily on the Commerce Clause, relatively few
such cases addressed the Section 5 issue. See generally Post & Siegel, supra note 17.
402. 106 U.S. 629 (1883).

403. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
404. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621-25.
405. Id. at 664-65 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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VAWA's civil rights remedy was passed in response to, and in order
to remedy and deter, a proven pattern of inadequate legal remedies
and outright gender bias by which the states have denied female crime
victims equal protection of the laws.4 °6 In a particularly discordant
note, the Morrison Court asserted that Harris and the Civil Rights
Cases deserve special weight because they were decided soon after
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, by justices who were
presumably familiar with the Amendment's adoption.4 7 Precisely
because of the historical period during which they were decided (that
is, the same period of sustained backlash against Reconstruction that
also produced Plessy v. Ferguson),"' Harrisand the Civil Rights Cases
and their narrow409 reading of the Fourteenth Amendment are, if
anything, suspect.

"[E]ven if" the case at hand could be distinguished from Harrisand
the Civil Rights Cases, the Court wrote in Morrison, "we do not
believe that it would save [the] civil remedy."4' 10 According to the
Court, the civil rights provision also failed the test requiring that
"prophylactic legislation under § 5 must have a 'congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and
the means adopted to that end.""'41 When this test was first announced
in Boerne, the Court stated that it was designed to ensure that
legislation that purports to enforce existing constitutional rights does
not in fact create new ones. 12 Although the Court has never defined
the congruence and proportionality test with precision,4"3 it appears to
demand both that Congress was reacting to an actual, substantial
constitutional violation, and that Congress's chosen solution was
calibrated to correspond to the problem it sought to correct.414
406. The majority in Morrisonattempted to reinforce the analogy to Harrisand the
Civil Rights Cases by pointing out that the statutes challenged in those cases were
likewise accompanied by legislative history revealing discriminatory state action. Id.
at 624-25. However, the Court in Harris and the Civil Rights Cases made no mention
of the portions of the legislative history cited in Morrison and instead treated both
statutes as restrictions on purely private activity with no connection to state action.
See Goldscheid, supra note 308, at 128.
407. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 622.
408. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
409. See Akhil Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 Harv. L.
Rev. 26, 104-07 (2000); Post & Siegel, supra note 17, at 481-82, 486, 501-03.
410. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 625.
411. Id. at 625-26 (citations omitted).
412. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (stating that legislation
lacking congruence and proportionality "may become substantive"-rather than
remedial or preventive-"in operation and effect").
413. For criticism of the test's lack of precision, see, for example, Evan H.
Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 Stan. L.
Rev. 1127, 1153 (2001); Post & Siegel, supra note 17, at 458-59, 479-80, 510-11.
414. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 89 (2000); Fla. Prepaid v.
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639 (1999); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530. This test has both
qualitative and quantitative dimensions. Caminker, supra note 413, at 1153-56.
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Unlike the other federal statutes previously struck down under this
test,415 VAWA's civil rights measure was tailored to "respond to a

history of 'widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional
rights."' 416 The civil rights provision was designed to "remedy" and

"prevent" these violations of women's equal protection rights in
several ways.
At the most basic level, the statute furnished a remedy for the

states' unconstitutional discrimination by providing women with a
cause of action for acts of violence that otherwise would not be
adequately redressed because of gender discrimination in the state
criminal and civil justice systems.4 17 Another way in which the civil
rights provision remedied unconstitutional discrimination in the
states' legal systems was by counteracting the reassurance that those
systems offered to rapists and batterers that gender-motivated
violence is permissible and unlikely to result in punishment.418
The civil rights measure was also aimed at deterring future
constitutional violations by the states. While other portions of
VAWA directly assist the states to improve their response to violence
against women by providing federal funding and other federal
resources, the civil rights provision complemented and reinforced that
effort by setting an example of treating violence against women with
the utmost seriousness.419 Federal civil rights legislation is uniquely
powerful in conveying the message that discriminatory behavior is
415. See supra notes 378-83 and accompanying text.
416. See Fla. Prepaid,527 U.S. at 645 (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 526).
417. Although the remedy provided did not take the form of a cause of action
against the states, it nevertheless remedied (that is, made up for) the states'
discriminatory failure to redress violence against women by providing victims with
access to federal law to obtain compensation for their injuries. This can be expressed
as a three-step process: (1) an assailant commits a gender-discriminatory act of
violence; (2) because of unconstitutional gender discrimination in the state criminal
and civil justice systems, the victim is denied adequate redress at the state level for the
discriminatory act of violence; (3) to remedy the state's unconstitutional
discrimination, VAWA provides the victim with an alternative source of redress for
the discriminatory act of violence. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 665 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) ("[G]iven the relation between remedy and violation-the creation of a
federal remedy to substitute for constitutionally inadequate state remedies-where is
the lack of 'congruence?'); see also Caminker, supra note 400, at 1358.
418. See supra Part II (describing mutually reinforcing attitudes of the general
public and state actors that condone violence against women); see also MacKinnon,
supra note 99, at 171 ("Although there are many explanations for violence against
women, few think it would take place to the degree it does if it were not largely and
predictably exempt from effective recourse.").
419. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 665 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that the civil
rights remedy "may lead state actors to improve their own remedial systems,
primarily through example"); 1991 Senate Hearing,supra note 44, at 156 (statement of
Gill Freeman, indicating that the civil rights remedy will "by its very existence,
increase the responsiveness of the states"); 1991 Senate Report, supra note 40, at 34
(describing the federal civil rights remedy and federal funding to states as "different
complementary strategies").
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unacceptable. 42° By communicating this message to state officials,
among others, the civil rights provision had the potential to change

both their attitudes and their behavior.421 Finally, VAWA's civil
rights provision served as a model for states to improve their legal
response to gender-motivated violence by adopting their own versions
of the civil rights remedy.422
Morrison posited two reasons why the civil rights provision failed
the congruence and proportionality test: first, the law authorized suits
against individual assailants rather than against states or state officials,
and second, it applied uniformly throughout the country.423 With
regard to the first rationale, the Morrison Court was incorrect in

stating that the civil rights measure was not "directed ...at any State
or state actor. ' 42 4 On the contrary, although VAWA created a cause
of action against individual perpetrators of gender-motivated
violence,425 it was calculated to influence the states in myriad ways.42 6
As for the statute's national scope, this response was in keeping with
the pervasiveness and intensity of the constitutional deprivations
identified by Congress and therefore satisfied the requirement of
proportionality.42 7 In light of the fact that Congress had evidence that
states were not adequately responding to gender-motivated violence

420. See, e.g., Women and Violence: Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
101st Cong., pt. 2, 171 (1990) (statement of Senator Joseph Biden); 1993 Senate
Report, supra note 39, at 50.
421. See 1993 Senate Report, supra note 39, at 38 (stating that "the act is intended
to educate the public and those within the justice system" in order to overcome "the
underlying attitude that this violence is somehow less serious than other crime and ...
the resulting failure of our criminal justice system to address such violence"; stating
further that the message of the civil rights remedy is that "[i]t is time for attacks
motivated by gender [bias] to be considered as serious as crimes motivated by
religious, racial, or political bias"); see also Caminker, supra note 400, at 1356
(discussing the expressive function of the civil rights remedy as a source of new social
norms for state actors).
422. See supra Part III.B.
423. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626-27. The alternatives implicitly suggested by the
Court-namely, that Congress enact legislation authorizing lawsuits directly against
the states and/or create a federal statutory scheme targeting selected states for
enforcement -would prove far more problematic from the point of view of federalism
than the provision of VAWA that was struck down. See infra Part IV.C.
424. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626.
425. It is worth noting that some perpetrators of gender-motivated violence are
state actors, and in those instances, state actors were subject to suit under VAWA.
See, e.g., Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000) (alleging attempted rape
of a prisoner by a state prison guard). However, it is true that VAWA's definition of
"crime of violence motivated by gender" did not require a showing of action taken
under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d). Such a requirement would have
excluded most cases of gender-motivated violence from the statute's coverage. See
supra Part II.
426. See supra notes 186-87, 419-22 and accompanying text.
427. "The appropriateness of remedial measures must be considered in light of the
evil presented. Strong measures appropriate to address one harm may be an
unwarranted response to another, lesser one." Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S.
62, 89 (2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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in the form of official gender bias reports from twenty-one states, a
letter of support from attorneys general of thirty-eight states, a
unanimous resolution of the National Association of Attorneys
General, and testimony from numerous state and local officials, it is
difficult to imagine gender-motivated violence as anything other than
a national problem requiring a national solution. 2
The Court's doctrinal missteps in interpreting Section 5 reveal the
extent of its failure to appreciate that Section 5 was expressly designed
to empower Congress to override the states in order to protect
individual rights.429 After the Civil War, as part of a "basic alteration
in our federal system," the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted to
ensure national consistency with respect to certain basic guarantees,
including a guarantee of equal protection of the laws. 31
Congressional action under Section 5 was intended to be a crucial
means of translating this promise into reality. When Congress passes
a statute like VAWA's civil rights remedy, it carries out the function
assigned to it by Section 5: to act "as a guarantor of basic federal
rights against state power. ' 431 By reflexively elevating states' rights
over all other considerations,432 the Court fundamentally
misconceived Congress's role in enforcing the Fourteenth
Amendment.433 Recognizing that there are some things that the states
simply cannot do-and that establishing a nationally uniform set of
equality rights is one of them-would have helped the Court to see
VAWA's civil rights remedy for what it was: a legitimate exercise of
Congress's Section 5 powers.434

428. See generally supra Part III.A. The majority opinion in Morrison was simply
inaccurate in stating that "Congress' findings indicate that the problem of
discrimination against the victims of gender-motivated crimes does not exist in all
States, or even most States." Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626. Although Congress did not
explicitly find that such discrimination is present in all states, it certainly did not find
that such discrimination is not present in all states. See id. at 666 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). In any event, requiring Congress to "document the existence of a
problem in every State prior to proposing a national solution" would be both
unprecedented and incompatible with the wide latitude accorded to Congress's
actions under Section 5. Id.; see also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 284 (1970)
(Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that "Congress was not
required to make state-by-state findings" of racial discrimination arising from literacy
tests for voters before enacting a nationwide ban on such tests).
429. See generally Post & Siegel, supra note 17.
430. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238 (1972).
431. Id. at 239.
432. But see supra Part III.A; infra notes 437-49 and accompanying text (arguing
that the Morrison decision actually undercut the interests of the states).
433. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976) (stating that the Civil War
amendments authorize Congress to intrude into "spheres of autonomy previously
reserved to the States" because the amendments were intended to expand Congress's
powers "with the corresponding diminution of state sovereignty"); see also supra
notes 370-72 and infra notes 503-06, 559-63 and accompanying text.
434. See generally infra Part V.
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C. The Implications of United States v. Morrison for Federalism
Throughout its opinion in Morrison, the Court's five-member
majority indicated that its overarching goal was to preserve "'our dual
system of government.' 435 However, the decision reached by the
Court in the name of federalism actually undermines federalism in a
number of ways. 6
First, in the guise of protecting the states, the Court struck down a
statute that was enacted at the states' behest. 7 In the process of
drafting and passing the civil rights provision, Congress sought out
and deferred to the views of state officials. 438 As noted earlier,
officials from a large majority of the states supported the civil rights
remedy both when it was pending in Congress and when it was under
review by the Supreme Court.439 As Justice Souter's dissent observed,
"[t]he States will be forced to enjoy the new federalism whether they
want it or not." 440
Both dissenting opinions in Morrison argued that the political
process, rather than judicial review, was the appropriate forum for
consideration of whether VAWA's civil rights remedy unduly
encroached on the prerogatives of the states.441 This view, which was
adopted by the Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority,442 recognizes the importance of protecting the states from
federal overreaching but asserts that such protection is built into the
political influence wielded by the states in the procedures by which
the federal government is selected and conducts its business.443
435. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608 n.3 (citation omitted).
436. Of course, it is not unusual for a constitutional doctrine to be over- or underinclusive with respect to its background justification. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 54, 65-66 (1997).

Nevertheless, when a constitutional decision like Morrison purports to be justified on
functionalist grounds-and particularly when the decision fails on formalist grounds,
as discussed supra in Parts IV.A and IV.B-it is relevant to consider the quality of the
decision's "fit" with the values it seeks to serve. As will be discussed further below,
the Court could have based its decision on other grounds that would have provided a
better fit with the values of federalism. See infra Part V.
437. See supra Parts II, III.A.
438. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 661-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
439. See supra Part III.A.
440. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 654 (Souter, J., dissenting); see id. (stating that "Antonio
Morrison, like Carter Coal's James Carter before him, has 'won the states' rights plea
against the states themselves' (citation omitted)). See generally Peter M. Shane, In
Whose Best Interest? Not the States', Wash. Post, May 21, 2000, at B5.

441. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 647-52 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 660-61 (Breyer,
J., dissenting). But see Morrison at 616 n.7 (asserting that the political process is
responsible for controlling Congress's exercise of the commerce power only within
the outer bounds of that power, as established by judicial review).
442. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Although Garcia has not been overruled, the Court's
current majority has increasingly moved away from applying its holding. See, e.g.,
Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997 Sup.

Ct. Rev. 199, 243-45.
443. Garcia,469 U.S. at 550-55 (citing, inter alia, Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review
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Among scholars, the view that the political process is sufficient to
protect the interests of the states under federalism has its champions
and its critics. 4" Regardless of whether one believes that the political
process is sufficient to safeguard the interests of the states as a general
matter, it is clear that the process worked in just this way in the case of
VAWA's civil rights remedy." 5 In the political process that led to
enactment of the civil rights provision, the states played a vital role,
ranging from the state civil rights laws that served as prototypes for
the federal statute, to the state gender bias reports that formed an
important part of the legislative record,.to the active lobbying of state
attorneys general in support of the legislation and the successful
agitation by state judges for changes in the bill's language.446 In large
part, VAWA's civil rights remedy was a product of the states' own call
for federal
assistance with the challenges posed by violence against
447
women.

Of course, the states are not free to enlarge

Congress's

constitutionally enumerated powers even if doing so would suit their

own purposes. 448 Nevertheless, when the Court claims that it is
striking down a statute in order to protect the states, the extent to
which the statute itself incorporates the protection of the states'
interests should be a highly relevant consideration. 449 The majority
opinion in Morrison failed even to mention the states' active support
for the civil rights remedy. While the Morrison Court attempted to
and the National Political Process (1980); Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards
of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954)).
444. Compare, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into the Political
Safeguards of Federalism, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 215 (2000) (emphasizing the role of
political parties and the political process in protecting state interests), and Larry
Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1485 (1994) (describing
protections for the states arising from interdependence between state and federal
officeholders), with, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and
Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 752,
790-99 (1995) (arguing that the political-safeguards theory is out of step with current
conditions and provides insufficient protection to the states), and Saikrishna B.
Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism
Theories, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1459 (2001) (arguing that the political-safeguards theory is
inconsistent with the constitutional text, structure, and original understanding).
445. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 652-54 (2000) (Souter, J.,
dissenting); id. at 661-64 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
446. See supra Part I.
447. See generally supra Part III.A.
448. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992) ("Where Congress
exceeds its authority relative to the States, therefore, the departure from the
constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the 'consent' of state officials .... State
officials thus cannot consent to the enlargement of the powers of Congress beyond
those enumerated in the Constitution.").
449. See generally Morrison, 529 U.S. at 661-64 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see Resnik,
supra note 194, at 675 n.259 (suggesting the possibility that "federal courts ought to be
more reluctant to act in the name of federalism when congressional action is based on
demands from specific kinds of state actors representing a majority of states").
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portray Congress as riding roughshod over the states, that description
actually applies to the Court's own action in overturning legislation
that the states themselves had sought.
Second, in its attempt to uphold federalism, the Court infringed on
the powers of Congress. The separation of powers among the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches rests on the same
rationale, and is equally as important, as the division of power
between the federal and state governments.4 0 Although the Morrison
Court professed "[d]ue respect for the decisions of a coordinate
branch, '45 ' it failed to demonstrate the deference owed to Congress's
exercise of its legislative function. In its Commerce Clause analysis, as
Justice Souter pointed out in dissent, the majority implicitly
"supplant[ed] rational basis scrutiny with a new criterion of review"
that is far mcre demanding and accords a larger role to the
judiciary.452 Similarly, in its discussion of Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court employed an approach that bears a closer
resemblance to a presumption of unconstitutionality'53 than it does to
the Court's previously announced standard of "much deference" to
congressional determinations of "whether and what legislation
is
45 4
needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Thus, in its zeal to protect the states from what it viewed as
congressional overreaching, the Court engaged in judicial activism and
invaded the province of the legislative branch. The Morrison
majority's distrust of Congress is particularly out of place in light of
the careful, deliberative process by which Congress adopted
VAWA.4 55 The civil rights provision was under active consideration

for more than four years, during which Congress painstakingly
assembled a vast body of testimony and reports demonstrating the
need for the legislation, the effects of gender-motivated violence on
interstate commerce, and the connections between gender-motivated
violence and discrimination by state actors.456 The resulting legislative

450. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991), cited in New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. at 181; FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 790 (1982)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Samuel H. Beer, To
Make a Nation: The Rediscovery of American Federalism 283 (1993) ("The two
auxiliary precautions, federalism and separation of powers, had a common rationale:
the principle of dividing power in order to protect republican liberty and to promote
the excellence of popular government.").
451. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607; see also id. at 608 (describing Congress's
considerable latitude under the Commerce Clause); id. at 619 (discussing Congress's
broad enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
452. Id. at 637-38 (Souter, J., dissenting).
453. See Caminker, supra note 413, at 1132.
454. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80-81 (2000). For further
discussion of the judicial deference owed to congressional enactments under Section
5, see generally Caminker, supra note 413; Post & Siegel, supra note 17.
455. See generally Morrison, 529 U.S. at 661-64 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
456. See supra Part II.
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record "is far more voluminous" than the record supporting Title II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which was twice unanimously upheld by
the Court.45 7
Before Morrison, cases invalidating federal legislation under the
Commerce Clause or Section 5 appeared to turn in large part on
Congress's failure to document the elements required by the Court's

constitutional tests.458 Commentators have suggested that the Court's
recent spate of decisions invalidating federal statutes reflects an
attempt to compel Congress to engage in a process of careful factfinding and deliberation that grapples forthrightly with both the
Court's precedents and the federalism implications of proposed
legislation.4 9 That is exactly what Congress did when it enacted
VAWA.460 In the course of considering the civil rights remedy,
Congress not only tracked the requirements of the Court's
constitutional precedents that were then in force but actually
anticipated the stricter standards that the Court would adopt later. 61

457. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 635 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241 (1964)).
458, See, e.g., Kimel, 528 U.S. 62 (finding that Congress did not compile adequate
evidence of unconstitutional age discrimination by the states); Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (finding
that Congress did not compile adequate evidence of patent infringement by the
states); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (finding that Congress did not
compile adequate evidence of religious persecution by the states); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (finding that Congress did not compile adequate evidence
of the effects on interstate commerce of gun possession in school zones). See generally
A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme
Court's New "On the Record" ConstitutionalReview of Federal Statutes, 86 Cornell L.
Rev. 328 (2001) (critiquing the Court's recent tendency, as exemplified by Kimel and
FloridaPrepaid,to strike down federal statutes because of the Court's conclusion that
the legislative record was inadequate).
459. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 413, at 1198-99; Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism
and the Court. Congress as the Audience?, 574 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 145,
150-53 (2001).
460. Some recent commentary has suggested that Congress adopted VAWA's civil
rights remedy in a sloppy or cavalier manner. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Congress as
Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred On the Court's Anti-Congress Crusade, 51 Duke
L.J. 435, 453-54 (2001). Because the legislative history of the civil rights provision was
far more exhaustive in its fact-finding, attention to the Constitution, and
consideration of federalism than that of legislation that has been upheld (such as Title
II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), not to mention that of legislation that has been
struck down (such as the statutes at issue in Kimel, Florida Prepaid, Boerne, and
Lopez), this assertion lacks empirical support. See Jackson, supra note 459, at 154
(stating that Congress exercised "care and deliberation" when enacting VAWA's civil
rights remedy).
461. Congress made explicit findings of the substantial effects of gender-motivated
violence on interstate commerce before the Court expressed a preference for such
findings in Lopez. Congress also made findings that the states were engaging in
widespread unconstitutional discrimination against female victims of crime and that a
federal cause of action was necessary to remedy the states' discrimination, before the
Court adopted the congruence and proportionality test in Boerne.

2002]

VAWA AND FEDERALISM

Yet Congress's well-documented adherence to a thorough, reflective
legislative process when adopting VAWA-a process in which

deference to the Court4 62 as well as to the states 463 played a

conspicuous role-had no apparent impact on the Court's decision to
strike down the civil rights provision.
The weakness of the Court's reasoning concerning federalism is
perhaps most clearly revealed by the alternatives that the Court
implicitly suggested would be preferable to VAWA's civil rights
remedy. In its Fourteenth Amendment discussion, the Court faulted
VAWA for authorizing lawsuits against private parties and for failing
to visit any direct consequences on the states or state officials.4" By
implying that Congress should furnish redress to victims of gendermotivated violence by providing them with a cause of action against
the states, the Court placed itself in the curious position of advocating
a solution that would create a hostile relationship between Congress
and the states rather than the cooperative relationship established by
VAWA.465 In place of a civil rights remedy that was carefully limited
to minimize any invasion into state prerogatives,466 the Court tacitly
endorsed a federal cause of action that would directly interfere with
state autonomy, clash with judicial and prosecutorial immunity,
undermine the goals of sovereign immunity, 467 and deplete state
462. A number of legislative hearings and congressional committee reports were
devoted to identifying the Court's controlling case law decided under the Commerce
Clause and Section 5 and ensuring that the civil rights remedy complied with that
body of law. See, e.g., 1993 House Hearing,supra note 44, at 38-50 (statement of Burt
Neuborne); id. at 51-68 (statement of Cass Sunstein); 1991 Senate Hearing,supra note
44, at 84-102, 126-30 (statement of Burt Neuborne); id. at 103-30 (statement of Cass
Sunstein); 1993 Senate Report, supra note 39, at 48-55.
463. See supra Part III.A.
464. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621-26.
465. The Morrison Court compared VAWA's civil rights provision unfavorably to
the statutes upheld in Katzenbach v. Morgan, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, and Ex
Parte Virginia, each of which created a cause of action against states or state officials.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626 (citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879)).
It should be remembered, however, that those earlier statutes were the products of
the antagonistic relationship between Congress and intransigent state officials that
characterized the Reconstruction period and the mid-twentieth century civil rights
era. It is not clear why the Morrison Court would urge Congress to reinstate that
adversarial relationship when Congress concluded that it was not necessary to do so.
See also infra notes 473-75 and accompanying text (discussing the pitfalls of providing
federal remedies administered against the states by the federal executive branch).
466. See generally Part III.A.
467. In other contexts, the Court has recently acted aggressively to widen the scope
of the states' immunity from suit. See generally, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528
U.S. 62 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44 (1996). This trend in the Court's sovereign immunity decisions not only
suggests that Morrison is inconsistent in calling for a new cause of action against the
states, but also raises the question of whether such a measure, once passed by
Congress, would pass muster under the Court's increasingly expansive view of
sovereign immunity.
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treasuries.468 The Court itself had previously criticized federallycreated private rights of action against the states for blurring
the
4 69
political accountability of the federal and state governments.
The Court's suggestion that VAWA's civil rights remedy would be
more likely to be upheld if it were targeted only at certain selected
states is similarly counterproductive from the viewpoint of
federalism. 470 Although Congress is permitted to confine a remedy to
designated states if it chooses,47 1 there is a danger that singling out

particular states for enforcement is more likely to engender conflict
and distrust between the states and the federal government than a
remedy directed at all states equally. 472 The adversarial nature of such

an approach would be exacerbated if, as the Court seemingly
recommended in Morrison, the remedy against the selected states
took the form of an action brought against the states by the federal
executive branch.47 3 Unlike VAWA's civil rights remedy, a federally-

administered remedy against the states would expand the federal law
enforcement bureaucracy 474 and create an antagonistic relationship
between the federal and state governments. From the standpoint of
someone concerned about political accountability, the risks of federal
enforcement would seem to be even greater than those of private
enforcement, because direct imposition of federal authority to force
states to change their policies and practices is likely to create
468. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 750 ("Private suits against nonconsenting Statesespecially suits for money damages-may threaten the financial integrity of the

States.").
469. See, e.g., id. at 750-51; see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 653 n.21 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that VAWA's civil rights remedy maintained clear boundaries
between federal and state authority by making it evident to defendants "which of our
dual sovereignties is attempting to regulate their behavior," but that a federal
regulation of the states would blur those boundaries).
470. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626-27.
471. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966).
472. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 283-84 (1970) (Stewart, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("Nationwide application reduces the danger that federal
intervention will be perceived as unreasonable discrimination against particular States
or particular regions of the country .... [D]rawing a line between those States where
a problem is pressing enough to warrant federal intervention and those where it is
not... may well appear discriminatory to those who think themselves on the wrong
side of it.").
473. In Morrison, the Court criticized VAWA for deviating from the state-specific
nature of the statutory scheme upheld in Katzenbach v. Morgan and South Carolinav.
Katzenbach. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626-27. Both of those cases concerned portions of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that authorized enforcement against the states by the
Attorney General of the United States.
474. In the absence of additional federal law enforcement personnel, it is difficult
to imagine how the federal government could effectively enforce the right to be free
from gender-motivated violence. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 810 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("[U]nless Congress plans a significant expansion of the National
Government's litigating forces to provide a lawyer whenever private litigation is
barred by today's decision and Seminole Tribe, the allusion to enforcement of private
rights by the National Government is probably not much more than whimsy.").
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confusion among the electorate as to which sovereign should get
credit for the results.475
The Court also suggested that the presence of a jurisdictional
element, requiring proof in each case of a connection to or effect on
interstate commerce, might have saved VAWA's civil rights
remedy. 476 Although a jurisdictional element ensures that there is a
link between a regulated activity and interstate commerce, the nature
of that link may be far more tenuous and insignificant than the
substantial effects on interstate commerce that Congress found are
caused by gender-motivated violence. A civil rights remedy that
covers only acts of gender-motivated violence involving a person
moving across state lines or a weapon transported in interstate
commerce, to give two examples of typical jurisdictional elements,477
would bar many victims from receiving relief, while at the same time
doing little to achieve the Court's goal of preventing Congress from
regulating areas such as criminal law and family law that have
traditionally been regarded as subject to the states' police power.478 In
any event, given the current trend toward reading the Commerce
Clause narrowly, it is not clear that such jurisdictional elements would
suffice to immunize a federal statute from constitutional challenge.479
Another option left open to Congress by Morrison is the use of its
conditional spending power to protect the victims of gendermotivated violence.
Current Spending Clause doctrine, which
remains unchanged by Morrison, would presumably allow Congress to
condition the receipt of federal dollars on the states' willingness to
abolish exceptions for marital rape in their criminal law and
immunities for spouses in their tort law. 8 Similarly, Congress could
use its spending power to compel states to adopt a civil rights remedy
475. But see Alden, 527 U.S. at 756 ("Suits brought by the United States itself
require the exercise of political responsibility for each suit prosecuted against a State,
a control which is absent from a broad delegation to private persons to sue
nonconsenting States."); Ann Althouse, The Alden Trilogy: Still SearchingFor a Way
to Enforce Federalism, 31 Rutgers L.J. 631, 659-60 (2000) (stating that placing
enforcement powers against the states in the hands of "accountable, federal public
officials" rather than private individuals demonstrates solicitude for the states).
476. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
477. See id. at 658-59 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing cases and statutes).
478. See generally id. at 658-59 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also infra Part IV.D
(discussing the Morrison Court's concern about congressional regulation of criminal
and family law matters).
479. See, e.g., United States v. Faasse, 227 F.3d 660 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that the
Child Support Recovery Act, which makes failure to pay certain child support
obligations across state lines a federal crime, is unconstitutional), rev'd, 265 F.3d 475
(6th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
480. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). But see, e.g., Lynn A.
Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1911 (1995)
(arguing that when Congress uses conditional offers of federal funds to regulate the
states in ways that it could not do directly, the legislation should be presumed
invalid).
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for gender-motivated violence in order to receive federal funds for
programs related to violence against women.48 ' While requirements
such as these would result in beneficial changes in state law, they
would achieve that result through a mechanism that interferes more
directly with state legislative decision-making than VAWA's civil
rights provision did.
D. United States v. Morrison As an Exercise in Line-Drawing
As we have seen, the outcome in Morrison was justified neither on
the formalist ground of adherence to constitutional text and Supreme
Court precedent,"' nor on the functionalist ground of advancing the
interests of federalism.483 What, then, explains the Court's decision?
This question requires us to reexamine the nature of the Morrison
Court's concern about federalism. Although the Morrison decision in
fact undercut the prospects for ideal functioning of the federalist
system in several ways,484 the Court was clearly motivated by its

perception that invalidating VAWA's civil rights provision was
necessary in order to preserve federalism itself. According to the
Court, a decision upholding the civil rights remedy under either the
Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment would "obliterate"
the distinction between national and local authority and thereby
eradicate federalism altogether.485 Thus, the "function" the Court
sought to serve was the perpetuation of federalism, rather than the
perpetuation of its subsidiary benefits. Moreover, the version of
federalism that the Court sought to preserve took a particular form.
The Court's mission was to impose limits on federal power in order to
safeguard a "supposedly discernible, proper sphere of state autonomy
to legislate or refrain from legislating as the individual States see
fit. "486

In pursuit of this mission, the Court set aside the well-established,
deferential standards applicable to assessing the constitutionality of
federal legislation under the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, the Court framed its decision as a
series of categorical distinctions. In the course of a fairly brief
opinion, the Court set out at least a half-dozen such differentiations:
between economic and noneconomic activity, between statutes that do
and do not contain a jurisdictional element, between the presence and
481. See generally C. Quince Hopkins, Rescripting Relationships: Towards a
Nuanced Theory of Intimate Violence as Sex Discrimination,9 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & Law
409 (2001).
482. See supra Part IV.A-B.
483. See supra Part IV.C.
484. See supra Part IV.C.
485. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615, 616 n.6, 620 (2000); see also id. at
608 & n.3.
486. Id. at 644-45 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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absence of legislative findings, between state actors and private actors,
between remedies that are national in scope and those that are statespecific, and between areas of traditional state concern and areas of
traditional federal concern. In the Court's view, drawing these lines
was necessary in order to preserve the most important line of all: the
line between the national and the local that lies at the heart of
federalism.487
The existence and position of each of these lines is questionable on
a number of levels.
The dichotomy between economic and
noneconomic activity, which the Morrison Court incorporated into its
Commerce Clause analysis, is reminiscent of the artificial, limiting
distinctions that characterized Commerce Clause jurisprudence in the
years leading up to 1937.488 Those bright-line distinctions proved
unworkable under modern economic conditions and were abandoned
when the tide of Commerce Clause interpretation turned at the height
of the New Deal.
The Court specifically repudiated rigid
categorization as a mechanism for resolving Commerce Clause
disputes and adhered to this resolution for over half a century.489 Like
its pre-1937 predecessors, the economic-noneconomic distinction is
unwieldy, disregards the complexity of an interconnected national
economy, and leads to irrational results.49° If the ultimate question is
whether an activity regulated by Congress has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce,4 91 it is not at all clear why the nature of the
activity as intrinsically commercial or non-commercial should be
487. Id. at 617-18.
488. See id. at 640-45 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 627-28 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting). The distinctions relied upon in pre1937 Commerce Clause cases included a distinction between commerce and
manufacture and between direct and indirect effects on interstate commerce. See, e.g.,
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156

U.S. 1 (1895).
489. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Darby, 312 U.S. 100; NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Even Lopez, which went further
toward restricting the scope of the Commerce Clause than any other case decided in
the sixty years before Morrison, acknowledged that "the question of congressional
power under the Commerce Clause is necessarily one of degree" that cannot be
measured by "precise formulations." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566-67 (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also id. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that
congressional power under the Commerce Clause is "not susceptible to the
mechanical application of bright and clear lines"); id. at 573 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(stating that "mathematical or rigid formulas" are out of place in Commerce Clause
analysis (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at 123 n.24)).
490. As Justice Breyer pointed out in his dissent in Morrison, the line between
economic crime and noneconomic crime is difficult to draw. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 656
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Furthermore, if the Court's purpose was to allow the states
regulatory autonomy in areas traditionally under their control, economic crime fits
that description just as much as noneconomic crime. Id. at 658 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
491. See supra Part IV.A.
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determinative.492 "[T]he distinction between commercial and noncommercial activity does not map onto any value commonly
associated with federalism."49' 3

Similarly, as discussed earlier, the Court's distinctions between
statutes that do and do not contain a jurisdictional element, remedies
that target state actors and those that target private actors, and
statutes that apply to the whole country and those that apply only to
certain states, were not required by previous case law and invite
consequences that are counterproductive from the viewpoint of
preserving state autonomy.4 94 As for the polarity between legislative

findings and no legislative findings, VAWA's civil rights remedy
actually fell on the
positive side of this axis, but the Court chose to
495
devalue this fact.
A line on which the Morrison Court placed particular emphasis was
the line demarcating "areas of traditional state regulation. '496 In its
Commerce Clause discussion, the Court warned that the arguments in
support of the civil rights remedy "would allow Congress to regulate
any crime" and could "be applied equally as well to family law,"
including "marriage, divorce, and childrearing."4' 97 Echoing Lopez,
Morrison portrayed criminal and family law as epitomes of "truly
local" concerns. 498 By depicting VAWA as a congressional attempt to
usurp control over criminal and family law and thereby invade "the
province of the States, ' 499 the Morrison Court raised the specter of a
"completely centralized government," devoid of any division between
state and federal powers.5 °° In other words, if Congress can regulate
criminal and family law, it can regulate anything.
The Court's concern about Congress invading areas "where States
historically have been sovereign, ' 50 1 although proclaimed most clearly
in its Commerce Clause discussion, reverberated in its Fourteenth
492. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 657-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Of course, the Court
may have concluded that permitting Congress to legislate regarding any matter that
has a substantial effect on interstate commerce would accord Congress too broad a
mandate. But that does not explain why the Court drew the line at noneconomic
activities, particularly when other, more appropriate limiting principles were
available. See infra Part V.
493. Shane, supra note 170, at 221.
494. See supra Part IV.C.
495. See supra notes 356-60 and accompanying text.
496. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615. This distinction is reminiscent of the focus on
traditional state functions in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976),
which was repudiated in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469

U.S. 528 (1995).
497. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16.
498. Id. at 613 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564); id. at 618 (citing, inter alia, Lopez,
514 U.S. at 566).
499. Id. at 618.
500. Id. at 608 (quoting, inter alia, Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556-57) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
501. Id. at 613 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564).
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Amendment analysis as well.5 °2 Any suggestion that Congress should
refrain from legislating under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment in areas that have traditionally been under state control
is entirely misplaced."0 3 As the Court has repeatedly recognized, the
Fourteenth Amendment permits congressional intrusion into
54
"legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States. 0
As part of the "basic alteration in our federal system ' 50 5 that was
achieved during Reconstruction, the Fourteenth Amendment was
expressly designed to "expand[] federal power at the expense of state
autonomy, ' 50 6 particularly in cases of discrimination by the states.
The Court's attempt to carve out "a sacred province of state
autonomy ' 50 7 in legal areas that have traditionally been subject to
Contrary to the Court's
exclusive state control is unsound.
assumption, criminal and family law have never been entrusted solely
to the states.50 8 Furthermore, the civil rights provision of VAWA was
not a criminal or family law statute;5 9 rather, to the extent that such
categorization is possible or helpful,510 it was a civil rights law. 1'
Moreover, despite the Morrison Court's insistence to the contrary,
overlapping federal and state control of a given subject is not
In fact, such
tantamount to the breakdown of federalism.512

502. See id. at 620 (stating that limitations on congressional action under the
Fourteenth Amendment "are necessary to prevent the Fourteenth Amendment from
obliterating the Framers' carefully crafted balance of power between the States and
the National Government").
503. See Caminker, supra note 413, at 1191-96; Post & Siegel, supra note 17, at 48186, 507-13.
504. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997) (quoting Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)).
505. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238 (1972).
506. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996), quoted in Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 637
(1999).
507. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 236 (1983), quoted in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985).
508. See generally Resnik, supra note 194, at 642-56.
509. The Morrison Court repeatedly described the civil rights provision as a statute
regulating crime. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 606, 615, 617-19 (2000).
The Court acknowledged that Congress "expressly precluded [the civil rights remedy]
from being used in the family law context." Id. at 616 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(4)
(1994)). Nevertheless, the Court concluded that it could not allow Congress to enact
this non-family law statute without giving Congress unlimited power to enact family
law statutes in the future. Id. at 615-16. This conclusion overlooked the presence of
factors, such as the need for federal intervention because of state incompetence and
discrimination, which distinguish VAWA's civil rights remedy from a generic federal
marriage or divorce law. See infra Part V.
510. See infra notes 515-20 and accompanying text.
511. On the distinctions between a civil rights law and state domestic relations and
criminal law, see supra notes 146-54.
512. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) ("As long as it is acting
within the powers granted it under the Constitution .... Congress may legislate in
areas traditionally regulated by the States.").

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

overlapping jurisdiction is typical of American federalism and is
potentially one of its greatest strengths.5 13 As VAWA illustrated,
federal legislation in an area that is also governed by state law may be
both welcomed by the states and conducive to their exercise of
legislative authority. 14
The critique of the Morrison Court's attempt to draw a line
between areas of traditional state and federal control also applies to
the Court's use of categorical distinctions in general. The Court's
reliance on bright-line distinctions is problematic, not only because it
invites categorization errors, 15 but because it is employed in the
service of a vision of federalism as a system of two clearly delineated,
mutually exclusive spheres of government. As Professor Judith Resnik
has argued, the Court's conception of "categorical federalism" is both
inaccurate and harmful.5 1 6 Although federalism presupposes the
existence of two levels of government, it does not presuppose that the
two realms are fixed and distinct. 17 With regard to many legal
questions, concurrent federal and state authority is the rule rather
than the exception. 18 Properly conceived, the task confronting the
Court in Morrison was not to stake out an impenetrable boundary
'
between the "truly national and... [the] truly local,"519
but to
encourage a dynamic, constructive interchange between federal and
state law. Upholding VAWA's civil rights remedy would have
fostered such an interchange; striking it down did the opposite.5 20
An additional criticism of the Court's line-drawing in Morrison is
that it is not clear how the dichotomies presented by the Court relate
to each other and which of them, if any, are determinative of the
holding. The Court's four-part Commerce Clause inquiry, the first
three parts of which are expressed as bright-line distinctions,521 is more
a set of "reference points" or "considerations" than a coherent legal
513. See generally Resnik, supra note 194.
514. See supra Part III.B.
515. See Resnik, supra note 194, at 629-34 (pointing out the danger of
categorization errors arising from the Court's adoption of bright-line distinctions in
the name of federalism). In Morrison, the Court committed categorization errors with
respect to several of the dualisms featured in its opinion. The subject of VAWA's
civil rights remedy should properly be regarded as economic, not noneconomic; the

statute's attempt to remedy and prevent constitutional violations was aimed at state
actors, not private actors; the problem the statute addressed was nationwide, not
specific to certain states; and the civil rights provision fell under the rubric of civil
rights legislation, not criminal law or family law. See supra Part IV.A-B.
516. See generally Resnik, supra note 194.
517. Id.
518. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 639 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting);
Post & Siegel, supra note 17, at 484-85; see generally Resnik, supra note 194.
519. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18.
520. See supra Part HILA-B.
521. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the distinctions between economic and
noneconomic activities, the presence or absence of jurisdictional elements, and the
presence or absence of legislative findings).
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rule.522 For example, the Court equivocated on whether it was
adopting a requirement that legislation enacted under the Commerce
Clause may regulate only economic activity. 23 In the same manner,
the Court seemed to establish an absolute prohibition against
congressional regulation of private actors under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment 5 24 but then suggested that this distinction
was not necessarily dispositive 525 and revisited the state action-private
action dichotomy as merely one factor in the amorphous "congruence
and proportionality" test. 26 In sum, the lines drawn by the Morrison
Court are rigid in themselves but vague in application.527
V. PRESERVING CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS WITHOUT SACRIFICING
FEDERALISM: A PROPOSAL FOR AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE COURT'S
ANALYSIS IN MORRISON

Central to the Morrison Court's reasoning was the assumption that
if Congress could pass VAWA's civil rights remedy, it could pass
anything; if the civil rights remedy survived, federalism was dead.528
The Court overlooked possible alternative approaches for preserving
Congress's ability to enact civil rights legislation without obliterating
the distinction between federal and state government.
The most obvious alternative consists of relying on the basic
standards that had been established in previous case law for
determining the scope of Congress's powers under the Commerce
Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.529 Properly
applied, those traditional standards lead to the conclusion that
VAWA's civil rights remedy was a valid exercise of Congress's
522. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609, 613; id. at 654-55 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority for embracing earlier Commerce Clause cases as sources of
"considerations" rather than rules, failing to provide a workable definition of the
commerce power, and leaving future cases to ad hoc decision-making).
523. Compare id. at 613 (stating that "we need not adopt a categorical rule against
aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases"),
with id. at 617 ("We accordingly reject the argument that Congress may regulate
noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect
on interstate commerce.").
524. Id. at 621-25.
525. Id. at 625 (considering an alternative ground for decision that would invalidate
VAWA's civil rights provision even if it could be successfully distinguished from the
statutes struck down in the Civil Rights Cases and United States v. Harris).
526. Id. at 625-26; see supra Part IV.B.
527. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 637, 645, 654 (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing
the majority's analysis as a series of "discounts" or "devaluations" superimposed on
well-established Commerce Clause tests).
528. See supra Part IV.D.
529. Those standards include, interalia, the requirement that Congress must have a
rational basis for concluding that an activity regulated under the Commerce Clause
has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and the requirement that legislation
enacted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment must be designed to remedy
or prevent constitutional violations. See supra Part IV.A-B.
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Commerce Clause and Section 5 powers.3 " Additionally, a strong
argument can be made that those standards are adequate to the task
of preventing the federal government from amassing unlimited power,
particularly in light of the role the states play in the formation and
operations of the federal government.53' However, the Morrison
majority clearly disagreed with this position and felt that it needed to
articulate additional limitations on congressional power in order to
avoid the slippery slope toward "a completely centralized
government."532
Even if one accepts as valid the Court's impulse to adopt additional
limiting principles to protect "'our dual system of government,"'533 the
limitations chosen by the Court were not an effective means of
accomplishing that task. As demonstrated above, the categorical
distinctions adopted in Morrison, together with the Court's failure to
defer to Congress and the expressed will of the states, were not
conducive to advancing the values of federalism and were in many
53 4
ways arbitrary or harmful when assessed according to those values.
An alternative limiting principle-one that rests on concepts that lie
at the core of federalism-was available to the Court in Morrison. If
the Court felt the need to identify a discrete limiting principle to
restrict congressional power, in addition to those already incorporated
into well-established tests under the Commerce Clause and Section 5,
it should have focused its inquiry on whether Congress could
rationally have found that there was a demonstrated need for federal
intervention based on the states' innate incapability of addressing the
problem at hand. In the case of VAWA's civil rights remedy, the
need for federal intervention was demonstrated by the fact that the
states, by their own admission, were incompetent to solve the problem
of gender-motivated violence; the fact that the states themselves were
discriminating against victims of gender-motivated violence; and the
fact that fundamental antidiscrimination norms, by their nature,
require national application.535
This proposed approach is a logical expression of the legitimate
federal interest in filling gaps left by state law's inadequacies. Unlike
the bright-line distinctions on which the Morrison majority relied, it
has the advantage of addressing head-on the Court's concern about
avoiding total centralization of power in the federal government. It
leaves room for consideration of both states' rights and individual
rights and is consistent with the fact that federal intervention can
empower the states to solve otherwise insuperable problems; by
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.

See generally supra Part IV.A-B.
See supra notes 441-45 and accompanying text.
Morrison,529 U.S. at 608 (citations omitted).
Id. at 608 n.3 (citation omitted).
See supra Part IV.C-D.

535. See infra notes 546-70 and accompanying text.
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contrast, the Court's analysis in Morrison focused solely on states'
rights and simplistically assumed that federal intervention is always

detrimental to the states' autonomy. In keeping with the deference
due to congressional enactments under the Commerce Clause and
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the criterion proposed here
should be interpreted broadly.536 By recognizing a robust but not
unlimited role for federal intervention,537 this alternative analysis
would allow both antidiscrimination statutes like the VAWA civil

rights remedy and federalism to survive and flourish.
Channeling federal legislative power to areas that lie beyond the
capabilities of the states has a long history that is reflected in both the

Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. The delegates to
the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia adopted a resolution to
vest in Congress the power "to legislate in all cases for the general
interests of the Union, and also in those to which the states are
separately incompetent, or... in which the harmony of the United
'
States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation."5 38

The Committee of Detail was charged with the task of distilling these
general principles into a document enumerating specific powers, and
the Commerce Clause derived directly from this process.53 9 Thus, the

Commerce Clause, from its inception, was intended to apply to
matters in which federal action was needed because actions by the
states would be inadequate or counterproductive.54 Likewise, Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted in recognition of the
need for federal action to overcome state resistance to racial
equality.54 ' Under Section 5, Congress was empowered to provide a
536. See supra Part IV.A-B.
537. Even construed liberally, this inquiry would require more than a mere
showing that the activity regulated by Congress is a nationwide problem or a topic on
which national uniformity might be helpful or convenient. Thus, it would succeed in
distinguishing VAWA's civil rights remedy, which would be upheld based on the
ample available evidence of the states' inability to offer an adequate legal response,
from the Gun-Free School Zones Act or a generic federal code of domestic relations
or criminal law, which would be struck down in the absence of such evidence. If,
however, evidence emerged that the states are as incompetent and discriminatory in
their treatment of divorcing women as they are in their treatment of victims of
gender-motivated violence, a federal statute targeted at protecting divorcing women's
civil rights might be permissible under this approach. See MacKinnon, supra note 99,
at 149 (suggesting that the states' record of sex discrimination in divorce is
comparable to their record of unconstitutional discrimination against female victims
of violence).
538. Robert Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47
Harv. L. Rev. 1335, 1338-40 (1934), quoted in Brest et al., supra note 333, at 134-35.
539. Id.
540. Indeed, a primary reason for adopting a Constitution was that the states
proved incapable of coordinating their commercial affairs under the Articles of
Confederation. See The Federalist No. 22, at 143-45 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961); The Federalist No. 42, at 267 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
541. See generally Post & Siegel, supra note 17; see also infra notes 559-63 and

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

remedy where state law provided none, or where a state law remedy
existed in theory but proved inadequate in practice. 42
Even staunch opponents of broad congressional authority have
acknowledged that congressional action is appropriate when a
problem lies beyond the legislative ability of individual states.543 Chief
Justice Rehnquist, in speeches criticizing Congress for creating too

many new federal causes of action, has suggested that "demonstrated
state failure" should serve as a litmus test for identifying topics
suitable for federal intervention.5"

In applying this test to the

Violence Against Women Act, Chief Justice Rehnquist assertedagainst the weight of the evidence-that state courts were "already

competently handl[ing]" violence against women and that "one
senses... that the question of whether the states were doing an
adequate job in this particular area was never seriously asked" by
Congress.545
Although the Morrison Court failed to recognize it, gendermotivated violence is an archetypal example of demonstrated state

failure. 46 As the courts have previously noted, the nature of problems
that require federal legislation because they "defy local solution" can

take varying forms.547 In the case of gender-motivated violence, there
accompanying text (discussing the need for national uniformity in equality norms).
542. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-74 (1961), overruled on other
grounds by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
543. See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Federalismfor the Future, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev.
523, 534 (2001) ("Instead of peering solely at phrases like 'remedial and preventive'
or 'commandeering' or 'substantial effects,' the Court will need to ask whether a
particular area is one where the uniform application of a rule is important.").
544. William H. Rehnquist, The 1998 Year-End Report of the Federal Judiciary,
The Third Branch, Jan. 1999, at 1, 4; see also id. at 3 ("[M]atters that can be handled
adequately by the states should be left to them; matters that cannot be so handled
should be undertaken by the federal government."); Rehnquist Discusses LongRange Planning for U.S. Courts, 138 Cong. Rec. E747 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1992)
(stating that before Congress adds to the federal courts' caseload, "the question
should be asked as to whether the state courts presently deal, and deal with
reasonable effectiveness, with these same matters").
545. William H. Rehnquist, Welcoming Remarks: National Conference on StateFederal Judicial Relationships, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1657, 1660 (1992); Rehnquist: Is
Federalism Dead?, Legal Times, May 18, 1998, at 12. The legislative record
assembled by Congress in support of VAWA thoroughly belies the Chief Justice's
claims that the states were already handling the problem of violence against women
and that Congress failed to consider whether the states were doing an adequate job.
See supra Parts II, IV.A-B.
546. VAWA's civil rights remedy is thus distinguishable from the string of federal
statutes recently struck down in whole or in part by the Court on the basis of the
Court's finding that they were not enacted in response to widespread state inaction or
misconduct. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see
also supra Part IV.A-B.
547. United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding the Child
Support Recovery Act). These forms include but are not limited to situations that
span across state lines, see, e.g., id., and situations that present collective action
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was indisputable evidence that the states were systemically incapable
of responding effectively to the problem because of a combination of
inertia and entrenched discrimination. Congress determined that rape
and domestic violence are committed on a huge and growing scale;
arrest and conviction rates are abysmal; archaic state legal doctrines
like interspousal tort immunity and marital rape exemptions bar
women from obtaining legal relief; special evidentiary rules and jury

instructions expose rape victims to scrutiny and humiliation not
inflicted on victims of other crimes; and actors in the state criminal
and civil justice systems routinely subject female victims of violent
crime to indifference and hostility. 48 These widespread state
failures,54 9 and the consequent need to rectify them at the federal
level, were among the primary reasons why VAWA's civil rights
remedy was passed."5
Significantly, the admission of state incompetence as well as the call
for federal intervention came from state officials themselves.
Although active state participation of this kind is not essential to
justify congressional action, it is certainly a relevant consideration
from the viewpoint of concern about federalism. 1 Congress had
before it twenty-one reports, produced by state-appointed task forces
to examine gender bias in the state courts, which together provided
"overwhelming evidence" of the states' failure to treat female crime
victims fairly.55 In a letter to Congress supporting VAWA, forty-one

attorneys general stated,
We believe.., that the current system for dealing with violence
against women is inadequate. Our experience as Attorneys General
strengthens our belief that the problem of violence against women is
a national one, requiring federal attention .... [VAWA] would
begin to meet those needs by, inter alia.... creating a specific
problems among the states, see, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 281-82 (1981); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115
(1941); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 588 (1937). See generally Perez v.
United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (upholding the Consumer Credit Protection Act
based in part on a showing that loan-sharking "'simply cannot be solved by the States
alone"' (citation omitted)).
548. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628-34 (Souter, J., dissenting); 1993 Senate
Report, supra note 39, at 38, 42, 44-47, 49, 55.
549. Christy Brzonkala's experience illustrates the common phenomenon of state
failure to redress gender-motivated violence. She received no tangible results from
her efforts to seek justice through the internal disciplinary process at her state
university and through her state's criminal justice system. See supra notes 109-17 and
accompanying text.
550. See 1993 Senate Report, supra note 39, at 44 (stating that "State remedies are
inadequate to fight bias crimes against women"); id. at 55 (stating that the civil rights
provision "provides a necessary remedy to fill the gaps and rectify the biases of
existing State laws").
551. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 653-54 (Souter, J., dissenting).
552. Id. at 630 & n.7 (Souter, J., dissenting); 1993 Senate Report, supra note 39, at
49 & n.53.
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civil rights remedy for the victims of gender-based

crimes . ..

."'

The brief in support of the civil rights remedy that was filed in the
Supreme Court by thirty-six states and Puerto Rico was similarly
unequivocal. It stated, "The States' own studies demonstrate that
their efforts to combat gender-motivated violence, while substantial,
are not sufficient by themselves to remedy the harm caused by such

'
violence or to eliminate its occurrence."554
The brief described at
length the deficiencies in the states' legal systems as revealed by the
states' gender bias task force reports and concluded, "The States' own
assessments of their legal responses to violence against women
demonstrate that state protections remain inadequate, 555
and thus
support congressional enactment of VAWA's civil remedy.
It is particularly noteworthy that a primary cause of the states'
inability to address gender-motivated violence was rampant
discrimination within the state legal systems. 556 Discrimination by
state officials is a classic scenario calling for the enactment of federal

civil rights legislation. 7 Just as the quest for racial justice cannot be
entrusted to state courts that are perpetuating racism, it seems

pointless to expect state courts to recognize and punish sexdiscriminatory crimes of violence when they are unable to root out sex
discrimination in their own midst.
This type of double
discrimination-discriminatory state action that effectively immunizes
private discrimination from meaningful legal redress-is a powerful
justification for federal intervention. s
553. 1993 House Hearing,supra note 44, at 35. The attorneys general signing the
letter came from thirty-eight states, the District of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin
Islands. Id. at 36.
554. Brief of Arizona, supra note 174, at 2.
555. Id. at 15-16.
556. Congress found that
existing bias and discrimination in the criminal justice system often deprives
victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender of equal protection of the
laws and the redress to which they are entitled; ... and the victims of crimes
of violence motivated by gender have a right to equal protection of the laws,
including a system of justice that is unaffected by bias or discrimination and
that, at every relevant stage, treats such crimes as seriously as other violent
crimes.
House Conference Report, supra note 62, at 385-86.
557. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961) (explaining that one reason
for enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was "to afford a federal right in federal courts
because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws
might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges,
and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by state
agencies"), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436
U.S. 658 (1978).
558. As Professor Burt Neuborne stated in testimony before Congress:
The common denominator that underlies [previous federal civil rights
legislation] is a recognition that there are vulnerable people living at the
State and local level, that State and local government have been unable to
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There is another sense in which the discriminatory nature of
gender-motivated violence cries out for a national solution in ways
that are distinct from a host of other problems, such as gun possession
in school zones. Basic equality rights must be declared and protected
at the federal level, because only federal law can establish legal norms

that are fundamental to national citizenship.55 9 If a right is
fundamental to our national conception of justice, it must not
disappear or diminish as one crosses state lines.56°
Discrimination has long been recognized as a special case in which
federal intervention is justified not only by state obstructionism but
also by the conscious choice that was made in the aftermath of the
Civil War to place certain types of equality at the center, rather than
the periphery, of national self-definition. Almost 150 years ago, "[a]s
a result of the new structure of law that emerged in the post-Civil War
era-and especially of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was its
centerpiece-the role of the Federal Government as a guarantor of
basic federal rights against state power was clearly established. 5 61 A
similar move took place with respect to sex discrimination with the
ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, which declared that
women's status as equal citizens is essential to our national identity

and not contingent on state preferences.562
Thus, when Congress declared that crimes of violence motivated by
gender constitute a federal civil rights violation, it was acting
consistently with constitutional and statutory developments since the
Civil War to enforce equality rights in a manner that explicitly and

intentionally removes the power of the states to deny those rights.563

Recognizing

the

special

role

of federal

law

in

combating

protect, and that Congress steps in with a backstop, with a reinforcement,
with an exercise in cooperative federalism to try to help State and local
government carry out their primary responsibility. That is what the civil
rights cause of action in [VAWA] is.
1991 Senate Hearing,supra note 44, at 87 (testimony of Burt Neuborne).
559. See 1993 Senate Report, supra note 39, at 51 ("State laws do not provide, and
by their nature cannot provide, a national antidiscrimination standard.").
560. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 209, at 22-23.
561. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1972); see also Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112, 284 (1970) (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("A
remedy for racial discrimination which applies in all the States underlines an
awareness that the problem is a national one and reflects a national commitment to its
solution.").
562. See generally Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex
Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 947 (2002). As Professor

Siegel points out, the promise of the Nineteenth Amendment was not fully realized in
litigation, and sex discrimination doctrine instead developed, much later and less
satisfactorily, under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
563. See generally, e.g., Caminker, supra note 413, at 1189-90; Post & Siegel, supra
note 17, at 507-09. Of course, states remain free to pass their own laws that meet or
exceed federal antidiscrimination protections. Federal civil rights laws, including
VAWA's civil rights remedy, play a valuable role by stimulating such state legislative
activity. See generally supra Part III.B.
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discrimination would have enabled the Court to uphold VAWA's civil
rights remedy without removing all limitations on congressional
power.
The argument for a special federal role in the recognition and
enforcement of equality guarantees is most closely associated with
legislation enacted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
However, it is also relevant to enactments under the Commerce
Clause.5 1 In twentieth-century cases upholding civil rights legislation
on the basis of the commerce power, 65 the Court has held that
Congress may legitimately prohibit discrimination that prevents a
disadvantaged group from being able to participate equally in
interstate commerce.566 In the Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung
cases, the Court noted that Congress had acquired "voluminous"
evidence of the burdens that discrimination placed upon AfricanAmericans' participation in interstate commerce; specifically, the
Court deferred to Congress's findings that racial discrimination
discouraged its targets from traveling interstate, from making
purchases in businesses engaged in interstate commerce, and from
taking jobs in certain areas.
With respect to VAWA's civil rights68
remedy, Congress correspondingly acquired voluminous evidence
that gender-motivated violence deters women from engaging in
interstate travel, from transacting with businesses involved in
interstate commerce, and from accepting certain types of
employment. 69 Just as racial discrimination impaired AfricanAmericans' economic equality, "[g]ender-based violence bars its most
likely targets-women-from full [participation] in the national
564. Traditionally, Congress's powers under the Fourteenth Amendment and
Commerce Clause have been analyzed separately. However, Professor Vicki Jackson
has suggested reading the Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment
"holistically" in order to bring into clearer focus Congress's authority to remove the
barriers preventing members of historically disadvantaged groups from participating
as equals in the national economy. See Jackson, supra note 18; see also MacKinnon,
supra note 99, at 150-51 (arguing that the Court should have adopted a rationale in
Morrison based on a combination of the Commerce Clause and Fourteenth
Amendment).
565. Although Congress invoked its powers under both the Commerce Clause and
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when enacting Title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the Court's decisions upholding that statute and similar legislation
confined themselves to the Commerce Clause. See generally Post & Siegel, supra note
17, at 494, 503-05; see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
279-86 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing that Title II of the Civil Rights Act
should be upheld under the Fourteenth Amendment); id. at 291-93 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (arguing that Title II is constitutional under both the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Commerce Clause).
566. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. 241.
567. See McClung, 379 U.S. at 299-300; Heartof Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 252-53.
568. In fact, the evidence supporting VAWA's civil rights provision exceeded that
supporting Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 635 (Souter,
J., dissenting).
569. See, e.g., House Conference Report, supra note 62, at 385.
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economy."570 Thus, gender-motivated violence not only substantially
affects interstate commerce; it does so by jeopardizing a fundamental
right to equality, which only the federal government can fully protect.
Of course, the unique federal role in combating discrimination has
never been universally accepted. During both the Reconstruction
period and the civil rights era, opponents of antidiscrimination
legislation argued that private establishments should not be subject to
government mandates of racial equality, and that such matters are
reserved to state law and lie outside Congress's authority.57 ' These
two arguments are interrelated; the claim is that the states are
"private" with respect to the federal government, just as individual
discriminators are "private" with respect to government intervention
generally. Although these arguments have been largely discredited
with respect to racial discrimination, they were revived and directed
against VAWA's civil rights remedy.572 The Morrison Court's
repeated denunciations of Congress's purported meddling in areas of
traditional state concern carry echoes of this appeal to state privacy,
and by extension, the privacy of the individual rapist or batterer to
carry on acts of gender-motivated violence.5 73

The connection between the privacy of the states and the privacy of
individual discriminators is crystallized in Morrison's closing
sentences, which aver that any "civilized system of justice" would
provide Christy Brzonkala with a remedy, "[blut under our federal
system that remedy must be provided by the Commonwealth of
Because the
Virginia, and not by the United States. '574
Commonwealth of Virginia had already proven itself incapable of
providing Brzonkala with a remedy, the practical result of the Court's
protection of state privacy was to protect the privacy of the individual
perpetrator of gender-motivated violence as well. Just as with race
discrimination, these misguided conceptions of privacy should give
way to the recognition that when individuals are discriminating, and
states are incapable of preventing or redressing that discriminationin large part because of their own entrenched patterns of
570. 1993 Senate Report, supra note 39, at 54. Unlike VAWA, the statute at issue
in Heartof Atlanta and McClung regulates commercial establishments such as motels
and restaurants, and it applies only to those private enterprises whose operations
affect commerce (a requirement that is weakened by an irrebuttable presumption that
certain kinds of establishments affect commerce per se). Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at

247-48. However, the Court's decisions upholding the statute did not turn on either of
those elements but rather relied on congressional findings of the impact of racial
discrimination on interstate commerce. See McClung, 379 U.S. at 302, 304-05; Heart
of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 257-58.
571. Post & Siegel, supra note 17, at 486-502.

572. As applied against the civil rights remedy, the privacy arguments were
predicated on gender-specific notions of public and private spheres. See supra notes
47-54 and accompanying text.
573. See generally MacKinnon, supra note 99.
574. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).
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discriminatory conduct-federal action is not only justified but is
likely to be the only effective response.
The approach proposed here, which emphasizes the need for
federal intervention in those areas that cannot be adequately managed
at the state level, satisfies the Morrison Court's demand for an
additional limiting factor to superimpose on the traditional tests for
determining whether Congress has acted within its constitutionally
enumerated powers under the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. It does so in a way that is far more
consistent with the structure and goals of federalism than the various
bright-line distinctions adopted in Morrison. In future cases,
substituting this approach in place of the misguided analysis found in
the Morrison opinion would permit the Court to preserve federal civil
rights legislation without sacrificing federalism.
VI. CONCLUSION

By striking down the civil rights remedy of the Violence Against
Women Act, the Supreme Court claimed to be serving the interests of
federalism but in fact did the opposite. Like many federal civil rights
statutes, VAWA was inspired in part by existing state civil rights laws,
and in turn, it inspired other states to propose similar laws of their
own. This interplay of federal and state legislative action is a common
pattern for the development and diffusion of new legal rights. The
opportunity for a constructive dialogue between federal and state
legislation, which is a valuable feature of federalism, was both ignored
and undermined by the Morrison decision.
United States v. Morrison was a setback not only for women, but
also for an expansive and nuanced understanding of federalism.
Instead of a vision of states' rights and individual rights as potentially
complementary, the Court assumed that any action by Congress to
protect individual rights is an imposition on the states. In the case of
VAWA's civil rights remedy, the states themselves realized that they
needed federal help to protect the rights of women. If the Court had
made a similar realization, it could have upheld VAWA's civil rights
remedy, secure in the knowledge that it was simultaneously enhancing
the freedom of women, promoting the freedom of the states, and
avoiding the risk of conferring unlimited power on Congress. Instead,
the majority in Morrison, through a combination of faulty
constitutional analysis and misguided conceptions about federalism,
eliminated the nation's most effective legal remedy for acts of
violence motivated by gender.
It remains to be seen whether the Court will eventually abandon its
narrow understanding of federalism, in keeping with the push for an
expanded federal role in the wake of the September 11 attacks. Such
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an eventuality would bear out Justice Souter's prediction in his dissent
that Morrisonwill ultimately prove not to be enduring law. 75 Even if
the Court continues to subscribe to the view that the risk of
congressional overreaching requires it to exercise a level of scrutiny
that goes beyond the traditional deferential tests for the
constitutionality of congressional enactments, it should abandon the
rigid and artificial categorical distinctions on which the Morrison
decision relied. Instead, the Court should adopt an approach that
focuses on whether Congress had a rational basis for concluding that
federal intervention was justified because the problem being
addressed lay beyond the capacity of the states to resolve. Legislation
designed to combat widespread patterns of discrimination against
members of a disadvantaged group is uniquely likely to satisfy this
inquiry, in part because basic guarantees of equality require national
consistency in order to be meaningful and effective. Thus, this
approach would ensure that federal antidiscrimination laws like the
civil rights remedy of the Violence Against Women Act would be
upheld, while at the same time preserving limitations-on congressional
authority.

575. Id. at 654 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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